Charles McQueen, V. Suburban Propane, LP
This text of Charles McQueen, V. Suburban Propane, LP (Charles McQueen, V. Suburban Propane, LP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
October 4, 2022
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II CHARLES McQUEEN, No. 56055-1-II
Appellant,
v.
SUBURBAN PROPANE, L.P., a foreign UNPUBLISHED OPINION corporation d/b/a SUBURBAN PROPANE, and JOHN DOES 1-5,
Respondent.
LEE, J. — Charles McQueen appeals the superior court’s order granting summary judgment
in favor of Suburban Propane, LP in his negligence suit. McQueen argues that the superior court
erred in excluding his expert testimony on causation. Because the opinion on causation in this
case was outside the expert’s area of expertise, summary judgment was proper. We affirm.
FACTS
On November 26, 2019, McQueen filed a complaint for damages against Suburban
Propane alleging the company’s negligence caused him injury and damages. Specifically, the
complaint alleged that a Suburban Propane technician improperly ignited McQueen’s water heater
during routine maintenance, causing an explosion. McQueen alleged that as a result of the incident
he suffered severe headaches, vision disturbances, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).
On June 4, 2021, Suburban Propane filed a motion for summary judgment. Suburban
Propane argued that summary judgment was appropriate because McQueen had failed to disclose No. 56055-1-II
any expert witness establishing a causal connection between the alleged explosion and McQueen’s
alleged injuries.
In McQueen’s response to Suburban Propane’s motion for summary judgment, for the first
time, McQueen asserted that he had obtained expert medical testimony establishing a causal link
between his injuries and the alleged explosion. McQueen relied on the declaration of Jon M.
Corey, PhD. Corey declared, “I am a physician, over the age of 18, and competent to testify in
this matter.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 15. And Corey declared, based on a review of McQueen’s
medical files that
[o]n a more probable than not basis it is my professional medical opinion, based on my education, training, medical literature and experience, that Charles McQueen does suffer from PTSD related symptoms as a result of his experiences exclusively related to the propane blast that occurred on or about December 13, 2016.
CP at 15. McQueen included a report prepared by Corey but did not include a curriculum vitae
(CV) documenting Corey’s qualifications.
In reply, Suburban Propane submitted a copy of Corey’s CV obtained from a publicly
accessible website. Corey’s CV shows that Corey had a PhD in psychology and education,
specifically organizational management and administration. Corey’s professional experience
includes several teaching positions and various executive positions involving management and
organizational development. Corey’s CV identified clinical experience in psychology from 1979
to 1985, working “on several clinical, legal, medical, and research programs on a global basis,
focusing on clinical, as well as drug and alcohol programs and Employee Assistance Programs.”
CP at 133. Specifically, Corey served as the chief psychologist at Frankfurt Army Hospital in
Germany from September 1979 to June 1982. Suburban Propane also submitted the results of a
medical license search which revealed only an expired counselor registration for Corey.
2 No. 56055-1-II
Suburban Propane argued that Corey was not a medical expert. Suburban Propane also
argued that Corey did “not have the requisite training or experience to offer medical opinions on
brain injuries or psychological conditions, such as PTSD.” CP at 118.
The superior court granted Suburban Propane’s motion for summary judgment and
dismissed McQueen’s complaint with prejudice. McQueen filed a motion for reconsideration,
supported by clarifying declarations from Corey. Specifically, Corey clarified that he was a
psychologist, not a physician. The superior court denied the motion for reconsideration.
McQueen appeals.
ANALYSIS
McQueen argues that the superior court erred by denying his motion for summary judgment
because he presented evidence of causation through Corey’s declaration.1 Suburban Propane
argues that Corey was not qualified as an expert .
We review orders on summary judgment de novo. Frausto v. Yakima HMA, LLC, 188
Wn.2d 227, 231, 393 P.3d 776 (2017). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c).
Although we generally review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, “‘[t]he de novo
standard of review is used by an appellate court when reviewing all trial court rulings made in
1 McQueen designated both the order on summary judgment and the order on reconsideration in his notice of appeal. However, McQueen’s briefing only addresses the superior court’s ruling as an erroneous evidentiary decision—Corey’s qualification to present expert testimony establishing causation. Therefore, we review de novo whether the trial court properly considered Corey’s declaration, as required by the standard of review governing summary judgment motions. We do not consider the motion for reconsideration because McQueen neither assigned error to the decision on the motion for reconsideration nor argued the motion for reconsideration on appeal. RAP 10.3(a)(4), (a)(6).
3 No. 56055-1-II
conjunction with a summary judgment motion.’” Frausto, 188 Wn.2d at 231 (quoting Folsom v.
Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663, 958 P.2d 301 (1998)).
Expert testimony is governed by ER 702, which provides:
If scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
“‘Practical experience is sufficient to qualify a witness as an expert.’” State v. Weaville, 162 Wn.
App. 801, 824, 256 P.3d 426 (quoting State v. Ortiz, 119 Wn.2d 294, 310, 831 P.2d 1060 (1992),
overruled on other grounds, State v. Condon, 182 Wn.2d 307, 343 P.3d 357 (2015)), review
denied, 173 Wn.2d 1004 (2011). “However, ‘the expert testimony of an otherwise qualified
witness is not admissible if the issue at hand lies outside the witness’ area of expertise.’” Id.
(quoting State v. Farr-Lenzini, 93 Wn. App. 453, 461, 970 P.2d 313 (1999)).
Here, Corey may be qualified as an expert based on education and professional experience.
However, offering opinions related to the cause of McQueen’s PTSD is outside of Corey’s area of
expertise. The overwhelming majority of Corey’s education and experience is in the field of
organizational psychology and management, not in clinical psychology or any field that focuses
on diagnosing, treating, or researching PTSD. Corey’s only relevant experience was almost 3
years of clinical work in the army about 40 years ago. Nothing in the record before this court
demonstrates that Corey has the expertise to offer opinions on the cause of PTSD. Further, because
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Charles McQueen, V. Suburban Propane, LP, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charles-mcqueen-v-suburban-propane-lp-washctapp-2022.