Charles Sampson, Sr. v. Odoc

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedDecember 22, 2023
Docket23-35045
StatusUnpublished

This text of Charles Sampson, Sr. v. Odoc (Charles Sampson, Sr. v. Odoc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Charles Sampson, Sr. v. Odoc, (9th Cir. 2023).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 22 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES SAMPSON, Sr., No. 23-35045

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 6:21-cv-01262-IM

v. MEMORANDUM* OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, an agency of the State of Oregon; REED PAULSON; JERRY BECKER; WILLIAM STRAUSS; WILLAMETTE SURGERY CENTER, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Karin J. Immergut, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 5, 2023 Portland, Oregon

Before: NGUYEN and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and MONTALVO,** District Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Frank Montalvo, United States District Judge for the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation. Oregon inmate Charles Sampson, Sr., appeals the district court’s dismissal

of his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Drs. Jerry Becker, Reed Paulson,

and William Strauss. Sampson claims the doctors were deliberately indifferent to

his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, see Chambers v.

Herrera, 78 F.4th 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2023), we affirm in part, reverse in part,

and remand.

1. State law supplies the two-year statute of limitations, see Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 12.110(4), but federal law determines when it begins to run. Reed v. Goertz, 598

U.S. 230, 235 (2023). Under the discovery rule, a deliberate indifference claim

based on medical malpractice “accrues when a plaintiff ‘has knowledge of the

injury and its cause.’” Tunac v. United States, 897 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2018)

(quoting Winter v. United States, 244 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001)); see Gregg

v. Haw., Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 870 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2017). However, “a

cause of action does not accrue . . . when [the] plaintiff has relied on statements of

medical professionals with respect to his or her injuries and their probable causes.”

Tunac, 897 F.3d at 1207 (quoting Winter, 244 F.3d at 1090).1

1 Tunac involved a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). The parties cite FTCA cases in discussing the discovery rule’s application, and we did so in Gregg, a deliberate indifference case, see 870 F.3d at 888–89 (discussing Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986)). We assume without deciding that FTCA cases are relevant in this context.

2 23-35045 Sampson alleges that for three years the doctors did not perform a medically

necessary test—an MRI—that would have diagnosed his spinal stenosis while it

was still treatable. Instead, he alleges, they repeatedly diagnosed and treated other

conditions—carpal tunnel and irritable bowel syndrome—despite his worsening

symptoms. Sampson reasonably relied on those diagnoses because as an inmate

“he was unable to seek independent medical advice.” While “[a] cause of action

accrues even if ‘the full extent of the injury is not then known,’” Gregg, 870 F.3d

at 887 (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007)), Sampson does not

claim that the doctors caused his underlying condition. He alleges injury from the

delayed diagnosis caused by the doctors’ deliberate decision not to perform the

necessary test.

Sampson allegedly first learned of that injury and its cause on September 6,

2019, when Dr. Glass informed him that an MRI showed spinal stenosis had

caused his pain and other symptoms. Taking Sampson’s allegations as true, as we

must, he timely filed his complaint less than two years later.2

2. A prison official is deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious

medical needs if the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

health.” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc)

2 We do not foreclose a statute of limitations defense at a later stage of the proceedings.

3 23-35045 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “[A]n inadvertent failure

to provide adequate medical care, differences of opinion in medical treatment, and

harmless delays in treatment are not enough to sustain an Eighth Amendment

claim.” Simmons v. Arnett, 47 F.4th 927, 934 (9th Cir. 2022).

Sampson alleges that “[t]hroughout 2016, 2017 and 2018, [he] continued to

complain of pain, numbness and burning sensations in his back, abdomen, hands

and arms” by “sen[ding] numerous inmate communication forms” and that “[t]hese

complaints were continuously ignored by defendants,” who “misrepresented his

medical conditions to him.” “Becker knew or should have known . . . that he could

not diagnose the cause of Sampson’s numbness and pain . . . without performing an

MRI” and “ignored this fact and performed an unnecessary and painful surgery for

[carpal tunnel syndrome,] a condition Sampson did not have.” “Paulson ordered a

CT scan of the abdomen and pelvis” and a colonoscopy, the results of which “were

normal,” but Paulson continued treating Sampson for irritable bowel syndrome

“despite knowing that it was unnecessary, unwarranted and would not provide

relief for his symptoms.”3

3 Although the complaint facially assigns this knowledge to Sampson, he asserts that it actually belonged to Paulson, attributing the discrepancy to sloppy drafting. We accept Sampson’s explanation; otherwise, he would be entitled to amend the complaint to fix the mistake. See Gregg, 870 F.3d at 887, 889 (explaining that leave to amend should be granted unless futile).

4 23-35045 These allegations sufficiently state a deliberate indifference claim against

Drs. Becker and Paulson. Prison officials are deliberately indifferent when,

“despite [an inmate’s] numerous complaints over a period of years and . . . visibly

deteriorating condition, [they] ignore[] his [symptoms]” and instead

“continu[e] . . . the same treatment in the face of obvious failure.” Stewart v.

Aranas, 32 F.4th 1192, 1194 (9th Cir. 2022).

Although Sampson makes several allegations against “defendants” that

include Dr. Strauss, the only specific allegation against Strauss is that he

performed the colonoscopy that Dr. Paulson ordered. That is insufficient to state a

deliberate indifference claim.

We affirm the dismissal of Sampson’s claims against Dr. Strauss, reverse the

dismissal of Sampson’s claims against Drs. Becker and Paulson, and remand for

further proceedings. The parties shall bear their own costs.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Wallace v. Kato
127 S. Ct. 1091 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Jerrie M. Simmons v. United States
805 F.2d 1363 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Cion Peralta v. T. Dillard
744 F.3d 1076 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Alexandria Gregg v. Hawaii Dept. of Public Safety
870 F.3d 883 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Felisa Tunac v. United States
897 F.3d 1197 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
Lewis Stewart v. Romeo Aranas
32 F.4th 1192 (Ninth Circuit, 2022)
Kevin Simmons v. G. Arnett
47 F.4th 927 (Ninth Circuit, 2022)
Roscoe Chambers v. C. Herrera
78 F.4th 1100 (Ninth Circuit, 2023)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Charles Sampson, Sr. v. Odoc, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charles-sampson-sr-v-odoc-ca9-2023.