Charles McDonald v. William Hutchings

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 9, 2024
• Docket: 22-15952
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 9 2024 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES E. MCDONALD, No. 22-15952

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00261-CDS-DJA v.

WILLIAM HUTCHINGS; ATTORNEY MEMORANDUM* GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Cristina D. Silva, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 1, 2024 Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, BADE, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Appellant-Defendant Charles E. McDonald appeals the denial of his petition

for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(d). Convicted of larceny and possession

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. of stolen property, McDonald argues that his trial counsel was ineffective under

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), for failing to investigate his

competency to stand trial. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. '' 1291

and 2253(a), and we affirm.

We review the denial of McDonald’s habeas petition de novo. Arnold v.

Runnels, 421 F.3d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 2005). We may not grant a habeas petition

under 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(d) unless the claim’s adjudication in state court (1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of federal law “clearly established” by United States Supreme Court precedent, or

(2) resulted in an “unreasonable” factual determination. Id. (citing Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70B73 (2003)). “Under ' 2254(d), a habeas court must

determine what arguments or theories supported . . . the state court’s decision; and

then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those

arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this

Court.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011); see also Cullen v.

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011) (review of a Strickland claim under '

2254(d) is “doubly deferential.”).

To prevail under Strickland, McDonald needed to prove (1) deficiency—that

his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and

2 (2) prejudice—a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

conduct, McDonald would have been declared incompetent. 466 U.S. at 687.

The Nevada Court of Appeals found that McDonald proved neither prong. Barker

v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (“When more than one state court

has adjudicated a claim, we analyze the last reasoned decision.”) (citing Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803‒04 (1991)).

At a minimum, the prejudice determination was supported by the state trial

court’s direct observations concerning McDonald’s behavior, John Parris’s

testimony about McDonald’s conduct during their interactions, inconclusive

testimony from medical experts, and McDonald’s alternating competency

designations in a concurrent criminal matter. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.

402, 402 (1960) (defendant is competent to stand trial if they have “sufficient

present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding—and . . . has a rational as well as factual understanding of the

proceedings against him.”). From this evidence, fair-minded jurists could have

determined it was not reasonably probable that McDonald would have been

declared incompetent to stand trial. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (“The

Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of reasonable applications is

3 substantial.”). Because McDonald failed to establish that the Nevada Court of

Appeals reached an unreasonable prejudice finding, his habeas petition is denied.

AFFIRMED.