Charles M. Stowers v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: July 10, 2024
• Docket: 2023 CA 000179
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

RENDERED: JULY 12, 2024; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2023-CA-0179-MR

CHARLES M. STOWERS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE STEVE ALAN WILSON, JUDGE ACTION NO. 09-CR-00930

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, CETRULO, AND A. JONES, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Charles M. Stowers (“Stowers”) appeals from the trial

court’s denial of relief on his motion pursuant to CR 1 60.02, following his

conviction of two counts of rape in the first degree and being a persistent felony

offender in the second degree and his resulting sentence of fifty (50) years. Having

1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. reviewed the briefs of the parties, the trial court record and order, and pertinent

law, we affirm.

FACTS

The underlying facts of this case were set out in Stowers’ prior appeal

to the Kentucky Supreme Court and, again, in his prior appeal to this Court:

Appellant Charles Stowers married Amy Webster in June 2009 and lived with her and her two teenage daughters for most of that year, both before and after the marriage. On the night of September 9, 2009, Webster’s thirteen-year old daughter, [D.D.],[2] was taken to an emergency room complaining of bleeding, a heavy period, and abdominal pain. After a series of routine tests, the hospital staff discovered that [D.D.] was pregnant and suffering a miscarriage. At the behest of the treating physician, Nurse Rebecca Melloan spoke with [D.D.]. When Melloan told [D.D.] that she was pregnant and miscarrying, [D.D.] stated that Stowers had raped her. Subsequent DNA testing on the fetus revealed that Stowers could not be excluded as the father, with a 99.99999% probability of paternity.

Stowers was indicted by a Warren County grand jury on two counts of first-degree rape and charged as a second-degree persistent felony offender. At trial [D.D.] testified that Stowers entered her bedroom while she was sleeping. [D.D.] suspected that it was her younger sister sneaking into her room until Stowers began to touch her chest and “privates.” She further testified that Stowers touched her “private” with his “private,” and that his “private” went inside of her. [D.D.] testified that she was scared and she told Stowers to stop several times before he left the bedroom. Stowers returned to her bedroom

2 While D.D. is now an adult, she was a juvenile at the time of the events described herein and per Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 5(B)(2), her name will be initialized.

-2- three or four nights later and began touching her again. [D.D.] testified that Stowers again placed his “private” inside of her. She explained that she was scared and again did not know what to do, so she told Stowers to stop. When he left her bedroom, [D.D.] testified that she retreated to her sister’s bedroom and locked the doors and windows.

Stowers was found guilty of two counts of first- degree rape and of being a PFO in the second degree. The jury recommended twenty-years enhanced to twenty- five years on each count, to run consecutively for a total sentence of fifty years in prison. In its final judgment, the trial court sentenced Stowers in accordance with the jury’s recommendation.

Stowers v. Commonwealth, No. 2016-CA-001553-MR, 2019 WL 1868929, at *1

(Ky. App. Apr. 26, 2019) (unpublished) (hereinafter “Stowers II”) (quoting

Stowers v. Commonwealth, No. 2012-SC-000100-MR, 2014 WL 702180, at *1

(Ky. Feb. 20, 2014) (hereinafter “Stowers I”)).

Stowers appealed as a matter of right in 2012. At that time, he alleged

trial errors, including arguing insufficient evidence of forcible compulsion entitled

him to a directed verdict on both counts of First-Degree Rape. The Kentucky

Supreme Court affirmed his conviction in 2014.3 In 2015, he filed a motion,

pursuant to RCr4 11.42, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion was

3 See Stowers I. 4 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

-3- denied by the trial court without a hearing. This Court upheld that denial in 2019. 5

Stowers next filed a motion pursuant to CR 60.02 in July of 2019.

The trial court denied relief upon that motion and Stowers did not appeal the

denial. Finally, in September of 2021, Stowers filed the successive CR 60.02

motion which is the subject of this action. The trial court denied any relief. He

now appeals that denial. We again affirm his convictions and sentence. Further

facts will be discussed as needed in our analysis.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal of a trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to a CR 60.02

motion, this Court reviews the determination of the trial court for an abuse of

discretion as the decision whether to grant relief is within the trial court’s exclusive

discretion. Priddy v. Commonwealth, 629 S.W.3d 14, 17 (Ky. App. 2021).

A trial court abuses its discretion when it issues a decision which is

“arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”

Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Therefore, the lower

court’s decision will be affirmed absent a showing of some “flagrant miscarriage

of justice.” Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky. 1983).

5 See Stowers II.

-4- ANALYSIS

Stowers’ 60.02 motion forwarded three reasons for relief to the trial

court. First, he alleged being found guilty of two counts of rape in the first degree

was a violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy. Second, he alleged the

indictment was defective as it indicated D.D. was twelve (12) years of age at the

time of the offenses but there was testimony indicating she was actually thirteen

(13). Finally, Stowers alleged his trial counsel was ineffective when no objection

was made concerning double jeopardy or the “deficient” indictment.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Beginning with Stowers’ last allegation, the trial court held he was

precluded from raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel which could

have been raised in his prior RCr 11.42 motion, citing McQueen v.

Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1997). McQueen holds:

Civil Rule 60.02 is not intended merely as an additional opportunity to relitigate the same issues which could reasonably have been presented by direct appeal or RCr 11.42 proceedings. The obvious purpose of this principle is to prevent the relitigation of issues which either were or could have been litigated in a similar proceeding.

Id. at 416 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Having reviewed Stowers’ 60.02 motion, which closely mirrors his

appeal, it is obvious any of Stowers’ contentions regarding assistance of counsel

could certainly have been addressed in his prior motion. Stowers makes no

-5- allegation he was unaware of or otherwise unable to raise these allegations at that

time. Nothing in the nature of his allegations suggests prior unavailability,

concealment, or any other excusable reason for Stowers to have been unaware

prior to his 60.02 motion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

relief on this allegation.

Double Jeopardy

Next, Stowers alleges his conviction for two counts of rape in the first

degree was in violation of constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.

Fifth Amendment, U.S. CONSTITUTION; §13 KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION. He asserts

“the same facts needed to convict on Count One first degree rape” were identical to

those by which “the jury could have convicted the Appellant of the second-degree

rape charge.” Stowers’ argument does not bear scrutiny.

Initially, when Stowers was informed of the statements D.D. made

during the emergency room visit, Stowers denied ever having sexual relations with

his stepdaughter. After DNA testing of the miscarried fetus confirmed Stowers

had impregnated D.D., he admitted to having intercourse with her but maintained it

occurred on only a single occasion. Stowers now argues the Commonwealth

“needed to use the same fact that the victim miscarried her baby” and “the same

DNA evidence in both counts of rape.” Stowers contends the DNA evidence of his

impregnating D.D., and his subsequent admission to having intercourse with her on

-6- a single occasion, were the only evidence available for a jury to base their findings.

This position is, at best, mistaken.

D.D. testified to two separate instances of having been raped by

Stowers. Under direct examination, after responding to inquires detailing the first

incident, she affirmed being “100%” sure Stowers had again come into her room,

while she was sleeping, three or four nights after the first rape. She described in

detail this second incident of Stowers having sexual intercourse with her, despite

her saying “no” multiple times before he ceased.6

When Stowers twice raped his stepdaughter in the summer of 2009, it

occurred under factually similar circumstances. However, the argument he “could

not be convicted of Count One . . . unless he would have been guilty of Count

Two” is in no way accurate. The jury was presented evidence of two distinct

events and was instructed in a manner which distinguished the two.

Stowers’ counsel argued his defense that only a single incident of

sexual intercourse occurred. Instructions for the two counts of the same charge

were not identical; the allegations for each respective count were identified within

as “Encounter 1” and “Encounter 2.” The Instructions presented the jury a clear

6 To the extent Stowers attempts to revisit arguments in his prior appeal concerning sufficiency of this evidence to establish forcible compulsion, this Court rejects Stowers’ assertions and declines to reexamine the matter. That evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to find the intercourse occurred by forcible compulsion has been conclusively established. It is the law of the case.

-7- opportunity to find only one occasion of sexual intercourse had occurred, had they

found Stowers’ partial defense credible. However, the jury clearly found two

separate incidents of sexual intercourse occurred.

Stowers was not held twice in jeopardy for the same event when

convicted of two counts of rape in the first degree. The trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying relief.

The Charging Indictment

Stowers’ remaining allegation, that his indictment was insufficient, is

premised upon an instance of testimony relating to D.D.’s age at the time Stowers

raped her. Stowers alleges D.D. “testified that she was born on September 5, 1995,

and that in 2009 when these crimes occurred she was 14 years of age.” Reviewing

D.D.’s trial testimony, which took place August 23, 2011, upon inquiry as to her

date of birth, her response is, in fact, the date Stowers indicates. This birthdate

would have made D.D. fifteen (15) years old the day of her testimony and thirteen

(13) during June and July of 2009. Immediately following the testimony about her

birthdate, D.D. testified to being presently fourteen (14) years old and about to turn

fifteen (15) when asked about her upcoming birthday. Contrary to Stowers’

characterization, she did not indicate being fourteen (14) during the summer she

was raped by Stowers.

-8- On the other hand, trial testimony from D.D.’s mother, as well as

Nurse Melloan, reflects D.D.’s age to have been fourteen (14) years old at the time

of her testimony, thirteen (13) on September 9, 2009, when she visited the

emergency room, and twelve (12) during her mother’s brief marriage to Stowers in

the summer of 2009. The reason for the discrepancy with D.D.’s testimony as to

her birthdate is not clear. In denying Stowers’ 60.02 motion, the trial court

indicated it was clearly established by the record “that D.D. was, in fact, twelve

(12) years old at the time of the rapes.”

Ultimately, the distinction of whether D.D. was twelve (12) or thirteen

(13) during June and July of 2009 matters not. The plain language of Stowers’

indictment twice alleges he “committed the crime of Rape First Degree when he

engaged in sexual intercourse with [D.D.], age 12, by forcible compulsion.” A

person may be found guilty of rape in the first degree, per KRS7 510.040(1)(a), by

engaging in sexual intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion. Each

of the elements of KRS 510.040(1)(a) are alleged explicitly in Stowers’ indictment.

A person may also be found guilty of rape in the first degree, per KRS

510.040(1)(b)2., by engaging in sexual intercourse with a person who is incapable

of granting consent because their age is less than twelve (12) years old. Nowhere

in the record does it indicate Stowers was ever indicted under KRS 510.040(1)(b)2.

7 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

-9- However, in his CR 60.02 motion, as well as his appeal, Stowers

conflates these two subsections of KRS 510.140(1) to assert the victim’s age was

an element of the offenses for which he was convicted. This is incorrect.

Throughout the proceedings, Stowers was charged and eventually convicted under

KRS 510.040(1)(a). The language of Stowers’ indictment unmistakably alleged he

was charged for sexual intercourse which occurred by forcible compulsion. While

Stowers’ indictment contains a reference to D.D.’s age, the specific elements of

KRS 510.040(1)(b)2. are nowhere mentioned. The indictment simply did not

allege a lack of consent on the part of D.D. for reasons of incapability; reference to

D.D.’s age in the indictment was unnecessary and the mention mere surplusage.

Furthermore, Stowers alleges “the indictment was premised on theory

that the victim was under the age of 12.” (Emphasis added.) This is flatly untrue.

Nowhere is D.D. alleged to be less than twelve (12) years of age in the indictment.

Even if miscalculated, the indictment plainly asserted D.D. was twelve (12) years

old – not younger than twelve – at the time of the offenses.

This Court may affirm a lower court for any reason supported by the

record. See Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 814 S.W.2d 928, 930

(Ky. App. 1991). Whether or not D.D.’s age had been miscalculated in the

indictment did not render it deficient. Even if it were, “defects in an indictment

will not support a collateral attack upon a judgment of conviction.” Warner v.

-10- Commonwealth, 385 S.W.2d 77, 77 (Ky. 1964). Here, the jury was properly

instructed on forcible compulsion and convicted Stowers on that theory. His

conviction was not based upon any theory of incapacity to consent. The trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying relief.

The Trial Court’s Denial of Relief is Additionally Affirmed as Stowers’ Motion Was Procedurally Barred.

The Commonwealth takes issue with procedural issues of Stowers’

60.02 motion as a whole, including timeliness and its being a successive motion.

While the trial court considered Stowers’ central arguments on their merits and

rejected only his RCr 11.42 argument for procedural reasons, in this successive CR

60.02 proceeding, the Commonwealth’s point is well taken.

There is no reason Stowers’ arguments alleging double jeopardy and

sufficiency of the indictment could not have been made in his initial RCr 11.42

motion. CR 60.02 “is available only to raise issues which cannot be raised in other

proceedings.” McQueen, 948 S.W.2d at 416 (emphasis added). This includes

“issues which could ‘reasonably have been presented’ by direct appeal or RCr

11.42 proceedings.” Id. (quoting RCr 11.42(3) and Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 855-56).

The trial court would have been well within its discretion to have denied Stowers’

successive motion simply for being successive.

Much the same may be said regarding the timeliness of Stowers’

motion. Stowers’ motion sought relief under CR 60.02(e) and (f). CR 60.02

-11- mandates a motion under either of these subsections “shall be made within a

reasonable time.” Determining whether a motion has been made within a

reasonable time is discretionary. Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 858. In Gross, the

Supreme Court concluded the passing of five years after final judgment before a

CR 60.02 motion was not a reasonable time. Id. Stowers’ final judgment was

entered on December 20, 2011. He did not file the subject CR 60.02 motion until

nearly a decade later, on September 7, 2021. As previously discussed, the record

indicates no reason for Stowers to have been previously unaware of any

information cited in his motion. Stowers did not make his motion within a

reasonable time and the trial court would have been well within its discretion to

have denied relief solely for its being untimely.

CONCLUSION

The trial court did not err in denying Stowers relief. We uphold the

finding of the Warren Circuit Court.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Charles M. Stowers, pro se Daniel Cameron LaGrange, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky

Melissa A. Pile Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky

-12-