Charles R. Pruett v. John Doe, University Healthcare System, L.C. D/B/A Tulane University Hospital and Abc Insurance Company
This text of Charles R. Pruett v. John Doe, University Healthcare System, L.C. D/B/A Tulane University Hospital and Abc Insurance Company (Charles R. Pruett v. John Doe, University Healthcare System, L.C. D/B/A Tulane University Hospital and Abc Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
CHARLES R. PRUETT * NO. 2019-C-1075
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL JOHN DOE, UNIVERSITY * HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, L.C. FOURTH CIRCUIT D/B/A * TULANE UNIVERSITY STATE OF LOUISIANA HOSPITAL AND ABC ******* INSURANCE COMPANY
APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2015-03103, DIVISION “J” Honorable D. Nicole Sheppard, ****** JAMES F. MCKAY III CHIEF JUDGE ****** (Court composed of Chief Judge James F. McKay III, Judge Edwin A. Lombard, Judge Dale N. Atkins)
MICHELLE D. ROBERT JENNIFER G. AHNER 839 St. Charles Ave., Suite 200 New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT
BERT MILLER STEPHEN M. PIZZO BLUE WILLIAMS, L.L.P. 3421 N. Causeway Blvd., Suite 900 Metairie, Louisiana 70002 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RELATOR
WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED AND RENDERED
APRIL 8, 2020 JFM The Defendant/Relator, Ariel Pravia, R.N., seeks review of a November 15, EAL DNA 2019 trial court ruling denying his motion for summary judgment. Mr. Pravia
contends that the Plaintiff/Respondent, Charles R. Pruett would not be able to meet
his burden of proving that relator was the person who sexually assaulted him while
he was a patient at Tulane University Hospital and Clinic (“TUHC”).
Relator argues that Respondent cannot meet his burden of proof in his sexual
assault claim because absolutely no evidence has been submitted in support of his
claim that Relator assaulted him, an essential element of any intentional tort claim,
citing Brungardt v. Summitt, 2008-0577, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/8/09), 7 So.3d
879, 887, a sexual assault case. In Brungardt, this Court ruled that the plaintiffs
would be unable to produce factual evidence at trial that the plaintiff had been
assaulted or battered, and plaintiffs could not rest on their mere allegations in their
petition, and granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Relator contends
that he is a defendant in this matter solely because Respondent claims that
1 Relator’s name is the one that Respondent was given by other staff members, and
not because any such evidence actually exists.
Respondent, in his deposition testimony taken on October 17, 2017, testified
that there were four separate assaults by a Hispanic man. He testified that could
not identify this man and did not know his name, but that he would have
recognized him that day. Mr. Pruett further testified that, as to several of the
alleged incidents, he was not sure if these events were even occurring as he was “in
and out of consciousness” and possibly dreaming. Respondent testified that a
Hispanic male nurse helped him use the telephone later during that day to call his
brother, and to whom he told his allegations, was not the same Hispanic man who
allegedly assaulted him. It is noteworthy that Relator testified in his deposition
that it was he who assisted Respondent with his telephone call on June 8, 2014
during his shift.
Finally, Relator points out that discovery is complete and that this matter has
been pending for more than four years, during which Respondent has submitted no
additional evidence into the record.
In his opposition to Relator’s motion for summary judgment, Respondent
argued that he was given the name “Ariel” while a patient at TUHC. The name
“Ariel” appears in the initial Forensic Sexual Assault Evaluation Form contained in
LSU Interim Hospital/University Medical Center records. Three years later, when
deposed, Respondent could not recall who gave him the name “Ariel,” but it was
given to him and he remembered it. Respondent argues that because one of the
2 nurses working on the date of the incident was named “Ariel,” he should be
allowed to bring the matter to trial for the trier-of-fact to determine whether Nurse
Ariel Pravia was the person who assaulted him.
While there are disputes as concerning whether Respondent was assaulted
while a patient at TUHC, and if so, by whom, the record does not provide
conclusive proof of either an attack or the identity of the alleged attacker. A
review of Respondent’s deposition testimony reveals that Respondent has no such
evidence to support his allegation as to Relator Pruett. As such, the Relator has
adequately established that Respondent is unable to meet his burden of proof due
to the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to
Respondent’s claim. As such, the ruling of the trial court denying the motion for
summary judgment was wrong. Respondent has had sufficient time, through
discovery and depositions, to carry his case forward after years of litigation but has
not done so. Accordingly, we grant Relator’s writ application, and reverse the trial
court’s ruling denying the motion for summary judgment; we also grant summary
judgment in favor of the Relator, Mr. Pravia, and dismiss the Respodent’s, Mr.
Pruett’s action against him.
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Charles R. Pruett v. John Doe, University Healthcare System, L.C. D/B/A Tulane University Hospital and Abc Insurance Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charles-r-pruett-v-john-doe-university-healthcare-system-lc-dba-lactapp-2020.