CHARLES LACEY v. PS&S (L-0981-20, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedMarch 1, 2022
DocketA-2210-20
StatusUnpublished

This text of CHARLES LACEY v. PS&S (L-0981-20, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CHARLES LACEY v. PS&S (L-0981-20, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
CHARLES LACEY v. PS&S (L-0981-20, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), (N.J. Ct. App. 2022).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2210-20

CHARLES LACEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PS&S,

Defendant-Respondent. _________________________

Submitted February 17, 2022 – Decided March 1, 2022

Before Judges Haas and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Docket No. L-0981-20.

Costello & Mains, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Deborah L. Mains, on the brief).

Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, PC, attorneys for respondent (Mark Diana and Jocelyn A. Merced, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Plaintiff Charles Lacey appeals from the Law Division's March 5, 2021

order granting defendant PS&S's motion to dismiss his complaint for failure to

state a cause of action. We reverse.

Defendant employed plaintiff for thirty-three years. During this time,

plaintiff worked in at least four different departments. On January 11, 2019,

defendant's president told plaintiff "there was no work and today was his last

day."

After defendant fired plaintiff, he filed a complaint alleging defendant

terminated him because of his age in violation of the Law Against

Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50. In order to adequately plead a

cause of action for age discrimination under the LAD, a plaintiff must assert he

(1) is in the protected class; (2) was performing the job at a level that met the

employer's legitimate expectations; and (3) was nevertheless discharged; and

that (4) the circumstances surrounding the discharge support an inference of

discrimination based on his age. See Young v. Hobart West Group, 385 N.J.

Super. 448, 463 (App. Div. 2005); Williams v. Pemberton Twp. Pub. Schs., 323

N.J. Super. 490, 498 (App. Div. 1999).

In his complaint, plaintiff asserted he was sixty-three years old; had

"worked up to or beyond [defendant's] reasonable expectations"; and was

A-2210-20 2 terminated. As to the fourth element, plaintiff stated defendant's "reason for his

termination [was] pretext [to cover defendant's discriminatory intent] because

[d]efendant continued to hire younger individuals for various jobs after his"

discharge.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint under Rule 4:6-

2(e), and alleged plaintiff's complaint "contain[ed] no facts to suggest that his

age played any role whatsoever in his termination." The trial court agreed with

defendant and dismissed plaintiff's complaint without prejudice.

The court found the complaint included sufficient facts to meet the first

three elements of a prima facie case of age discrimination. However, the court

found the pleading did not adequately explain plaintiff's assertion that the

circumstances surrounding the discharge supported an inference of age

discrimination. The court stated the complaint was deficient because "[p]laintiff

does not allege that [d]efendant made age-related remarks to him or others; that

[d]efendant has a pattern of discriminating against older workers; that he was

replaced by a substantially younger employee; or make any other allegations

that might suggest age discrimination occurred."

In order to address these deficiencies, plaintiff filed an amended

complaint. In this pleading, plaintiff stated defendant sought employees to fill

A-2210-20 3 "multiple" positions after it claimed it discharged plaintiff for lack of work.

Plaintiff asserted he "was qualified for the jobs indicated in the [job] postings"

and yet, defendant "hire[d] younger individuals" for these positions. Plaintiff

also alleged that after his dismissal, a co-worker told him that "a member of

[defendant's] upper management" stated "that the company wanted to go forward

with younger people." Plaintiff asserted these circumstances supported an

inference of age discrimination.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint and

again argued plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to satisfy the fourth prong

of a prima facie case of age discrimination. The trial court agreed and granted

defendant's motion, this time with prejudice.

In its March 5, 2021 decision, the court ruled that plaintiff's statement that

the company "wanted to go forward with younger people" after terminating

defendant, did "not necessarily raise an inference of unlawful discrimination or

that age made a difference in [p]laintiff's treatment by [his] employer." In

addition, the court found that because plaintiff did not apply for any of the

positions that defendant sought to fill after his discharge, he could not use these

job postings to support his claim that defendant falsely claimed it had no work

for him.

A-2210-20 4 On appeal, plaintiff asserts he "stated a viable claim for relief under the"

LAD and that the trial court erred by dismissing his complaint. We agree.

"The standard traditionally utilized by courts to determine whether to

dismiss a pleading for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted is

a generous one." Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 451 (2013). In

assessing a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion, courts should view the complaint indulgently,

assume the truthfulness of the allegations in the complaint, and afford the

complainant every reasonable inference. NCP Litig. Trust v. KPMG LLP, 187

N.J. 353, 365 (2006).

A court's inquiry at such an early stage in the proceedings is limited to the

adequacy of the pleadings, not the complaining party's ability to prove its

allegations. See Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739,

746 (1989). To this end, a court should search "the complaint in depth and with

liberality to ascertain whether a fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned

even from an obscure statement of claim . . . ." Ibid. (quoting Di Cristofaro v.

Laurel Grove Mem'l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)).

In reviewing a Rule 4:6-2(e) dismissal, we employ the same standard as

that applied by the trial court. Donato v. Moldow, 374 N.J. Super. 475, 483

(App. Div. 2005). We "assume the facts as asserted by plaintiff are true," and

A-2210-20 5 we give the plaintiff "the benefit of all inferences that may be drawn." Banco

Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 166 (2005) (quoting Velantzas v.

Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)). Dismissal is appropriate

only if "the complaint states no basis for relief and discovery would not provide

one." Ibid.

Applying these principles, we are satisfied plaintiff pled sufficient facts

to withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e). Defendant conceded

plaintiff satisfied the first three elements of a prima facie case of age

discrimination under the LAD. Contrary to the trial court's determination,

plaintiff also clearly met the requirements of the fourth prong.

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleged one of defendant's leaders

commented "that the company wanted to go forward with younger people." The

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Young v. Hobart West Group
897 A.2d 1063 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2005)
Donato v. Moldow
865 A.2d 711 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2005)
Williams v. PEMBERTON TP. SCHOOLS
733 A.2d 571 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1999)
NCP Litigation Trust v. KPMG LLP
901 A.2d 871 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2006)
Banco Popular North America v. Gandi
876 A.2d 253 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2005)
Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp.
563 A.2d 31 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1989)
Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Memorial Park
128 A.2d 281 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1957)
Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.
536 A.2d 237 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1988)
Green v. Morgan Properties
73 A.3d 478 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
CHARLES LACEY v. PS&S (L-0981-20, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charles-lacey-v-pss-l-0981-20-somerset-county-and-statewide-njsuperctappdiv-2022.