Charles Mandacina v. United States

18 F. App'x 450

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
• Decided: September 10, 2001
• Docket: 98-2638
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

A jury found Charles J. Mandarina guilty of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, aiding and abetting the sale of firearms to a felon, aiding and abetting armed bank robbery, aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a crime of violence, and supplying a firearm to a convicted felon. The evidence at trial established Mandarina sold guns to Patrick McGuire, who used them in connection with his bank robbery ring. After an unsuccessful appeal, see United States v. Crouch, 46 F.3d 871, 873 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 871, 116 S.Ct. 193, 133 L.Ed.2d 129 (1995), Mandarina initiated this 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. As relevant to this appeal, Mandarina claimed his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by faffing to call co-defendant McGuire as a witness. The district court denied relief, Mandarina appeals, and we affirm.

Following careful review, see Forest v. Delo, 52 F.3d 716, 721 (8th Cir.1995), we agree with the district court that Mandari-nas claim of ineffective assistance fails because counsel’s decision not to call McGuire was a reasoned tactical decision. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-94, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Mandarina acknowledges counsel’s investigator interviewed McGuire and counsel advised him against calling McGuire because McGuire, a twice-convicted contract murderer who had pleaded no contest to all of the charges in the indictment, had strong personal ties to Man-darina and was vulnerable to cross-examination about uncharged acts of criminal conduct involving Mandacina. These undisputed facts show counsel’s tactical decision was made after appropriate investigation and consultation. See Forest, 52 F.3d at 722 (denying ineffective-assistance claim because counsel had reasonable basis for not calling witness); Novak v. Purkett, 4 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir.1993) (noting counsel’s decision to refrain from calling a witness who had prior conviction and credibility problems did not constitute deficient performance).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.