COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00433-CR
CHARLES LEVI MILLER APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM THE 90TH DISTRICT COURT OF YOUNG COUNTY ----------
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury found appellant Charles Levi Miller guilty of aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon, a knife, and assessed his punishment at fifteen years’
confinement and a fine of $2,000. In two issues, Miller argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting into evidence four knives and photographs of
those knives and that in-court identifications of him by two witnesses were
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. inadmissible because they were tainted by an impermissibly suggestive pretrial
identification procedure. We will affirm.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
One afternoon, Kathy McCain was working alone at the Akers & Fultz
office on Loving Highway in Graham when a man, later identified as Miller, came
to the door of her office. Miller asked McCain if she knew the owner of an
adjacent building. McCain directed the man to Coleman’s Packers, the business
across the street, for the information. Miller left McCain’s office and went to
Coleman’s Packers, where he spoke to Stacy Creswell. Approximately ten
minutes later, Miller returned to McCain’s office and asked to borrow a phone
book. Miller returned the phone book to McCain, and when she reached out to
take it, Miller grabbed her left arm and pushed her down onto a couch. Miller
held a knife to McCain’s throat and told her to do as he said or he would slit her
throat. McCain began praying out loud to God and Jesus and pleaded with Miller
to stop. Miller attempted to take off McCain’s jeans while still holding the knife
but was unable to do so. McCain continued pleading with Miller and finally
convinced him to stop. Miller stood, releasing McCain, hugged her, and left.
McCain and Creswell each gave officers a description of Miller and the
truck he was driving. Officers located the truck at a house and found Miller lying
on the floor inside the house. Miller accompanied officers to the police station
and consented to a search of his home and truck. Officers found two knives in
2 the house and two in the truck. At the police station, Miller confessed to the
assault and gave a written statement to officers.
Two days after the attack, Sergeant Terry Vanlandingham met with
McCain at the Akers & Fultz office and met with Creswell at the Graham Police
Department to show them a photographic lineup that he had compiled from the
Young County Jail database. The photographic lineup consisted of six black and
white photographs of males approximately the same size and build. Each
photograph contained a marker with an identification number and the booking
date of the individual. Miller’s photograph was the only one that had the same
booking date as the offense date. McCain and Creswell both identified Miller in
the photographic lineup.
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE KNIVES AND PHOTOGRAPHS
In his first issue, Miller argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting into evidence the four knives that were found in his truck and house
and the photographs of those knives because there was no evidence that the
knives were used in the commission of the assault. We will assume error and
apply a harm analysis.2
2 The parties appear to dispute whether the knives were admissible as evidence of the actual knife used in the assault or as demonstrative evidence of replicas or duplicates of the actual knife used. We need not decide whether the complained-of evidence was admissible for either reason because, applying the appropriate standard of review, we hold that any error was harmless.
3 Because any error in admitting this evidence was not constitutional, rule
44.2(b) is applicable. Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). A substantial right is affected
when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury’s verdict. King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)
(citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1253
(1946)). Conversely, an error does not affect a substantial right if we have a fair
assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.
Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Johnson v. State,
967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
In making this determination, we review the record as a whole, including
any testimony or physical evidence admitted for the jury’s consideration, the
nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, and the character of the alleged
error and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence in the
case. Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We may also
consider the jury instructions, the State’s theory and any defensive theories,
whether the State emphasized the alleged error, closing arguments, and even
voir dire, if applicable. Id. at 355–56.
In this case, the State presented ample evidence of Miller’s guilt, including
his use of a deadly weapon. McCain testified that Miller held a knife to her throat
and threatened to slit her throat if she did not cooperate. She testified that she
could not “be for sure” that the knife used in the assault was one of the four
knives recovered by officers from Miller’s truck or house. Officers that arrived on
4 the scene after the assault saw visible redness on McCain’s neck and took
photographs of her injuries. Miller later confessed to the attack in writing,
although he did not mention the use of a knife in his confession. The testimony
about the knives found in Miller’s truck and home was not extensive and focused
on where the knives had been found and the fact that McCain could not positively
identify one as the one used in the attack. The State made no mention of the
knives in its closing arguments, but the defense’s closing argument reiterated to
the jury that none of the knives were ever identified by McCain.
Having examined the record as a whole, we have a fair assurance that any
error in admitting the knives found in Miller’s truck and house, and photographs
of those knives, did not substantially sway the jury to finding him guilty of assault
with a deadly weapon. See Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 365; Johnson, 967 S.W.2d at
417. Accordingly, we hold that any error in admitting the knives and photographs
of the knives did not have a substantial or injurious effect on the jury’s verdict and
did not affect Miller’s substantial rights. See King, 953 S.W.2d at 271. Thus, we
disregard any error. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). We overrule Miller’s first issue.
IV. IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS
In his second issue, Miller argues that Creswell’s and McCain’s in-court
identifications of Miller as the person who committed the assault lacked indicia of
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COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00433-CR
CHARLES LEVI MILLER APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM THE 90TH DISTRICT COURT OF YOUNG COUNTY ----------
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury found appellant Charles Levi Miller guilty of aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon, a knife, and assessed his punishment at fifteen years’
confinement and a fine of $2,000. In two issues, Miller argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting into evidence four knives and photographs of
those knives and that in-court identifications of him by two witnesses were
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. inadmissible because they were tainted by an impermissibly suggestive pretrial
identification procedure. We will affirm.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
One afternoon, Kathy McCain was working alone at the Akers & Fultz
office on Loving Highway in Graham when a man, later identified as Miller, came
to the door of her office. Miller asked McCain if she knew the owner of an
adjacent building. McCain directed the man to Coleman’s Packers, the business
across the street, for the information. Miller left McCain’s office and went to
Coleman’s Packers, where he spoke to Stacy Creswell. Approximately ten
minutes later, Miller returned to McCain’s office and asked to borrow a phone
book. Miller returned the phone book to McCain, and when she reached out to
take it, Miller grabbed her left arm and pushed her down onto a couch. Miller
held a knife to McCain’s throat and told her to do as he said or he would slit her
throat. McCain began praying out loud to God and Jesus and pleaded with Miller
to stop. Miller attempted to take off McCain’s jeans while still holding the knife
but was unable to do so. McCain continued pleading with Miller and finally
convinced him to stop. Miller stood, releasing McCain, hugged her, and left.
McCain and Creswell each gave officers a description of Miller and the
truck he was driving. Officers located the truck at a house and found Miller lying
on the floor inside the house. Miller accompanied officers to the police station
and consented to a search of his home and truck. Officers found two knives in
2 the house and two in the truck. At the police station, Miller confessed to the
assault and gave a written statement to officers.
Two days after the attack, Sergeant Terry Vanlandingham met with
McCain at the Akers & Fultz office and met with Creswell at the Graham Police
Department to show them a photographic lineup that he had compiled from the
Young County Jail database. The photographic lineup consisted of six black and
white photographs of males approximately the same size and build. Each
photograph contained a marker with an identification number and the booking
date of the individual. Miller’s photograph was the only one that had the same
booking date as the offense date. McCain and Creswell both identified Miller in
the photographic lineup.
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE KNIVES AND PHOTOGRAPHS
In his first issue, Miller argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting into evidence the four knives that were found in his truck and house
and the photographs of those knives because there was no evidence that the
knives were used in the commission of the assault. We will assume error and
apply a harm analysis.2
2 The parties appear to dispute whether the knives were admissible as evidence of the actual knife used in the assault or as demonstrative evidence of replicas or duplicates of the actual knife used. We need not decide whether the complained-of evidence was admissible for either reason because, applying the appropriate standard of review, we hold that any error was harmless.
3 Because any error in admitting this evidence was not constitutional, rule
44.2(b) is applicable. Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). A substantial right is affected
when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury’s verdict. King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)
(citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1253
(1946)). Conversely, an error does not affect a substantial right if we have a fair
assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.
Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Johnson v. State,
967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
In making this determination, we review the record as a whole, including
any testimony or physical evidence admitted for the jury’s consideration, the
nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, and the character of the alleged
error and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence in the
case. Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We may also
consider the jury instructions, the State’s theory and any defensive theories,
whether the State emphasized the alleged error, closing arguments, and even
voir dire, if applicable. Id. at 355–56.
In this case, the State presented ample evidence of Miller’s guilt, including
his use of a deadly weapon. McCain testified that Miller held a knife to her throat
and threatened to slit her throat if she did not cooperate. She testified that she
could not “be for sure” that the knife used in the assault was one of the four
knives recovered by officers from Miller’s truck or house. Officers that arrived on
4 the scene after the assault saw visible redness on McCain’s neck and took
photographs of her injuries. Miller later confessed to the attack in writing,
although he did not mention the use of a knife in his confession. The testimony
about the knives found in Miller’s truck and home was not extensive and focused
on where the knives had been found and the fact that McCain could not positively
identify one as the one used in the attack. The State made no mention of the
knives in its closing arguments, but the defense’s closing argument reiterated to
the jury that none of the knives were ever identified by McCain.
Having examined the record as a whole, we have a fair assurance that any
error in admitting the knives found in Miller’s truck and house, and photographs
of those knives, did not substantially sway the jury to finding him guilty of assault
with a deadly weapon. See Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 365; Johnson, 967 S.W.2d at
417. Accordingly, we hold that any error in admitting the knives and photographs
of the knives did not have a substantial or injurious effect on the jury’s verdict and
did not affect Miller’s substantial rights. See King, 953 S.W.2d at 271. Thus, we
disregard any error. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). We overrule Miller’s first issue.
IV. IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS
In his second issue, Miller argues that Creswell’s and McCain’s in-court
identifications of Miller as the person who committed the assault lacked indicia of
reliability because their out-of-court identifications were based on an
impermissibly suggestive photo array.
5 A. Standard of Review
To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the
trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds
for the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the context of the request,
objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d 687,
691–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Further, the trial court must have ruled on the
request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or the complaining
party must have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P.
33.1(a)(2); Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). A
reviewing court should not address the merits of an issue that has not been
preserved for appeal. Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 473 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010) (op. on reh’g).
B. Preserving Issues Challenging Pretrial Photo Arrays
When attacking an in-court identification as being tainted by an
impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification procedure, generally, a motion to
suppress the identification should be filed and a hearing held out of the jury’s
presence. Barley v. State, 906 S.W.2d 27, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1176 (1996); Martinez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 842, 848 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1969); Wallace v. State, 75 S.W.3d 576, 584 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2002), aff’d on other grounds, 106 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). “At the
very least, there should [be] a trial objection to the in-court identification made by
the witnesses who viewed the photographic array.” Barley, 906 S.W.2d at 32.
6 Failure to complain about or object to the in-court identification amounts to a
procedural default and waives any complaint on appeal. Id.; Wallace, 75 S.W.3d
at 584. It is not enough to object to the introduction of the photographic lineup to
preserve a complaint on the in-court identification. See Wallace, 75 S.W.3d at
584.
C. Waiver of Complaint Regarding Pretrial Photo Array
Miller argues on appeal that neither McCain’s nor Creswell’s initial
descriptions were particularly specific or adequate to identify Miller and that the
date of Miller’s arrest that is visible on the photograph of him in the lineup had the
“corrupting effect” of a suggestive pretrial lineup. However, Miller did not file a
motion to suppress the in-court identifications or object when either Creswell or
McCain identified him in court. See Barley, 906 S.W.2d at 32; Wallace, 75
S.W.3d at 584. Consequently, Miller has not preserved this issue for appeal.
See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). We overrule Miller’s second issue.
7 V. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Miller’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: WALKER, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: July 12, 2012