Charles v. Charles
This text of 923 So. 2d 786 (Charles v. Charles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Mildred Luckette CHARLES
v.
Gerald CHARLES.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Kendra F. McCune, Nancy Sue Gregorie, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Mildred Luckette Charles.
Gerald Charles, Baton Rouge, Pro Se.
Before: KUHN, GUIDRY, and PETTIGREW, JJ.
KUHN, J.
Plaintiff-appellant, Mildred Luckette Charles, appeals a judgment partitioning the assets and liabilities of the former community of acquets and gains between her and defendant-appellee, Gerald Charles, which concluded that all the assets and liabilities were her separate property and ordered her to execute a promissory note to her former husband to offset his entitlement to reimbursement. We reverse and render.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In February 1999, Gerald and Mildred married after having lived together for approximately five years in a house Mildred owned. In March 2002, the parties physically separated. The following month, Mildred sought spousal support but *787 did not initiate divorce proceedings. In October 2002, Gerald filed a petition for divorce, which was granted by a judgment signed in December 2002.
Mildred subsequently filed a petition to partition the property of the former community. Gerald did not file a responsive pleading. After Gerald failed to file a sworn descriptive list of the assets and liabilities of the community, a hearing was held on Mildred's rule to show cause, which sought an order to have her sworn detailed descriptive list be deemed to constitute a judicial determination of the community assets and liabilities. Gerald appeared without legal representation at the April 6, 2004 hearing on Mildred's rule. Having determined that Gerald had been duly served with the community partition pleading, the trial court granted Mildred the requested relief. The judgment rendered in conformity with the trial court's April 6, 2004 ruling ordered that "the Detailed Descriptive List filed by Mildred Charles is deemed to be a judicial determination of the community assets and liabilities."
A trial on the merits of the community partition was held on July 14, 2004, in which testimonial and documentary evidence was adduced. Gerald again appeared without legal representation. The trial court rendered a judgment on October 21, 2004, which concluded that the former community consisted of no assets and no liabilities. The judgment declared that Mildred owed Gerald reimbursement in the amount of $9,742.42 from her separate funds for payments made by the community on Mildred's separate obligations and for the benefit of her separate property. The trial court additionally ordered that Mildred execute a promissory note in that amount she owed Gerald for reimbursement. Mildred appeals.
DISCUSSION
According to La. R.S. 9:2801 A,
When the spouses are unable to agree on a partition of community property or on the settlement of the claims between the spouses arising either from the matrimonial regime, or from the co-ownership of former community property following termination of the matrimonial regime, either spouse, as an incident of the action that would result in a termination of the matrimonial regime or upon termination of the matrimonial regime or thereafter, may institute a proceeding, which shall be conducted in accordance with the following rules:
(1)(a) Within forty-five days of service of a motion by either party, each party shall file a sworn detailed descriptive list of all community property, the fair market value and location of each asset, and all community liabilities. For good cause shown, the court may extend the time period for filing a detailed descriptive list. If a party fails to file a sworn detailed descriptive list timely, the other party may file a rule to show cause why its sworn detailed descriptive list should not be deemed to constitute a judicial determination of the community assets and liabilities. At the hearing of the rule to show cause, the court may either grant the request or, for good cause shown, extend the time period for filing a sworn detailed descriptive list. If the court grants the request, no traversal shall be allowed. (Emphasis added.)
In this case, when Gerald failed to timely file his sworn descriptive list, after a hearing, the trial court granted Mildred's request that her sworn detailed descriptive list be deemed to constitute a judicial determination of the community assets and liabilities. Therefore, at the July 14, 2004 hearing, a traversal to the trial court's *788 April 6, 2004 judicial determination was statutorily precluded.
According to the amended sworn descriptive list, the community assets consisted of a 2000 Silverado truck and a patio cover. The community liabilities Mildred included in her detailed descriptive list were a Bank One truck loan and a Hibernia Bank home mortgage. Because the trial court had deemed at the April 6, 2004 hearing that Mildred's sworn detailed descriptive list constituted a judicial determination of the community assets and liabilities, at the trial on the merits, the only issues before the trial court were the valuation of the 2000 Silverado truck and the patio cover, the distribution of these assets, the distribution of the Bank One and Hibernia Bank loans, any resulting equalizing payment that may have been due subsequent to the partition, see La. R.S. 9:2801 A(4), and Mildred's claim for reimbursement.[1] Thus, the trial court committed legal error when it rendered a judgment after the July 14, 2004 hearing, which purported to address a traversal of the assets and liabilities listed in Mildred's sworn descriptive list since those had already been deemed to be a judicial determination of the community assets and liabilities. Gerald did not seek appellate review of the trial court's April 6, 2004 ruling, or its subsequent judgment rendered on August 25, 2004, and in this appeal by Mildred has not raised any contentions addressing the propriety of the trial court's reclassification of the assets and liabilities subsequent to the judicial determination. Accordingly, because the trial court committed legal error, its October 21, 2004 judgment is reversed, and we conduct a de novo review of the evidence in this partition proceeding.
Louisiana Revised Statute 9:2801 A provides in relevant part:
(4) The court shall then partition the community in accordance with the following rules:
(a) The court shall value the assets as of the time of trial on the merits, determine the liabilities, and adjudicate the claims of the parties.
(b) The court shall divide the community assets and liabilities so that each spouse receives property of an equal net value.
(c) The court shall allocate or assign to the respective spouses all of the community assets and liabilities. In allocating assets and liabilities, the court may divide a particular asset or liability equally or unequally or may allocate it in its entirety to one of the spouses. The court shall consider the nature and source of the asset or liability, the economic condition of each spouse, and any other circumstances that the court deems relevant. As between the spouses, the allocation of a liability to a spouse obligates that spouse to extinguish that liability. The allocation in no way affects the rights of creditors.
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923 So. 2d 786, 2006 WL 305879, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charles-v-charles-lactapp-2006.