Charles M. Childers v. Pilares Oil & Gas, Inc.

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedApril 4, 2002
Docket11-01-00255-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Charles M. Childers v. Pilares Oil & Gas, Inc. (Charles M. Childers v. Pilares Oil & Gas, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Charles M. Childers v. Pilares Oil & Gas, Inc., (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

11th Court of Appeals

11th Court of Appeals

Eastland, Texas

Opinion

Charles M. Childers et al

Appellants

Vs.                   No. 11-01-00255-CV B Appeal from Taylor County                                      

Pilares Oil & Gas, Inc.

Appellee

The trial court granted Pilares Oil & Gas, Inc.=s application for a temporary injunction and ordered appellants to Adesist and refrain@ from taking any actions involving Pilares and from interfering with Norma Eltringham, the new president and director of Pilares, or Larry Schultz, the other new director of Pilares.  Appellants Charles M. Childers and Edward Austin had been directors of Pilares, and appellant Nelson Quinn had been legal counsel for Pilares.  The trial court also ordered appellants to produce Pilares=s records to Eltringham.  We affirm.

Pilares filed suit requesting the trial court to declare that:  (1) Childers and Austin are no longer directors, officers, or agents of Pilares; (2) Quinn is no longer Pilares=s counsel; (3) Eltringham is president and treasurer of Pilares; (4) Schultz is vice president and secretary of Pilares; and (5) Pilares=s board of directors consists of Eltringham and Schultz.  In this same pleading, Pilares asked the trial court to issue a temporary injunction requiring appellants Ato turn over all the books and records of Pilares...to Eltringham.@  The application for temporary injunction further requested that appellants be prohibited from transferring any of Pilares=s assets or acting in any way for or on behalf of Pilares. 


Appellants objected to Pilares=s application for temporary injunction on the ground that Pilares=s pleading failed to comply with TEX.R.CIV.P. 682 and 683.  Pilares supplemented its original pleading but did not address appellants= objections.  To obtain a temporary injunction, Pilares had to plead and prove three specific elements:  (1) a cause of action against appellants; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.  Butnaru v. Ford Motor Company, 44 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 808, 2001 WL 618149 at *7 (June 7, 2001).  In its pleading, Pilares alleged that the sole shareholder of Pilares had removed Childers and Austin as officers and directors, that appellants were continuing to conduct business and pursue legal matters on behalf of Pilares, that appellants were transferring assets of Pilares, and that A[Pilares] believes that said [appellants=] actions are prejudicial to [Pilares] and that [Pilares] is entitled to the [injunctive] relief requested.@  Pilares pleaded a cause of action but did not mention a probable right to the relief sought or state why there existed a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.  Pleadings must set forth detailed facts about the alleged harm; general or conclusory allegations are insufficient to serve as a basis for injunctive relief.  See Markel v. World Flight, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 74, 79 (Tex.App. B San Antonio 1996, no writ); Rawson v. Brownsboro Independent School Dist., 263 S.W.2d 578, 580-81 (Tex.Civ.App. B Dallas 1953, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

Although appellants objected to Pilares=s pleading in their original answer, appellants never asserted in the trial court that there was a lack of notice or that they were not suitably informed of the cause of action against them or the relief sought.  Texas is a notice pleading state.  Only fair notice of the claim or allegations need be provided in pleadings.  See TEX.R.CIV.P. 45(b) & 47(a).  Appellants did not specially except or request a continuance; they appeared at the hearing on the temporary injunction and announced ready.  No mention of pleading defect was raised at the hearing until appellants made their final argument.  The temporary injunction was Atried by consent.@  See TEX.R.CIV.P. 67.

An appellate court should only reverse the trial court=s order granting a temporary injunction if the trial court abused its discretion.  Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.1993).  A trial court abuses its discretion where the law is misapplied to the facts or where the evidence does not support the findings.  State v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 526 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex. 1975); Ichiban Records, Inc. v. Rap-A-Lot Records, Inc., 933 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Tex.App. B Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).  The appellate court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court and will not find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the injunction unless the trial court=s action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion.  Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 861-62 (Tex.1978).  Additionally, the appellate court should draw all inferences from the evidence in a manner most favorable to the trial court=s judgment.  Rugen v. Interactive Business Systems, Inc., 864 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tex.App. B Dallas 1993, no writ).


At a temporary injunction hearing, the applicant is not required to establish that it will prevail on final trial; the only question before the trial court is whether the applicant is entitled to preservation of the status quo pending a final trial on the merits. Walling v. Metcalfe, supra at 58; Double M Petroproperties, Inc. v. Frisby, 957 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex.App. B

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Rawson v. Brownsboro Independent School Dist.
263 S.W.2d 578 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1953)
Ichiban Records, Inc. v. Rap-A-Lot Records, Inc.
933 S.W.2d 546 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1996)
Markel v. World Flight, Inc.
938 S.W.2d 74 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1996)
State v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.
526 S.W.2d 526 (Texas Supreme Court, 1975)
Rugen v. Interactive Business Systems, Inc.
864 S.W.2d 548 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1993)
Walling v. Metcalfe
863 S.W.2d 56 (Texas Supreme Court, 1993)
Davis v. Huey
571 S.W.2d 859 (Texas Supreme Court, 1978)
Double M Petroproperties, Inc. v. Frisby
957 S.W.2d 594 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Charles M. Childers v. Pilares Oil & Gas, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charles-m-childers-v-pilares-oil-gas-inc-texapp-2002.