In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-23-00379-CR
CHARLES TAYLOR, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from County Court at Law Number 1 Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. CC-2023-CR-1827, Honorable Mark Hocker, Presiding
June 11, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Following a plea of not guilty, Appellant, Charles Taylor, was convicted by a jury
of theft of property valued between $100 and $750, a Class B misdemeanor.1 The trial
court assessed punishment at fifty days’ confinement. By a single issue, Appellant
maintains the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because the
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm.
1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a)(1), (e). BACKGROUND
During the evening hours of March 2, 2022, a store manager at a Family Dollar
heard an alarm from an exit door at the rear of the store. She exited the store through
the front door and walked around the corner of the building. She observed a man loading
items into the rear tailgate area of a white SUV at the rear of the store while using a store
dolly. The vehicle was not in an area designated for customers. The manager re-entered
the store to retrieve her car keys and cell phone. She turned on her vehicle’s headlights
and photographed the SUV with her cell phone. She described the SUV as moving slowly
“kind of like holding the brake to slowly roll to load up the items.” After the items were
loaded, the passenger joined the driver and they fled.2 According to the manager, the
stolen items were valued at $282.95 before sales tax and that neither the driver nor his
passenger had consent to take them.3 She approximated the value of the stolen dolly at
$150 to $160.4
As the suspects drove away, the manager saw a police vehicle drive by and
flagged it down. Sergeant Paine of the Lubbock Police Department stopped, and the
manager reported what had occurred. She told him the SUV had turned onto a nearby
street. He followed her directions and saw the SUV traveling at a high rate of speed in a
thirty-mile-per-hour residential area. He activated his patrol vehicle’s emergency lights to
2 Although Family Dollar keeps surveillance video footage for ninety days, neither law enforcement
nor the State requested the footage. 3 The items were returned to the store by officers shortly after Appellant was arrested. The manager
photographed the items and generated a receipt to assess their value.
4 During direct examination, the manager testified she has a prior felony conviction for misprision
but was telling the truth about the theft. On cross-examination, she clarified the conviction was for being in a relationship with an inmate while she was a correctional officer. 2 which the driver did not respond. Sergeant Paine then activated the siren and the SUV
eventually stopped. The driver remained inside; the passenger, however, exited the SUV
and fled the scene.
Appellant, the driver, initially misidentified his passenger to Sergeant Paine but
when warned he may go to jail, correctly identified the passenger. Appellant claimed the
passenger requested a ride to Family Dollar to pick up some items and he obliged in
exchange for twenty dollars.
Sergeant Paine searched the SUV and found the stolen merchandise in a large,
clear plastic tote in the rear seat together with the dolly used to load the merchandise.
He testified he did not pursue the passenger without backup due to the risk of Appellant
fleeing.
Appellant was arrested and charged with theft. His defense was wrong place,
wrong time, wrong person, and he denied any knowledge that his passenger had stolen
the items. After the State rested, Appellant moved for a directed verdict asserting the
State had failed to establish the elements of theft. The State answered it had prosecuted
Appellant as a party to the theft.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for directed verdict is an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction and its denial is reviewed under the same standard used in a
sufficiency review. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The
only standard a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is
sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense the State is required to prove 3 beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). See Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854,
859 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
APPLICABLE LAW
A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully appropriates property without the owner’s
effective consent with intent to deprive the owner of that property. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 31.03(a)(1). Theft is classified as a Class B misdemeanor if the value of the property
stolen is $100 or more but less than $750. Id. at (e)(2).
Under the law of parties, a person is criminally responsible for an offense
committed by his conduct or the conduct of another and may be charged with commission
of that offense. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01(a), (b). Section 7.02(a)(2) provides that a
person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if he
acts with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense by soliciting,
encouraging, directing, aiding, or attempting to aid the other person to commit the offense.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2).
Circumstantial evidence alone may be used to prove a person is a party to an
offense. Beardsley v. State, 738 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Although
mere presence at the scene of an offense is insufficient under the law of parties to support
a conviction, it may be sufficient when combined with other circumstances. Brochu v.
State, No. 07-15-00295-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 6439, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July
12, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Ahrens v. State, 43
S.W.3d 630, 634 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d)). The State must show
4 it was the defendant’s conscious objective or desire for the primary actor to commit the
crime to prove he intended to promote or assist in the commission of the offense. Metcalf
v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
ANALYSIS
Appellant’s sole complaint is that the trial court should have granted his motion for
directed verdict because the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction,
particularly his intent to deprive the owner of the property.5 We disagree.
Appellant’s presence alone at the scene was insufficient to convict him as a party.
However, the State presented sufficient evidence to show he assisted in the theft. During
the manager’s cross-examination, she was asked about the photograph she took of
Appellant’s SUV leaving the scene. It showed the brake lights were activated at the
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In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-23-00379-CR
CHARLES TAYLOR, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from County Court at Law Number 1 Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. CC-2023-CR-1827, Honorable Mark Hocker, Presiding
June 11, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Following a plea of not guilty, Appellant, Charles Taylor, was convicted by a jury
of theft of property valued between $100 and $750, a Class B misdemeanor.1 The trial
court assessed punishment at fifty days’ confinement. By a single issue, Appellant
maintains the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because the
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm.
1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a)(1), (e). BACKGROUND
During the evening hours of March 2, 2022, a store manager at a Family Dollar
heard an alarm from an exit door at the rear of the store. She exited the store through
the front door and walked around the corner of the building. She observed a man loading
items into the rear tailgate area of a white SUV at the rear of the store while using a store
dolly. The vehicle was not in an area designated for customers. The manager re-entered
the store to retrieve her car keys and cell phone. She turned on her vehicle’s headlights
and photographed the SUV with her cell phone. She described the SUV as moving slowly
“kind of like holding the brake to slowly roll to load up the items.” After the items were
loaded, the passenger joined the driver and they fled.2 According to the manager, the
stolen items were valued at $282.95 before sales tax and that neither the driver nor his
passenger had consent to take them.3 She approximated the value of the stolen dolly at
$150 to $160.4
As the suspects drove away, the manager saw a police vehicle drive by and
flagged it down. Sergeant Paine of the Lubbock Police Department stopped, and the
manager reported what had occurred. She told him the SUV had turned onto a nearby
street. He followed her directions and saw the SUV traveling at a high rate of speed in a
thirty-mile-per-hour residential area. He activated his patrol vehicle’s emergency lights to
2 Although Family Dollar keeps surveillance video footage for ninety days, neither law enforcement
nor the State requested the footage. 3 The items were returned to the store by officers shortly after Appellant was arrested. The manager
photographed the items and generated a receipt to assess their value.
4 During direct examination, the manager testified she has a prior felony conviction for misprision
but was telling the truth about the theft. On cross-examination, she clarified the conviction was for being in a relationship with an inmate while she was a correctional officer. 2 which the driver did not respond. Sergeant Paine then activated the siren and the SUV
eventually stopped. The driver remained inside; the passenger, however, exited the SUV
and fled the scene.
Appellant, the driver, initially misidentified his passenger to Sergeant Paine but
when warned he may go to jail, correctly identified the passenger. Appellant claimed the
passenger requested a ride to Family Dollar to pick up some items and he obliged in
exchange for twenty dollars.
Sergeant Paine searched the SUV and found the stolen merchandise in a large,
clear plastic tote in the rear seat together with the dolly used to load the merchandise.
He testified he did not pursue the passenger without backup due to the risk of Appellant
fleeing.
Appellant was arrested and charged with theft. His defense was wrong place,
wrong time, wrong person, and he denied any knowledge that his passenger had stolen
the items. After the State rested, Appellant moved for a directed verdict asserting the
State had failed to establish the elements of theft. The State answered it had prosecuted
Appellant as a party to the theft.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for directed verdict is an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction and its denial is reviewed under the same standard used in a
sufficiency review. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The
only standard a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is
sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense the State is required to prove 3 beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). See Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854,
859 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
APPLICABLE LAW
A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully appropriates property without the owner’s
effective consent with intent to deprive the owner of that property. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 31.03(a)(1). Theft is classified as a Class B misdemeanor if the value of the property
stolen is $100 or more but less than $750. Id. at (e)(2).
Under the law of parties, a person is criminally responsible for an offense
committed by his conduct or the conduct of another and may be charged with commission
of that offense. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01(a), (b). Section 7.02(a)(2) provides that a
person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if he
acts with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense by soliciting,
encouraging, directing, aiding, or attempting to aid the other person to commit the offense.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2).
Circumstantial evidence alone may be used to prove a person is a party to an
offense. Beardsley v. State, 738 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Although
mere presence at the scene of an offense is insufficient under the law of parties to support
a conviction, it may be sufficient when combined with other circumstances. Brochu v.
State, No. 07-15-00295-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 6439, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July
12, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Ahrens v. State, 43
S.W.3d 630, 634 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d)). The State must show
4 it was the defendant’s conscious objective or desire for the primary actor to commit the
crime to prove he intended to promote or assist in the commission of the offense. Metcalf
v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
ANALYSIS
Appellant’s sole complaint is that the trial court should have granted his motion for
directed verdict because the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction,
particularly his intent to deprive the owner of the property.5 We disagree.
Appellant’s presence alone at the scene was insufficient to convict him as a party.
However, the State presented sufficient evidence to show he assisted in the theft. During
the manager’s cross-examination, she was asked about the photograph she took of
Appellant’s SUV leaving the scene. It showed the brake lights were activated at the
intersection by the store and the defense theorized that shoplifters do not drive slowly or
comply with traffic laws while driving a getaway vehicle. Sergeant Paine testified that
when the manager flagged him down, he saw a white Expedition leave the area “very
quickly.” He immediately gave chase and saw the SUV within a few blocks speeding in
a residential area. Appellant was speeding through a residential neighborhood while
fleeing, conduct consistent with driving a getaway vehicle. He failed to stop in response
to the patrol vehicle’s emergency lights which required Sergeant Paine to activate the
siren. Also, he falsely identified his passenger when first asked about him.
5 “Owner” is defined as a person who has a greater right to possession of the property than the
actor. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(35)(A). Here, the “owner” for the purpose of proving theft was the Family Dollar store manager. 5 Sergeant Paine found the stolen merchandise and dolly in the rear seat.6 Based
on what the store manager had told Sergeant Paine and the way the merchandise was
thrown in a large, clear tote together with Appellant’s departure in a “rapid manner,” he
deduced Appellant was involved in the theft.7
The State rested after the manager and Sergeant Paine testified. Outside the
jury’s presence, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict of not guilty for failure to
prove the elements of theft. The State responded that the evidence showed Appellant
was a party to the theft. The trial court denied the motion and the defense rested without
presentation of any evidence.
The court’s charge instructed the jury on the law of parties. The manager’s
testimony that Appellant was rolling slowly in the rear area of the store not designated for
customer parking while his passenger loaded items indicates awareness that his
passenger did not pay for the items. The stolen items were not bagged; they were thrown
into a large plastic bin. A dolly was also loaded into Appellant’s SUV. The evidence,
albeit circumstantial, showed Appellant’s participation amounted to more than mere
presence at the scene; he assisted the passenger in depriving the owner of the property
by driving the getaway vehicle making him criminally responsible as a party to the offense.
6 The defense attempted to discredit the manager because she gave an inconsistent statement
when she claimed to see the passenger load the stolen merchandise into the rear tailgate area of the SUV but the merchandise was found in the rear seat instead. She testified a year and a half had passed and she was “so confused.” The jury was free to resolve the inconsistency against Appellant.
7 Redacted footage from Sergeant Paine’s body camera was admitted. However, at times the
sound was not activated. 6 The jury was free to reject his defensive theory that he was unaware his passenger had
committed theft.
Additionally, the presence of stolen property in Appellant’s SUV without a
reasonable explanation permitted the trier of fact to draw an inference of guilt as to the
theft of that property. See Poncio v. State, 185 S.W.3d 904, 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
To support a theft conviction, the explanation for possession of stolen property must be
either proven false or unreasonable. Id. Whether an explanation is true is a question for
the trier of fact. Lewis v. State, No. 07-15-00061-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12533, at
*16 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 22, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). Appellant told Sergeant Paine he had offered his passenger a ride to go
“shopping.” Yet, he parked in the rear of a store not designated for customers parking
while unbagged merchandise and a dolly were loaded into his SUV as it slowly rolled.
The jury rejected his explanation as unreasonable. We conclude the evidence was
sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for theft under the law of parties. The trial court
did not err in denying his motion for directed verdict. His sole issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Alex Yarbrough Justice
Do not publish.