RENDERED: FEBRUARY 9, 2024; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2022-CA-1022-MR
CHARLES R. STANFILL JR. APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JAMES T. JAMESON, JUDGE ACTION NO. 10-CR-00212
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, COMBS, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.
COMBS, JUDGE: Appellant, Charles R. Stanfill, Jr. (Stanfill), is serving a
twenty-year sentence for manufacturing methamphetamine, second offense. He
appeals from an Order of the Calloway Circuit Court denying his motion for relief
pursuant to CR1 60.02 and 60.03. After our review, we affirm.
1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. On March 7, 2022, Stanfill, pro se, filed a motion in Calloway Circuit
Court requesting that the court set aside, vacate, or amend the remainder of his
sentence pursuant to “CR 60.02 and/or CR 60.03, due to Violations of his 1st, 8th,
and 14th United States Constitutional Amendments and Applicable Ky. Const.
Amendments.” Stanfill explained that he had exhausted all institutional remedies
and that he now sought recourse to the circuit having jurisdiction of the matter. In
his motion, he invoked the ancient equitable remedy of audita querela, which is
defined by Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) as follows:
A writ available to a judgment debtor who seeks a rehearing of a matter on grounds of newly discovered evidence or newly existing legal defenses ....
“The writ of audita querela (=quarrel having been heard) . . . , introduced during the time of Edward III, was available to re-open a judgment in certain circumstances. It was issued as a remedy to defendant where an important matter concerning his case had arisen since the judgment. Its issue was based on equitable, rather than common law principles.” L.B. Cuzron, English Legal History (2nd ed. 1979).
“Audita querela is distinguished from coram nobis in that coram nobis attacks the judgment itself, whereas audita querela may be directed against the enforcement, or further enforcement of a judgment which when rendered was just and unimpeachable.” 7A C.J.S. Audita Querela § 2, at 901 (1980).
-2- His motion contained references to the two equitable remedies of
coram nobis and audita querela impliedly underlying the history of our current CR
60.02 and 60.03:
Movant is not attacking the issuance of this sentences nor any proceeding or the Trial itself, in the style of CORAM NOBIS.
Movant is however attacking the Remainder of his Sentence in the style of the Ancient Writ of AUDITA QUERELLA in so much as further execution of this sentence is no longer Equitable.
In Balsey v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.2d 614, 616 (KY. 1967) the Court Ruled that “The Remadies formerly available by way of CORAM NOBIS and AUDITA QUERRELA are preserved in CR 60.02(5) [5 is now subsection (e)] . . . The technical distinction is that CORAM NOBIS attacks the Judgement itself; Whereas AUDITA QUERELLA may be Directed against the Enforcement . . . .”
Further Enforcement of Judgement in this instance definitely rises to the level of an “Oppressive Defect of Justice”, Where the Jury and the Court imposed the Bare Minimal Sentence allowed under the statute, and not a Death sentence, or possible Life Sentence of pain and ill health from COVID Long Haul symptoms. With the Pollitical Climate where the Public seems to be tired of statutes that Oversentence crimes that have no victim, Suspending further Execution of this Sentences so Mr. Stanfill could go enrole in a COVID Long Haul study at the V.A. or U.K. seems to fall in the category of RIGHT. The most basic function of our Courts is to Determine Right or Wrong.
-3- (Emphases, punctuation, and spelling original.) Stanfill also filed a motion for an
evidentiary hearing.
By Order entered on June 6, 2022, the court denied Stanfill’s motion,
which the court addressed on the merits, noting nonetheless that his arguments and
the underlying factual circumstances “remain relatively similar to his initial
Motion for Relief.”2
The court summarized Stanfill’s argument; i.e., that his previously
imposed sentence is no longer equitable due to the conditions in the facility where
he is housed and that due to his incarceration, he is at increased risk of serious
illness and death as well as complications due to underlying medical conditions.
The court further acknowledged that Stanfill sought relief “in the style” of audita
querela and accordingly accepted his motion pursuant to CR 60.02(e).3
The court found that Stanfill’s motion pursuant to CR 60.02(e) fell far
below the standard set forth in Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 101 (Ky.
1998), that “to be eligible for CR 60.02 relief, the movant must demonstrate why
he is entitled to this special, extraordinary relief.” Additionally, the court found
2 This Court affirmed the denial of Stanfill’s June 4, 2020, motion in Stanfill v. Commonwealth, No. 2020-CA-0904-MR, 2022 WL 67407, at *1 (Ky. App. Jan. 7, 2022).
3 In relevant part, CR 60.02(e) provides that: “[o]n motion a court may, upon such terms as are just, relieve a party . . . from its final judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following grounds: . . . it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application[.]”
-4- that Stanfill was not entitled to relief under CR 60.02(f),4 citing Gribbins v.
Commonwealth, No. 2020-CA-0635-MR, 2021 WL 1164461 (Ky. App. Mar. 26,
2021). Gribbins held that CR 60.02(f) functions to address significant defects in
trial proceedings; thus, the results of incarceration with the risk of contracting
COVID-19 are not proper considerations or subject matter for CR 60.02(f) relief.
Next, the court determined that because Stanfill’s argument failed
under CR 60.02(f), his claim under CR 60.03 would also fail. CR 60.03 provides in
relevant part as follows:
Rule 60.02 shall not limit the power of any court to entertain an independent action to relieve a person from a judgment, order or proceeding on appropriate equitable grounds. Relief shall not be granted in an independent action if the ground of relief sought has been denied in a proceeding by motion under Rule 60.02 . . . .
The court was unpersuaded by Stanfill’s allegations of various
constitutional violations due to his incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The court explained that even if Stanfill had presented sufficient evidence to
establish a violation of his constitutional rights, his motion would still fail because
the sentencing court is not the proper forum for relief. Williams v. Commonwealth,
No. 2019-CA-0964-MR, 2021 WL 943753 (Ky. App. Mar. 12, 2021).
4 CR 60.02(f) permits a court to relieve a party from its final judgment, order, or proceeding for “any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.”
-5- In his appeal, Stanfill argues: (1) that the trial court erred in stating
that it was not the correct forum in which to raise defendant’s claim; (2) that the
court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing; and (3) that the court
intentionally used coram nobis and CR 60.02(f) to muddy the waters of its order
pertaining to his motion. We address these arguments together.
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 9, 2024; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2022-CA-1022-MR
CHARLES R. STANFILL JR. APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JAMES T. JAMESON, JUDGE ACTION NO. 10-CR-00212
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, COMBS, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.
COMBS, JUDGE: Appellant, Charles R. Stanfill, Jr. (Stanfill), is serving a
twenty-year sentence for manufacturing methamphetamine, second offense. He
appeals from an Order of the Calloway Circuit Court denying his motion for relief
pursuant to CR1 60.02 and 60.03. After our review, we affirm.
1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. On March 7, 2022, Stanfill, pro se, filed a motion in Calloway Circuit
Court requesting that the court set aside, vacate, or amend the remainder of his
sentence pursuant to “CR 60.02 and/or CR 60.03, due to Violations of his 1st, 8th,
and 14th United States Constitutional Amendments and Applicable Ky. Const.
Amendments.” Stanfill explained that he had exhausted all institutional remedies
and that he now sought recourse to the circuit having jurisdiction of the matter. In
his motion, he invoked the ancient equitable remedy of audita querela, which is
defined by Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) as follows:
A writ available to a judgment debtor who seeks a rehearing of a matter on grounds of newly discovered evidence or newly existing legal defenses ....
“The writ of audita querela (=quarrel having been heard) . . . , introduced during the time of Edward III, was available to re-open a judgment in certain circumstances. It was issued as a remedy to defendant where an important matter concerning his case had arisen since the judgment. Its issue was based on equitable, rather than common law principles.” L.B. Cuzron, English Legal History (2nd ed. 1979).
“Audita querela is distinguished from coram nobis in that coram nobis attacks the judgment itself, whereas audita querela may be directed against the enforcement, or further enforcement of a judgment which when rendered was just and unimpeachable.” 7A C.J.S. Audita Querela § 2, at 901 (1980).
-2- His motion contained references to the two equitable remedies of
coram nobis and audita querela impliedly underlying the history of our current CR
60.02 and 60.03:
Movant is not attacking the issuance of this sentences nor any proceeding or the Trial itself, in the style of CORAM NOBIS.
Movant is however attacking the Remainder of his Sentence in the style of the Ancient Writ of AUDITA QUERELLA in so much as further execution of this sentence is no longer Equitable.
In Balsey v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.2d 614, 616 (KY. 1967) the Court Ruled that “The Remadies formerly available by way of CORAM NOBIS and AUDITA QUERRELA are preserved in CR 60.02(5) [5 is now subsection (e)] . . . The technical distinction is that CORAM NOBIS attacks the Judgement itself; Whereas AUDITA QUERELLA may be Directed against the Enforcement . . . .”
Further Enforcement of Judgement in this instance definitely rises to the level of an “Oppressive Defect of Justice”, Where the Jury and the Court imposed the Bare Minimal Sentence allowed under the statute, and not a Death sentence, or possible Life Sentence of pain and ill health from COVID Long Haul symptoms. With the Pollitical Climate where the Public seems to be tired of statutes that Oversentence crimes that have no victim, Suspending further Execution of this Sentences so Mr. Stanfill could go enrole in a COVID Long Haul study at the V.A. or U.K. seems to fall in the category of RIGHT. The most basic function of our Courts is to Determine Right or Wrong.
-3- (Emphases, punctuation, and spelling original.) Stanfill also filed a motion for an
evidentiary hearing.
By Order entered on June 6, 2022, the court denied Stanfill’s motion,
which the court addressed on the merits, noting nonetheless that his arguments and
the underlying factual circumstances “remain relatively similar to his initial
Motion for Relief.”2
The court summarized Stanfill’s argument; i.e., that his previously
imposed sentence is no longer equitable due to the conditions in the facility where
he is housed and that due to his incarceration, he is at increased risk of serious
illness and death as well as complications due to underlying medical conditions.
The court further acknowledged that Stanfill sought relief “in the style” of audita
querela and accordingly accepted his motion pursuant to CR 60.02(e).3
The court found that Stanfill’s motion pursuant to CR 60.02(e) fell far
below the standard set forth in Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 101 (Ky.
1998), that “to be eligible for CR 60.02 relief, the movant must demonstrate why
he is entitled to this special, extraordinary relief.” Additionally, the court found
2 This Court affirmed the denial of Stanfill’s June 4, 2020, motion in Stanfill v. Commonwealth, No. 2020-CA-0904-MR, 2022 WL 67407, at *1 (Ky. App. Jan. 7, 2022).
3 In relevant part, CR 60.02(e) provides that: “[o]n motion a court may, upon such terms as are just, relieve a party . . . from its final judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following grounds: . . . it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application[.]”
-4- that Stanfill was not entitled to relief under CR 60.02(f),4 citing Gribbins v.
Commonwealth, No. 2020-CA-0635-MR, 2021 WL 1164461 (Ky. App. Mar. 26,
2021). Gribbins held that CR 60.02(f) functions to address significant defects in
trial proceedings; thus, the results of incarceration with the risk of contracting
COVID-19 are not proper considerations or subject matter for CR 60.02(f) relief.
Next, the court determined that because Stanfill’s argument failed
under CR 60.02(f), his claim under CR 60.03 would also fail. CR 60.03 provides in
relevant part as follows:
Rule 60.02 shall not limit the power of any court to entertain an independent action to relieve a person from a judgment, order or proceeding on appropriate equitable grounds. Relief shall not be granted in an independent action if the ground of relief sought has been denied in a proceeding by motion under Rule 60.02 . . . .
The court was unpersuaded by Stanfill’s allegations of various
constitutional violations due to his incarceration during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The court explained that even if Stanfill had presented sufficient evidence to
establish a violation of his constitutional rights, his motion would still fail because
the sentencing court is not the proper forum for relief. Williams v. Commonwealth,
No. 2019-CA-0964-MR, 2021 WL 943753 (Ky. App. Mar. 12, 2021).
4 CR 60.02(f) permits a court to relieve a party from its final judgment, order, or proceeding for “any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.”
-5- In his appeal, Stanfill argues: (1) that the trial court erred in stating
that it was not the correct forum in which to raise defendant’s claim; (2) that the
court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing; and (3) that the court
intentionally used coram nobis and CR 60.02(f) to muddy the waters of its order
pertaining to his motion. We address these arguments together.
The burden of proof in a CR 60.02 proceeding falls squarely on the movant to affirmatively allege facts which, if true, justify vacating the judgment and further allege special circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief. . . . We review the denial of a CR 60.02 motion under an abuse of discretion standard. The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.
Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 885–86 (Ky. 2014)(cleaned up):
We find no abuse of discretion. In Martin v. Commonwealth, 639
S.W.3d 433 (Ky. App. 2022), another panel of this Court addressed essentially the
same issues as those in the case now before us and held as follows:
CR 60.02 specifically functions to address significant defects in the trial proceedings. …
Physical ailments of a defendant are not tantamount to trial defects and thus do not warrant CR 60.02 relief.
...
So, because [defendant’s] argument on the same core grounds fails to satisfy CR 60.02(f), [he] is not entitled to relief under CR 60.03. . . .
-6- [Defendant] has not shown he is entitled to relief pursuant to the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. . . . [W]e have rejected similar COVID-19-based claims and do so here again, for the same fundamental reasons. Gribbins, 2021 WL 1164461, at *2-3 (holding that the Kentucky Department of Corrections was not indifferent to the health needs of prisoners); Williams, 2021 WL 943753, at *3 (holding that Eighth Amendment claims involve the conditions of the movant's confinement and thus are civil claims which are not properly brought in the sentencing court); Morris, 2021 WL 1933656, at *2 (holding that Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claims must be raised in civil actions by naming the warden of the movant’s institution as a named party and, in any event, success on those claims would not result in the claimant being released from incarceration).
Id. at 435-37 (Ky. App. 2022) (cleaned up) (emphases added).
We agree with the Commonwealth that there was no basis to conduct
an evidentiary hearing in this case. Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856
(Ky. 1983) (“Before the movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he must
affirmatively allege facts which, if true, justify vacating the judgment and further
allege special circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief.”). Stanfill failed to allege
an adequate basis for meriting CR 60.02 relief.
Therefore, we affirm the June 6, 2022, Order of the Calloway Circuit
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
-7- BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Charles R. Stanfill Jr., pro se Daniel Cameron Burgin, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew R. Krygiel Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
-8-