Charles Lucarelli v. Charles Schultz

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: December 4, 2025
• Docket: 25-2200
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

ALD-013 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 25-2200 ___________

CHARLES LUCARELLI, Appellant

v.

CHARLES SCHULTZ, Chase Bank Branch Manager ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-02167) District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane ____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to Jurisdictional Defect or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 October 16, 2025

Before: SHWARTZ, FREEMAN, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 4, 2025) _________

OPINION* _________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM

Appellant Charles Lucarelli, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals

from the District Court’s order dismissing his civil rights complaint. We will summarily

affirm.

I.

In December 2024, Charles Lucarelli filed a complaint against Charles Schultz, a

Chase Bank branch manager, alleging that Schultz committed theft of services, elder

abuse, and bank fraud when he withdrew money from Lucarelli’s bank account instead of

cashing Lucarelli’s check. The Chief Magistrate Judge issued a Report and

Recommendation that recommended dismissing Lucarelli’s complaint without prejudice

because he had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Over the

plaintiff’s objections, the District Court adopted the recommendation and dismissed

Lucarelli’s complaint without prejudice. Lucarelli was given 20 days to refile an

amended complaint that addressed the deficiencies that had been identified by the Chief

Magistrate Judge. Lucarelli did not refile an amended complaint, and instead filed a

notice of appeal.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 We review de novo an order

dismissing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Allah v. Seiverling, 229

1 By filing a notice of appeal rather than amending within the 20-day period the District Court provided, Lucarelli stood on his complaint, and we therefore have appellate 2 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). To survive dismissal, a pleading must “state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face” by alleging facts that “permit the court to infer more

than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).

We may summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir.

L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

III.

Appellant Lucarelli alleges that the defendant’s mishandling of his Veterans

Affairs disability check amounts to a violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

his rights under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), elder abuse, and theft of

services. All these claims were properly dismissed.

The District Court properly dismissed Lucarelli’s § 1983 claim because the

defendant, a bank manager at Chase Bank, is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. See

Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009). As to his ADA claim, Lucarelli did not

make any allegations that the defendant’s complained-of conduct was related in any way

to Lucarelli’s disability (which is not identified in the complaint). See Matheis v. CSL

Plasma, Inc., 936 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that a plaintiff must show that a

defendant “unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of his disability by (a)

failing to make a reasonable modification that was (b) necessary to accommodate his

disability”). To the extent that Lucarelli alleged the defendant committed violations of

jurisdiction. See Berke v. Bloch, 242 F.3d 131, 135-36 (3d Cir. 2001); Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992); Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 952 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam). 3 criminal law, the District Court properly dismissed those claims, because “a private

citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of

another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).

Finally, the District Court correctly concluded that Lucarelli had not established

diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Given that conclusion as well as those we

have already discussed, the District Court was well within its discretion to decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Lucarelli’s state-law claims. See Figueroa v.

Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 1999).

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.