Opinion issued November 24, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-15-00119-CV ——————————— CHARLES MANDEVILLE, Appellant V. DEBORAH MANDEVILLE, Appellee
On Appeal from the 387th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 14-DCV-211809
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Charles Mandeville appeals a final decree of divorce on the grounds that the
trial court erred by (1) excluding a marital property agreement from evidence
presented to the jury and (2) ordering that Charles’s possession of the children be
supervised. We affirm. Background
Charles and Deborah Mandeville married in New Mexico in June 2000.
During their marriage, the Mandevilles had five children together—three sons and
two daughters. On January 7, 2014, Deborah Mandeville filed an original petition
for divorce in Fort Bend County. Deborah later amended her petition to request
that Charles be supervised during periods of possession of all the children and that
Deborah be awarded possession at all other times.
Charles retained counsel and filed a counter-petition for divorce, including a
demand for a jury trial. The counter-petition referenced a marital property
agreement purportedly defining the parties’ respective rights to property, both
community and separate, and asked that the court divide the marital estate
according to the terms of the agreement.
At the time of the divorce proceedings, Deborah and the children were living
in Fort Bend County, Texas, and Charles lived and worked over one hundred miles
away in Guymon, Oklahoma. By the time of the pretrial hearing, Charles no
longer had counsel and instead represented himself pro se in the divorce
proceedings.
Motion in Limine
The Mandevilles each signed a “Community Property Declaration and
Agreement” on June 25, 2001, roughly one year into their marriage. Deborah filed
2 a pretrial motion in limine including a request that Charles not mention or refer to a
specific item, bank account, or retirement account as being his separate property
unless and until he obtained a ruling on its admissibility outside the presence of the
jury. In support, the motion referenced Charles’s failure to respond to an
interrogatory request seeking identification of purportedly separate property. To
the extent that reference to the agreement might be used to support a claim to
separate property, the motion in limine sought to require that Charles first bring the
matter to the trial court’s attention outside the presence of the jury. During a
pretrial hearing on October 17, 2014, the trial court considered and granted
Deborah’s motion in limine over Charles’s objections.
Jury Trial
Deborah testified on both the first and second day of trial. She characterized
her life and marriage with Charles as “very unstable” since the birth of their first
child. The Mandevilles moved frequently, starting their marriage in New Mexico,
then moving to Portland, and returning to New Mexico six days after the birth of
their first child. After several work-related moves in New Mexico, the
Mandevilles moved to Bloomington, Illinois. Each move was apparently driven by
Charles’s work preferences.
Deborah testified that, after Charles accepted a job in Oklahoma, he left their
family home in Illinois, taking all of his personal possessions with him. After
3 several weeks living separately, the Mandevilles sold their Illinois home and split
the proceeds. Deborah and the children then set out to move to Sugar Land, Texas.
Throughout their marriage, Deborah acted as the children’s primary care-
giver. In Sugar Land, Deborah continued to care for the Mandevilles’ five
children, while working part-time in an accounting business and substitute
teaching.
Upon arriving in Sugar Land, Deborah had some difficulty enrolling the
children in school as they did not yet have birth certificates or social security
numbers. Deborah testified that the children had neither because Charles was
against both. Though Charles never did consent, Deborah was able to get the
children both birth certificates and social security numbers so that the children
could be enrolled in public school and participate in extracurricular activities.
Deborah explained that all of the Mandevilles’ school-aged children are
doing well in school in Sugar Land. Since coming to Texas, all but the youngest
have been involved in extracurricular sporting activities, including basketball,
soccer, football, and swimming. The eldest also participates in a fitness and
positive outlook clinic. Though the four eldest are each involved in swimming in
Sugar Land, Deborah testified that Charles opposes swimming, believing pools are
filthy. Deborah continued to testify that Charles generally opposes organized
4 activities and that he would not continue to allow the children to participate in
organized sports if they primarily resided with him in Oklahoma.
Deborah further explained that their eldest son had been in counseling for
the past year and a half. Deborah decided that he should begin counseling after she
observed that he was having difficulty adjusting to living apart from his father.
Deborah testified that, though her eldest is generally outgoing, inventive, and
energetic, after spending a summer with his father in Oklahoma, he was apathetic
and withdrawn, with a “pretty depressed outlook on life” upon his return to Texas.
After counseling, however, he did return to being excited about school, looking
forward to participating in activities, and expressing a positive outlook on the
future.
Deborah testified that the other children were also negatively affected by
their summer with Charles in Oklahoma. She explained that they returned from
Oklahoma with a general nervousness and paranoia. By way of example, Deborah
explained that the children worried that she might be killed or raped while taking
the trash outside after dark. The two girls were so worried about “bad guys” that
they would no longer sleep in their own room. In Deborah’s opinion, “every time
the kids return [from visiting their father], it’s a longer period of trying to
reacclimate them to just normal views on life and not being fearful.” She
continued, “when they go [to visit their father] . . . it’s just super concentrated on
5 them; and . . . I’m just concerned because his paranoia is something that has a
tendency to filter down.”
Deborah testified that while they were cohabitating, Charles commonly
expressed paranoia. For example, he expressed concerns over going to the grocery
store or stopping at a gas station after dark. She continued to explain that his
paranoia extended to fears of “the house being robbed, making sure the garage
door was down, making sure bars were put up under the doorknobs for the front
and back door before we went to bed” and concern that she would be attacked if
any neighbors knew he was out of town. When the children would visit friends,
Deborah testified that Charles would always have a discussion with them warning
them not to be alone with someone’s father. According to Deborah, such fears
were a “constant discussion” in their home, notwithstanding the fact that she had
never been robbed or attacked. Though Charles had expressed such fears from the
beginning of their relationship, over their 14 years of marriage, the frequency
increased to daily paranoid discussions. In contrast, Deborah testified that she
instead preferred to talk with their children only regarding age-appropriate fears
that are within the children’s control and comprehension.
Deborah testified that, after discussing Charles’s perception of the world in
the course of counseling, the Mandevilles’ marriage counselor opined that Charles
6 may have paranoid personality disorder. Charles refused medication, but the
Mandevilles continued counseling together.
On the second day of the jury trial, Charles left the courtroom and never
returned. During discussions regarding the future availability of sitting jurors and
the potential of missing a single day of trial later in the week, Charles demanded a
continuance, citing a need to obtain representation, and demanded a change of
venue. Charles further threatened to leave the courtroom if his requests were not
granted. Deborah objected to the requested continuance, noting that the parties
were in the middle of a jury trial. The trial judge denied the continuance, taking
care to explain to Charles that proceedings could continue to final judgment
without him present should he elect to leave the courtroom. In a final comment
before exiting the courtroom, Charles stated, “[p]lease record that I’m leaving
under threat, duress, coercion, lack of counsel. This is absolutely not voluntary.
I’m trying to save my children from sadism and evil. This is just disgusting.”
After Charles left, the jury heard testimony from Jill Mandeville, Charles’s
paternal aunt. Jill explained that she had voluntarily flown to Texas to testify out
of a concern for her nephew’s stability. She was concerned about Charles’s
stability “[b]ecause he is so full of hatred that [she] believe[s] he’s harming himself
and he’s doing [mental and emotional] harm to the children.” Jill testified that
7 over the last couple years, her contact with Charles had been reduced to e-mail and
text messages as Charles became “impossible to have conversations with.”
Jill continued to testify regarding her brother, Charles’s father. According to
Jill, Charles’s father is isolated in a trailer in New Mexico and extremely paranoid.
Jill expressed concern that Charles is similar to his father, and that his behavior
warrants counseling and psychological evaluation. Though Jill expects it would
require a court order, she nonetheless maintained that “in terms of his interactions
with the children and in life . . . [Charles] might benefit from a psychological
evaluation and perhaps there might be some kind of a program that would help him
to recognize the extreme negativity and paranoia that he suffers from.”
Jill went on to describe Charles’s parenting style as “a militaristic type of
dictatorial commanding of the children . . . as opposed to a parent who . . . has a
style of perhaps a nourishing relationship with the child.” She explained that
Charles fails to show any patience or understanding toward the children, and that
“overall . . . he’s generally detached, [and] not involved with them.” Jill opined
that Charles’s visits with his children need to be supervised because Charles “can’t
seem to control his anger and hostility . . . [and] somebody needs to be there that
can stop him from saying these things and frightening these kids.”
8 Final Divorce Decree
The trial court entered a final divorce decree on November 12, 2014.
Consistent with the jury verdict, the final decree ordered the parties divorced on
the ground of insupportability. Deborah was appointed sole managing conservator
of the children, and Charles was appointed possessory conservator. Relevant to
this appeal, by a modified possession order, the trial court ordered that all periods
of possession of or access to the children by Charles be supervised by the SAFE
Supervised Visitation Programs of the Victim Assistance Centre, Inc., in Houston,
Texas. Charles timely filed a notice of appeal on February 10, 2015.
In his first point of error, Charles contends that the trial judge abused her
discretion in granting the motion in limine, which prevented the jury from
considering the Mandevilles’ agreement. Deborah responds that Charles is entitled
to no relief because a motion in limine is not a ruling on the evidence and Charles
did not preserve error. We agree with Deborah.
A. Applicable Law
A motion in limine operates to prevent the introduction of prejudicial
questions, statements or other evidence in the presence of the jury. In re Wyatt
Field Serv. Co., 454 S.W.3d 145, 161 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
orig. proceeding [mand. denied]). It is not a final evidentiary ruling, but instead
9 “merely precludes reference to the subject of the motion without first obtaining a
ruling on the admissibility of those matters outside the presence of the jury.” Sims
v. State, 816 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied)
(citing Tempo Tamers, Inc. v. Crow-Houston Four, Ltd., 715 S.W.2d 658, 662
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.)); see also TEX. R. EVID. 103(d). As a
result, though a ruling on a motion in limine may be erroneous, it is never
reversible error in and of itself. Id.; Collins v. Collins, 904 S.W.2d 792, 799 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (en banc).
In order to complain on appeal that the trial court erroneously excluded
evidence, a party must (1) attempt to introduce that evidence during the evidentiary
portion of the trial, (2) if the opposing party objects, specify the purpose for which
the evidence is offered and supply reasons why the evidence is admissible,
(3) obtain a ruling from the trial court, and (4) if the trial court excludes the
evidence, make an offer of proof. Comiskey v. FH Partners, LLC, 373 S.W.3d
620, 629–30 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied); see TEX. R.
APP. P. 33.1(a); TEX. R. EVID. 103(a).
B. Analysis
Charles contends that, by granting the motion in limine, the trial court
erroneously excluded the Mandevilles’ agreement from evidence. 1 However, the
1 We recognize that Charles characterizes his complaint with respect to the
10 record does not reflect Charles offered the agreement into evidence. In fact, we
have no record reflecting that Charles presented any evidence to the trial court
whatsoever. In large part, this is the case because Charles left the courtroom on the
second day of trial and never returned to present his case. Because the agreement
was not offered into evidence, the record contains no final evidentiary ruling
excluding the agreement. Accordingly, we must conclude that Charles failed to
preserve error and that this complaint therefore cannot serve as a basis for reversal.
Badall v. Durgapersad, 454 S.W.3d 626, 642 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2014, pet. denied) (holding that party failed to preserve complaint that trial court
erroneously excluded evidence of settlement agreement by never offering
settlement agreement for admission into evidence).
In his reply brief, Charles asserts that he properly preserved error regarding
the exclusion of the agreement by filing a motion for a new trial. 2 While a motion
motion in limine as a discovery issue. And Deborah’s counsel did reference failures to respond to discovery requests in the motion in limine. However, such arguments by counsel do not transmute the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine into a discovery sanction. See Sprague v. Sprague, 363 S.W.3d 788, 801 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (notwithstanding favorable ruling on motion in limine, by failing to obtain pretrial ruling on discovery issue, party waived complaint regarding admissibility of evidence). More fundamentally, as will be discussed below, Charles misunderstands the basic function of a motion in limine and thereby fails to recognize that the ruling did not bar him from attempting to introduce evidence of separate property, including the agreement. 2 Charles cites to Boateng v. Trainblazer Health Enters., LLC, 171 S.W.3d
11 for a new trial may preserve some errors, standing alone, it cannot preserve error
related to the admission or exclusion of evidence. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a);
TEX. R. EVID. 103(a). The fact remains that, according to the record on appeal,
Charles made no attempt to actually introduce the Mandevilles’ agreement into
evidence. As a result, the trial court made no final evidentiary ruling regarding its
admission, and any alleged error is not preserved for our review. TEX. R. APP. P.
33.1; Badall, 454 S.W.3d at 642; see also Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573
S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex. 1978) (“Litigants who represent themselves must comply
with the applicable procedural rules, or else they would be given an unfair
advantage over litigants represented by counsel.”); Brown v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n,
801 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (“Pro se
litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys.”).
481, 491 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied), and Rudisell v. Paquette, 89 S.W.3d 233, 236 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.), to support his claim that the filing of a motion for a new trial preserved this issue for appeal. Both are inapposite. In Boateng, our sister court addressed the potential of preserving error through a motion for a new trial following a trial court’s retroactive decision to convert a preliminary hearing into a hearing on the merits. Boateng, 117 S.W.3d at 491. In Rudisell, appellant was able to preserve error regarding imposition of sanctions for filing a groundless pleading through a motion for a new trial. Rudisell, 89 S.W.3d at 236. In both Boateng and Rudisell, the motion for a new trial effectively preserved errors that were not apparent to the parties until after the entry of judgment on the merits. Neither case lends support to the erroneous assertion that a motion for a new trial can preserve a complaint that a trial court erred in excluding evidence which was never offered and with respect to which the trial court never made a final evidentiary ruling.
12 Supervised Possession
In his second point of error, Charles contends that the trial court judge
abused her discretion in entering a modified possession order requiring supervision
when Charles is in possession of the children, though Deborah’s pleadings only
requested supervised possession when Charles is in possession of all the children. 3
A. Standard of Review
“The best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of
the court in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access
to the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002 (West 2014). It is well-settled that
3 Deborah construes Charles’s second point of error to possibly argue that the trial court judge also erred in entering a modified possession order without providing reasons to support deviating from the standard possession order. To the extent that Charles had intended such an argument, we find no error.
The Texas Family Code creates a rebuttable presumption that the standard possession order (1) provides reasonable minimum possession for a parent named as a joint managing conservator and (2) is in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.252 (West 2014). Upon receipt of a timely request, a trial court must state its specific reasons for varying from the standard possession order. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.258 (West 2014); see Welsh v. Welsh, 905 S.W.2d 615, 619–20 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (interpreting the family code to require that a trial court state reasons for deviating from a standard possession order only when timely requested to do so). We find no such request in the record. Similarly, we find no request of the trial court to make any findings of fact. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 296. As a result, we conclude that the trial court did not err by not stating grounds for deviating from the standard possession order. Welsh, 905 S.W.2d at 619 (in the absence of a timely request to do so, “the trial court has no obligation to state the reasons for the deviation from the standard possession order”).
13 the trial court has broad discretion in determining the best interests of a child in
family law matters. Leithold v. Plass, 413 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. 1967); Messier v.
Messier, 389 S.W.3d 904, 908 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
This rule flows from the observation that “[t]he trial court is typically in the best
position to observe the demeanor and personalities of the witnesses and to
understand influences on the family dynamic that cannot be discerned by mere
reference to the record.” Messier, 389 S.W.3d at 908–09 (citing In re N.A.S., 100
S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.)).
Accordingly, we review a trial court’s best-interest determination for an
abuse of discretion. Miles v. Peacock, 229 S.W.3d 384, 391 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (citing Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex.
1982)). A trial court abuses its discretion in this context when it acts arbitrarily,
unreasonably, or without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Worford v.
Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam); McGuire v. McGuire, 4
S.W.3d 382, 384 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Under this
standard, legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds
of error, but rather are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused
its discretion. Ayala v. Ayala, 387 S.W.3d 721, 726 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2011, no pet.). A trial court does not abuse its discretion when there is some
evidence of a substantive and probative character to support its judgment. Id.
14 B. Applicable Law
The pleadings are relied upon to define the issues at trial. Garvey v. Vawter,
795 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tex. 1990). A pleading is considered sufficient if it
provides an opposing party with enough information to enable him or her to
prepare a defense. Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 810 (Tex. 1982). Generally
speaking, a judgment must be supported by the pleadings, and a party may not be
granted relief in the absence of pleadings to support such relief. 4 TEX. R. CIV. P.
301; King v. Lyons, 457 S.W.3d 122, 126 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014,
no pet.). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not unsettle a trial court’s
determination as to whether pleadings include sufficient allegations to give fair
notice of a claim or requested relief. Montes v. Filley, 359 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.).
4 Regarding the sufficiency of the pleadings, though adequate citations were not provided, we believe Charles directs our attention to Smith v. Aramark Corp., Nos. 13–11–00500–CV & 13–11–00708–CV, 2013 WL 3568275 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 11, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.), and In re Sullender, No. 12–12–00058–CV, 2012 WL 2832542 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 11, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). Both are inapposite. Aramark concerns adequacy of an appellant’s brief relative to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e), 9.4(i)(3) and 38.1(k). Aramark, 2013 WL 3568275, at *1. In re Sullender concerns requirements to survive a motion to dismiss in the context of pleadings seeking court-ordered access to children by a grandparent while one fit parent is still alive and caring for the children. In re Sullender, 2012 WL 2832542, at *2. Neither case sheds light on the pleading requirements in the instant context.
15 C. Analysis
Charles contends that the trial court judge erred by ordering that his
possession be supervised at all times because Deborah’s pleadings (1) only sought
supervised possession when Charles is “in possession of all of the children at the
same time” and (2) allegedly failed to state grounds supporting supervised
possession.
Myriad cases address the import of and specificity required for pleadings
relative to the wide discretion afforded to trial courts in fashioning terms of
custody, control, possession, and visitation that meet the best interests of children.
For instance, in MacCallum v. MacCallum, 801 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 1990, writ denied), notwithstanding the fact that the mother had not sought
such relief by her pleadings, the trial court restricted the father from allowing his
sons to operate farm equipment or to participate in the mixing or application of
herbicides, pesticides, or other farm chemicals during periods of visitation until
they were 14 years old. MacCallum, 801 S.W.2d at 586–87. On appeal, the court
observed that “[p]leadings are of little importance in child custody cases and the
trial court’s efforts to exercise broad, equitable powers in determining what will be
best for the future welfare of a child should be unhampered by narrow technical
rulings.” Id. at 586.
16 In Peck v. Peck, 172 S.W.3d 26 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied), a
father appealed an injunction included in a divorce decree that enjoined both
parties from permitting a person of the opposite sex with whom they have or might
have an intimate or dating relationship from spending the night when that parent
had possession of the children. Peck, 172 S.W.3d at 32. Though the injunction
was not supported by the mother’s pleadings, relying on MacCallum, the Dallas
Court of Appeals upheld the injunction, noting that “the trial court has discretion to
place conditions on parents’ visitation even if the pleadings do not request such
conditions.” Id. at 35.
In O’Connor v. O’Connor, 245 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2007, no pet.), appellant argued that the trial court erred by entering a permanent
injunction barring her from any physical access to her children, which she believed
was not in the children’s best interest and exceeded the requested relief sought by
appellee—supervised possession. O’Connor, 245 S.W.3d at 518. Considering
evidence of appellant’s unstable and uncontrolled behavior and her unwillingness
to get necessary help, we found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
determination that the injunction was in the children’s best interest. Id.
Here, Deborah’s petition requested supervised possession. In Paragraph 9,
Deborah requested that “Charles Mandeville should be granted supervised
possession when in possession of all of the children at the same time with a
17 standard possession order.” Thus, Deborah’s pleading afforded notice to Charles
that she was requesting that the trial court consider the issue of supervised
possession. See Messier, 389 S.W.3d at 908. Because a request for supervised
possession directly relates to issues of custody, control, possession, and visitation,
the trial court enjoyed wide discretion in determining the best interests of the
children with respect to the possibility of supervised possession. MacCallum, 801
S.W.2d at 587; cf. King, 457 S.W.3d at 124 (finding abuse of discretion in mutual
injunctions restricting parents’ proximity to each other’s homes and places of
employment because such restrictions did not directly relate to custody, control,
possession, and visitation).
In exercising that broad discretion, rather than ordering supervised
possession when Charles is in possession of all the Mandevilles’ children, the trial
court ordered supervised possession whenever Charles is in possession of any of
the Mandevilles’ children. Relative to existing precedents, we conclude that this
modest departure was adequately supported by the pleadings. Cf. O’Connor, 245
S.W.3d at 518 (pleadings seeking supervised possession adequately supported
entry of permanent injunction barring mother from any physical access to her
children).
Because the pleadings support the judgment, requiring supervised possession
as ordered would only amount to an abuse of discretion if the record lacks some
18 evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that the best interests of the
children are served by requiring supervised possession at all times. Factors to
consider in determining the best interests of the children include: (1) desires of the
children, (2) emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future,
(3) emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future,
(4) parental abilities of individuals involved, (5) programs available to those
individuals to promote the best interests of the children, (6) plans for the children
by these individuals, (7) stability of the home, (8) acts or omissions of the parent
which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not proper, and
(9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544
S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).
We conclude that the trial court heard evidence sufficient to support its
determination that supervised possession would be in the best interests of the
children. Deborah and Charles’s aunt each testified to a need for supervised
possession based on Charles’s lack of experience in and aptitude for caring for the
children. Both expressed concerns regarding Charles’s increasingly unstable and
paranoid behavior, and both observed resulting negative effects on the children’s
mental and emotional well-being. Deborah testified that Charles would not allow
the children to participate in extracurricular and group sporting activities, which
the children presently enjoy. In light of such evidence, we conclude that the trial
19 court reasonably exercised its discretion in determining that the best interest of the
children would be served by requiring supervised possession and that the ordered
relief was adequately supported by Deborah’s pleadings. In re A.D., -- S.W.3d --,
2014 WL 1800082, at *12–13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)
(though father pled only for standard possession, record as a whole suggested that
child was in danger while in mother’s custody and supported order requiring
mother’s visitation with child be supervised).
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Rebeca Huddle Justice
Panel consists of Justices Higley, Huddle, and Lloyd.