COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Russell,* Friedman and Callins Argued at Salem, Virginia
CHARLES LEROY HOLMAN MEMORANDUM OPINION** BY v. Record No. 0830-21-3 JUDGE DOMINIQUE A. CALLINS JULY 12, 2022 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKBRIDGE COUNTY Christopher B. Russell, Judge
Kelsey Bulger, Senior Assistant Public Defender (Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.
Sharon M. Carr, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Charles Leroy Holman appeals his convictions for first-degree murder, aggravated
malicious wounding, abduction by force, armed burglary with intent to commit a felony,
unauthorized use of a vehicle, and three counts of using a firearm during the commission of a
felony. Holman contends that (1) the circuit court erred by failing to conduct further inquiry into
defense counsel’s alleged conflict of interest, in violation of Holman’s Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel, and (2) the circuit court erred by denying Holman’s motion to suppress the
statements he made before being given a Miranda warning, in violation of Holman’s Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. For the following reasons, we disagree and affirm
Holman’s convictions.
* Justice Russell participated in the hearing and decision of this case prior to his investiture as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia. ** Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. BACKGROUND
On April 5, 2019, Holman hatched a scheme to meet face-to-face with his former
girlfriend, Christina Martin (“Christina”). Holman abducted Christina’s former co-worker,
Debbie Holloway (“Debbie”), at Debbie’s house and forced Debbie to lure Christina to her home
to help with some vehicle problems. Christina drove to Debbie’s house with another co-worker,
Kimmie McKinney (“Kimmie”), who sat in the passenger seat. After Christina pulled up to
Debbie’s house, Holman appeared in the doorway brandishing a handgun, and Christina
immediately sped off. Holman then took the keys to Debbie’s vehicle and chased after Christina.
Meanwhile, Debbie escaped to a neighbor’s house and called 911 to report the incident. Once
Holman caught up to Christina’s vehicle, he rammed into the vehicle three times, forcing it to
flip over into an embankment. With Christina and Kimmie trapped inside the vehicle, Holman
approached with a rifle, told Christina “You just remember this is from me,” and fired a single
bullet into Christina’s chest. Holman then fled in Debbie’s vehicle. Police officers eventually
arrived on the scene and attempted to provide medical care to Christina and Kimmie. Christina
died from the gunshot wound, and Kimmie suffered a permanent shoulder injury from the
vehicle crash.
Police eventually spotted Holman in a Lexington DMV parking lot. Holman stood in the
corner of the lot holding a handgun to his head. Around the same time, some officers found
Debbie’s vehicle in an Advance Auto Parts parking lot nearby. Several police officers
surrounded Holman with their guns drawn, and Holman shouted multiple times for the officers to
shoot him. Holman eventually threw the handgun to the ground. The officers then swarmed
Holman, who laid on the ground, and placed him in handcuffs. The police later determined that
the gun Holman threw down was fake.
-2- As Holman lay on the ground in handcuffs, Investigator Andrew Ehrhard (“Investigator
Ehrhard”) of the Rockbridge Sheriff’s Office, one of the officers that had first responded to the
scene, engaged in the following exchange with Holman:
[EHRHARD]: Charles, you have anything else on you that’s going to hurt us, buddy?
[HOLMAN]: Nope.
[EHRHARD]: Alright. You got anything in your pockets that’s going to poke us, stick us? Anything like that?
[HOLMAN]: The real gun is over in the other parking lot in Debbie’s truck. That one’s a fake.
[EHRHARD]: When you say, “the real gun,” what are you talking about?
[HOLMAN]: The one that I shot Christina with.
[EHRHARD]: You shot Christina with that gun?
[HOLMAN]: Not that. That’s a toy gun.
[EHRHARD]: Where’s Christina at now?
[HOLMAN]: Christina’s in the car.
[EHRHARD]: Christina—is she the one in the car?
[HOLMAN]: Yea.
[EHRHARD]: You shot her with the gun that’s in your car?
[HOLMAN]: I shot her with the [unintelligible].
[EHRHARD]: Why’d you do that?
[HOLMAN]: Just get me out of here.
[EHRHARD]: Alright, we’ll get you out of here.
Police then transported Holman to the Rockbridge Sheriff’s Office, where he was given a
Miranda warning for the first time and was interviewed by the police.
-3- Holman was eventually indicted for first-degree murder under Code § 18.2-32,
aggravated malicious wounding under Code § 18.2-51.2(A), abduction by force under Code
§ 18.2-47(A), armed burglary with intent to commit a felony under Code § 18.2-91, grand
larceny of a vehicle under Code § 18.2-95(ii), three counts of using a firearm during the
commission of a felony under Code § 18.2-53.1, and possession of a firearm by a convicted
violent felon under Code § 18.2-308.2(A).1
A. The Motion to Suppress
Holman moved to suppress, among other things, the statements he made at the DMV
parking lot in response to Investigator Ehrhard’s questions before being given a Miranda
warning. A hearing on the motions was held at the Rockbridge County Circuit Court.2
Investigator Ehrhard testified at the suppression hearing. He explained that before responding to
the “person of interest” at the DMV parking lot, he was aware of both the reported armed
robbery at Debbie’s house and the vehicle accident that turned into a female with a gunshot
wound, but that “the situation was actively developing,” and he “didn’t know all the details of
what had actually occurred.” Investigator Ehrhard then testified that “a question that I ask with
every arrest is do you have anything on you that will poke us or stick us?” to ensure that “there
[are] not any additional weapons or any items on [the suspect] that would injure officers.”
Investigator Ehrhard explained that he asked Holman questions about the “real gun” and about
Christina because he initially thought the handgun Holman had been carrying was real; he was
“vaguely familiar with the names involved”; he “vaguely knew that Christina was potentially the
1 Holman’s charge for possession of a firearm by a convicted violent felon was nolle prossed by the Commonwealth. 2 Holman also moved to suppress the statements he made during his police interview at the sheriff’s office. The Commonwealth conceded to suppression of the statements Holman made after invoking his right to counsel, and the circuit court granted Holman’s motion to suppress the statements he made at the sheriff’s office before being given a Miranda warning. -4- same woman in the vehicle [accident]”; he didn’t “necessarily at this point even [know] who
Christina was or where she was in what vehicle”; and he “did not understand the totality of the
situation, including the link between . . . the wreck of the vehicle and the [armed robbery].”
The circuit court denied Holman’s motion to suppress, finding that the public safety
exception3 to Miranda applied to the statements Holman made to Investigator Ehrhard at the
DMV parking lot. Although finding that Holman “was in custody when he was on the ground
and surrounded by law enforcement,” the circuit court concluded that Investigator Ehrhard “had
no clear understanding of everything that had gone on despite maybe having a text message or
hearing some radio traffic” and that Investigator Ehrhard’s actions were not “the product of
deliberate deception, falsehood or any police misconduct.”
B. The Conflict of Interest
Holman’s arraignment was held on April 2, 2021, and the circuit court entered pleas of
not guilty to Holman’s eight indictments. During the arraignment, Holman expressed to the
court his dissatisfaction with defense counsel, Assistant Public Defenders Teresa Harris
(“Ms. Harris”) and Mary Hill (“Ms. Hill”), about what he described as their lack of
communication with him. Holman added that he thought his constitutional rights were being
violated because Ms. Harris “represented Christina Martin’s sister, brother and niece in multiple
cases . . . not long before I got locked up” and Ms. Harris “made this aware to me two to three
months after she was appointed to me.” Holman then stated that he “asked [Ms. Harris] to find
out about it, if it was a conflict of interest but she never did” and that “the next time that I stated
it to [Ms. Harris] . . . she, again, played it off like it was no big deal.” Holman finally pleaded,
“[H]ow can I ask for fairness if this woman refuses to step down? How do I know that the
3 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). -5- information that the Commonwealth has given to [defense counsel] is not stepped on by
[Ms. Harris] because of her concerns for the Martin family?”
Later in the arraignment, Ms. Hill stated to the court that “[Holman] has made it clear that
he is very unhappy with the relationship he has with us. To mention, for lack of better terms, the
total breakdown in communication between him and between his attorneys.” Ms. Hill then
stated, “Based off that, Judge, I would request that you consider his request to have new counsel
appointed.” The circuit court, finding that no request for new counsel had been made by
Holman, responded that Holman “basically just made a speech,” that “I don’t see any motion to
withdraw,” and that “I wouldn’t be inclined to grant it.” The court then asked Holman if he had
anything else he wanted to say, to which Holman responded, “No sir.” At the conclusion of the
arraignment, the court provided Holman with access to the jury deliberation room to
communicate with defense counsel for as long as he needed. The court also remarked to Holman
that “what you told me about a lack of communication and a lack of information does not match
the reality of the history of the case.” Neither Holman nor his counsel made further mention of
the alleged conflict of interest during the rest of the arraignment or at any of the subsequent
proceedings before trial.
Holman’s six-day jury trial began on April 19, 2021. Christine’s sister, brother, and
niece were not called as witnesses by the Commonwealth, nor had they any other type of
involvement in Holman’s trial. Additionally, the issue of Ms. Harris’s alleged conflict of interest
did not emerge at any point during the trial. The jury ultimately found Holman guilty of seven of
his eight charges,4 and he was sentenced to two life sentences, plus sixty-five years’
imprisonment. This appeal followed.
4 For Holman’s grand larceny of a vehicle charge, he was convicted of the lesser-included offense of unauthorized use of a vehicle under Code § 18.2-102. -6- ANALYSIS
I. Holman’s Sixth Amendment Claim5
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “A defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment
is violated by ‘an actual conflict of interest [that] adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’”
Kenner v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 279, 297 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Cuyler
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)). “[I]f the possibility of a conflict of interest is apparent, a
trial court has a duty to conduct further inquiry to determine if an actual conflict exists.” Dowell
v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 555, 559 (1987). Yet “[t]he mere possibility of a conflict of
interest, which is not apparent or to which no objection is made, prompts no need for a trial court
to conduct further inquiry.” Id. A trial court must conduct further inquiry into an alleged
conflict of interest “only when ‘the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular
conflict exists’—which is not to be confused with when the trial court is aware of a vague,
unspecified possibility of conflict.” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168-69 (2001) (citation
omitted) (quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347). Holman’s argument that the circuit court deprived
him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel “raises a constitutional question subject to de novo
review in this Court.” Deluca v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 567, 575 (2021).
“Trial courts must rely in the first instance upon the good faith and good judgment of
defense counsel who have an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representation and to advise
5 By alleging to the circuit court that Ms. Harris had a potential conflict of interest based on her prior representation of Christina’s relatives, Holman stated his objection with reasonable certainty and therefore preserved this issue on appeal. Rule 5A:18. Moreover, Holman took no actions that would constitute an express waiver of this objection. See Brown v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 210, 217 (2010) (“[I]f a trial court is aware of a litigant’s legal position and the litigant did not expressly waive such arguments, the arguments remain preserved for appeal.”). -7- the court promptly when a conflict of interest arises.” Dowell, 3 Va. App. at 559. This is
because defense counsel “is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a
conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial.” Sullivan, 446 U.S. at
347 (quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485 (1978)). Even so, “trial courts have a
duty to closely monitor cases involving multiple representation ‘[s]ince a possible conflict
inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation.’” Dowell, 3 Va. App. at 559
(alteration in original) (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348). Virginia attorneys are bound by Rule
1.7 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits a lawyer from representing a
client “if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.” A concurrent conflict of
interest exists if “there is significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.” Rule 1.7(a)(2).
The mere fact that Ms. Harris represented Christina’s sister, brother, and niece in
unrelated matters does not rise to the level of an apparent conflict of interest. See Cantrell v.
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 387, 393-94 (1985) (holding that an attorney “necessarily incurs a
conflict of interest” to “the level of an overwhelming probability” where the attorney
“undertake[s] the civil representation of a victim, or the family of a victim, of a crime whose
perpetrator he must [also] prosecute” as a special prosecutor). The record does not reflect that
Ms. Harris continued to represent Christina’s relatives through the time of the arraignment, nor
does Holman so allege. Christina’s sister, brother, and niece were not co-defendants at
Holman’s trial, nor were they called as witnesses by the Commonwealth to testify against
Holman—circumstances that, if alleged, could have raised an apparent conflict of interest.6 See
6 The only relative of Christina’s that the Commonwealth called to testify at trial was Christina’s mother, Susie Ann Martin. -8- Dowell, 3 Va. App. at 561 (holding that the Commonwealth’s elicitation of testimony from two
witnesses whom defense counsel was also representing in connection with the defendant’s same
offense “was sufficient to bring to the court’s attention a conflict of interest and to trigger an
appropriate inquiry”). Holman’s proffer, on its face, did not demonstrate that Ms. Harris’s prior
representation placed her in the position of having to “serve two masters” at the same time and
be thus “infect[ed] . . . with the possibility [of] private vengeance” against Holman. Cantrell,
229 Va. at 393-94; see also Turner v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 816, 819-20 (2000) (holding that
defense counsel’s seeking of employment with the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office during
the defendant’s trial proceedings did not rise to the level of an apparent conflict of interest, since
defense counsel “had done nothing more than file the application” with the Commonwealth’s
Attorney’s office).
Ms. Harris, as counsel, was in the best position to determine whether her prior
representation of Christina’s sister, brother, and niece would pose a significant risk of materially
limiting her ability to represent Holman. Ms. Harris had the specific knowledge regarding the
nature of her prior representation of Christina’s relatives, what legal responsibilities she owed to
them, and whether those responsibilities could be jeopardized during Holman’s trial. Yet
Ms. Harris herself never alleged that her prior representation of Christina’s relatives created a
potential conflict of interest. See Carter v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 569, 574 (1991)
(holding that where defense counsel’s motion to withdraw specifically alleges that the ability to
represent a client has been seriously compromised, the trial court knew or should have known “a
potential conflict of interest clearly existed”). And the concerns raised on Holman’s behalf about
what he perceived as a lack of communication from his counsel did not suggest that Ms. Harris
was disregarding her ethical duties as an officer of the court and acting directly contrary to
Holman’s interests. A conflict of interest implicates a circumstance that “affect[s] counsel’s
-9- performance” and does not raise “a mere theoretical division of loyalties.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at
171; see also Spence v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 355, 370 (2012). We decline the invitation
to impose a duty on the trial court to conduct further inquiry based on Holman’s speculative
allegation that, because Ms. Harris had represented Christina’s relatives, Ms. Harris deliberately
withheld information from Holman out of her bias in favor of Christina’s family. Because
Holman raised no apparent possibility of a conflict of interest, the trial court was not under any
duty to conduct further inquiry into the alleged conflict of interest.
II. Holman’s Fifth Amendment Claim
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V.
“Where an accused in a criminal case is subjected to custodial police interrogation, he first must
be advised of his Fifth Amendment rights as defined in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), for any statement he makes to be admissible in evidence.” Commonwealth v. Thornton,
24 Va. App. 478, 488 (1997). “Whether the circumstances . . . [are] such as to require Miranda
warnings is a mixed question of law and fact. On appeal, we review such questions de novo but
defer to the fact-finder’s findings of historical fact unless they are plainly wrong or without
evidence to support them.” Spinner v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 384, 392 (2019). “[W]e also
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party . . . together with all
inferences that may reasonably be drawn from it.” Id.
“Whether a suspect is ‘in custody’ under Miranda is determined by the [totality of the]
circumstances of each case, and ‘the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a “formal arrest
or restraint on freedom of movement” of the degree associated with formal arrest.’” Ford v.
Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 249, 256 (1998) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121,
1125 (1983)). “[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning,
- 10 - but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). “Volunteered
statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, and
thus “are unaffected by Miranda’s precautionary evidentiary rules,” Thomas v. Commonwealth,
72 Va. App. 560, 578 (2020).
Finally, “there is a ‘public safety’ exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be
given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted into evidence, and . . . the availability of that
exception does not depend upon the [subjective] motivation of the individual officers involved.”
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984). The public safety exception to Miranda
applies when a police officer’s questions to a criminal suspect “relate to an objectively
reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger.” Id. at 659 n.8.
Additionally, “nothing in Quarles, limits the application of the public safety exception to
questions about the location of a missing weapon.” Anderson v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 85, 92
(2010). Rather, “the application of the public safety exception is to be determined by the
particular circumstances surrounding the need for a police officer to ask questions to protect the
safety of the public and the officer.” Id.
Assuming without deciding that Holman was in “custody” for the purposes of Miranda
while he was on the ground in handcuffs at the DMV parking lot, we hold that Investigator
Ehrhard’s questions and Holman’s responses were not made in violation of Holman’s Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. Investigator Ehrhard’s initial questions to Holman
(“[Y]ou have anything else on you that’s going to hurt us, buddy?” and “You got anything in
your pockets that’s going to poke us, stick us? Anything like that?”) were routine questions for
police safety that were normally attendant to arrest and custody, and therefore did not constitute
- 11 - “interrogation” for the purposes of Miranda.7 See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Moreover, these
questions were not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from Holman, as
Investigator Ehrhard, who thought the handgun Holman had been holding was real, could not
have reasonably expected that Holman would respond, “The real gun is over in the other parking
lot in Debbie’s truck. That one’s a fake.” Finally, Holman’s response about the “real gun” was a
volunteered statement by Holman, and thus is not protected under the Fifth Amendment. See
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.
We conclude that Investigator Ehrhard’s subsequent question (“When you say, ‘the real
gun,’ what are you talking about?”) falls under the public safety exception to Miranda.
Investigator Ehrhard believed that the handgun Holman had been holding was real. Thus,
Holman’s sudden revelation about the “real gun” located in a vehicle in a public parking lot
created an objectively reasonable need for Investigator Ehrhard to inquire further to determine
whether the real gun posed an immediate risk of danger to either the public or the police.
Cf. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657 (public safety exception applied when a police officer asked about
the location of a handgun discarded in a supermarket after the suspect had recently committed
rape); Shelton v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 109, 118 (2000) (public safety exception applied
when a police officer asked about the location of a handgun discarded in a residential
neighborhood after the suspect had recently committed carjacking). We do not construe
Investigator Ehrhard’s question as designed to elicit incriminating information from Holman, but
as Investigator Ehrhard naturally following his “legitimate instincts when confronting [a]
situation[] presenting a danger to the public safety.” Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659.
7 At oral argument, Holman argued that Miranda warnings were required before Investigator Ehrhard asked Holman “Anything like that?” However, we construe this question as simply another question relating to police safety during Holman’s arrest and custody, rather than a vague question designed to elicit incriminating statements about weapons in other locations not immediately accessible to Holman. - 12 - In response to Investigator Ehrhard’s question about the “real gun,” Holman voluntarily
confessed to murdering Christina, stating: “The one that I shot Christina with.” This
self-incriminating statement, like Holman’s statement about the real gun, was volunteered by
Holman, and thus is not protected under the Fifth Amendment. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.
We also conclude that Investigator Ehrhard’s subsequent four questions (“You shot Christina
with that gun?”; “Where’s Christina at now?”; “Christina—is she the one in the car?”; and “You
shot her with the gun that’s in your car?”) also fall under the public safety exception to
Miranda.8 At the hearing on Holman’s motion to suppress, Investigator Ehrhard testified that
during the events leadings up to his encounter with Holman, he had faced an actively developing
situation with limited information and that he did not necessarily know who Christina was and
whether her location had been discovered by the police. Thus, Investigator Ehrhard’s questions
to Holman about Christina were based on an objectively reasonable need to obtain more
information about a woman that Investigator Ehrhard had just learned had been shot by Holman
and was potentially needing emergency medical care. That this emergency pertained to a
wounded woman, and not a discarded handgun, does not render the public safety exception to
Miranda any less applicable, as “nothing in Quarles[] limits the application of the public safety
exception to questions about the location of a missing weapon.” Anderson, 279 Va. at 92.
8 Investigator Ehrhard’s final question to Holman (“Why’d you do that?”) does not fall under the public safety exception to Miranda, since this question was not based on an objectively reasonable need for Investigator Ehrhard to obtain medical care for Christina. However, we conclude that any use of Holman’s answer during Holman’s trial is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” Sanchez v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 340, 353 (2003) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)), since there is no reasonable possibility that Holman’s non-responsive answer (“Just get me out of here”) contributed to the jury verdict. See id. (holding that constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because “there was no ‘reasonable possibility’ that the ‘error contributed to the verdict’” (quoting Tuggle v. Netherland, 79 F.3d 1386, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996))). - 13 - CONCLUSION
We hold that the circuit court did not err by declining further inquiry into defense
counsel’s alleged conflict of interest, and the circuit court did not err by denying Holman’s
motion to suppress the statements he made before being given a Miranda warning. Thus, neither
Holman’s Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, nor Holman’s Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination were violated. Accordingly, we affirm Holman’s convictions.
Affirmed.
- 14 -