Charles Nelson Medina v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
This text of Charles Nelson Medina v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Charles Nelson Medina v. Commonwealth of Kentucky) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 9, 2023; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2022-CA-0853-MR
CHARLES NELSON MEDINA APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OWEN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE R. LESLIE KNIGHT, JUDGE ACTION NO. 21-CR-00028
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON, GOODWINE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
DIXON, JUDGE: Charles Medina appeals the order revoking his probation,
entered by the Owen Circuit Court on May 24, 2022. Following a careful review
of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 4, 2021, Medina was sentenced to ten years’
imprisonment probated for five years after he pled guilty to being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, fleeing or evading in the second degree, driving under
the influence (first offense), and operating a motor vehicle with an expired license.
Medina’s release was conditional upon his abstaining from alcohol and completing
residential treatment.
On February 16, 2022, the Commonwealth moved to revoke Medina’s
probation for violating the terms of his release. At the ensuing hearing on May 24,
2022, Medina stipulated that he had used alcohol and that he was terminated from
treatment for twice attempting to conceal restricted property – a cellphone.
Medina, an admitted alcoholic, testified that he relapsed upon learning that
“gruesome” charges of felony sexual abuse1 of a family member had been filed
against him. Conceding that the pending charges precluded him from reentering
treatment, Medina nonetheless requested that his probation be reinstated since he
had not been indicted and the charges could be dismissed.
Citing Medina’s alcohol addiction, his history of domestic violence,2
and his penchant for possessing firearms, the court entered an order finding that
Medina had violated the terms of his release; his failure to comply posed a
1 For clarity, the Commonwealth did not seek revocation on the basis of the new charges because the alleged events predated Medina’s probation. 2 Medina admitted he was prohibited by a domestic violence order from being within 500 feet of his family’s residence and that the pending sexual assault charges arose from a domestic situation.
-2- significant risk to the community; and he could not be managed in the community.
His probation was revoked, and this appeal followed. Additional facts will be
introduced as they become relevant.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
KRS3 439.3106(1) states that “[s]upervised individuals shall be
subject to” the following:
(a) Violation revocation proceedings and possible incarceration for failure to comply with the conditions of supervision when such failure constitutes a significant risk to prior victims of the supervised individual or the community at large, and cannot be appropriately managed in the community; or
(b) Sanctions other than revocation and incarceration as appropriate to the severity of the violation behavior, the risk of future criminal behavior by the offender, and the need for, and availability of, interventions which may assist the offender to remain compliant and crime-free in the community.
We review a court’s decision revoking probation for an abuse of
discretion. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 448 S.W.3d 773, 780 (Ky. 2014) (citing
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 292 S.W.3d 878 (Ky. 2009)). An abuse of discretion
occurs if the court’s decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported
by sound legal principles.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d
941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).
3 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-3- LEGAL ANALYSIS
Medina argues that the court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation without first making necessary findings detailing how his violation of
supervision constituted a significant risk to the community. Medina further asserts
that the court’s findings of significant risk and his inability to be managed in the
community were refuted by the court’s acknowledgment that he could receive
shock probation and reenter treatment at a later date. We disagree.
Due process requires that a court make either written or oral findings
as to “the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation.”
Commonwealth v. Alleman, 306 S.W.3d 484, 487-88 (Ky. 2010). Additionally, to
comply with KRS 439.3106(1)(a), a court must specifically find that the
probationer’s failure to comply with the terms of their supervision constitutes a
significant risk to prior victims or the community and that they cannot be
appropriately managed in the community. Andrews, 448 S.W.3d at 780. However,
contrary to Medina’s assertion otherwise, the court need not detail the basis for
these findings; rather, all that is necessary is that the findings are supported by the
record. Kendrick v. Commonwealth, 664 S.W.3d 731, 734-35 (Ky. App. 2023);
New v. Commonwealth, 598 S.W.3d 88, 90-91 (Ky. App. 2019).
Here, Medina conceded that he could not obtain necessary mental
health and alcohol addiction treatment, that he had recently relapsed, and that the
-4- purported trigger to his relapse was ongoing. Coupled with his unmanaged
conditions, Medina’s criminal history − driving under the influence, twice illegally
possessing a firearm, and armed robbery − supported revocation. Additionally, the
court’s willingness to consider shock probation if Medina ultimately became
eligible for treatment is consistent with this decision and does not, as Medina
argues, undermine the court’s findings. Consequently, we find no error.
Next, Medina contends that the court’s refusal to consider sanctions
other than revocation necessitates a new hearing. Since neither the plain language
of KRS 439.3106 nor the cases interpreting it requires a court to consider lesser
punishments if the statutory prerequisites to revocation have been found, we again
disagree. See Andrews, 448 S.W.3d at 776-79. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
expressly held that revocation is within the discretion of the court “provided that
discretion is exercised consistent with statutory criteria.” Id. at 780. As required
by KRS 439.3106(1)(a), the court found that Medina posed a significant risk to the
community and that he could not be managed therein. Accordingly, even absent a
consideration of lesser sanctions, the court acted within its discretion in revoking
probation.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the order of the Owen
Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.
-5- ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Travis Bewley Daniel Cameron Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney E. Albini Assistant Solicitor General Frankfort, Kentucky
-6-
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Charles Nelson Medina v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charles-nelson-medina-v-commonwealth-of-kentucky-kyctapp-2023.