Charles Jovan Williams v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 23, 2024
• Docket: 07-23-00336-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-23-00336-CR

CHARLES JOVAN WILLIAMS, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 19th District Court McLennan County, Texas1 Trial Court No. 2017-2066-C1, Honorable Thomas C. West, Presiding

May 23, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Charles Jovan Williams, appeals his convictions on two counts of

indecency with a child by contact and resulting sentences of eighteen and two years’

incarceration.2 Appellant contends that the trial court’s polling of the jury as to its

1 Originally appealed to the Tenth Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by the

Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. Should a conflict exist between precedent of the transferor court and this Court on any relevant issue, this appeal will be decided in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2 Appellant was also fined $500 as part of the sentence for each count of conviction. numerical division during deliberations was coercive and deprived Appellant of his

constitutional right to an impartial jury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

BACKGROUND

As Appellant’s sole issue challenges the procedure leading to his conviction, we

will not discuss the facts underlying his convictions. Appellant was indicted for one count

of continuous sexual abuse of a young child3 and six counts of indecency with a child by

contact.4 Appellant pleaded not guilty to all counts of the indictment.

At the close of evidence, the case was submitted to the jury. After approximately

four hours of deliberation, the jury sent a note to the trial court asking, “If we can come to

an agreement on some but not all accounts [sic] is that okay?” In response, the trial court

indicated that it “would like to know the vote on the non-unanimous counts.” The jury

responded with a numerical breakdown as to each count other than count seven, where

it appeared that the jury had reached a unanimous decision. In response, the trial court

instructed the jury to “Please continue your deliberations.” Thirty-eight minutes later, the

jury sent a note indicating that it had reached a verdict as to all counts. The jury’s verdict

found Appellant guilty on counts two and seven. After the presentation of punishment

evidence, the jury recommended that Appellant be sentenced to eighteen years’

incarceration and a $500 fine as to count two, and two years’ incarceration and a $500

3 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02.

4 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11.

2 fine as to count seven. After the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s

verdicts, Appellant timely filed the instant appeal.

By his appeal, Appellant presents one issue. Appellant contends that the trial

court’s inquiry into how the jury stood numerically as to the counts upon which the jury

could not agree was coercive and deprived Appellant of his constitutional right to an

impartial jury. Appellant does not identify any specific Texas authority providing that a

trial court’s inquiry into the jury’s numerical division, without more, is coercive and

deprives a defendant of an impartial jury.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

“Any criminal defendant . . . being tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced verdict

of that body.” Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241, 108 S. Ct. 546, 98 L. Ed. 2d 568

(1988). It is not inherently improper for a trial court to require a jury to continue

deliberating after it indicates that it is deadlocked. See Montoya v. State, 810 S.W.2d

160, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc). However, a claim of jury coercion can arise

when a trial court attempts to encourage a deadlocked jury to reach a verdict. Barnett v.

State, 161 S.W.3d 128, 133 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005), aff’d, 189 S.W.3d 272 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2006).

The Supreme Court of the United States has indicated that the mere inquiry by the

trial court into the numerical division is error per se. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S.

448, 450, 47 S. Ct. 135, 71 L. Ed. 345 (1926). But the Supreme Court has subsequently

noted that its decision was not based on any constitutional provision, but was an exercise

of its supervisory powers, and need not be followed by state courts. Lowenfield, 484 U.S.

3 at 239–40 & n.3. Texas courts have held that a mere inquiry into a jury’s numerical

division is not reversible error per se. See Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102, 124 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1996) (en banc); Melancon v. State, 66 S.W.3d 375, 384–85 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (op. on en banc reh’g); Chairs v. State, 878 S.W.2d

250, 252 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1994, no pet.); Odom v. State, 682 S.W.2d

445, 448 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1984, pet. ref’d). While not per se erroneous, it is

possible that an inquiry into the numerical division will have an improper coercive effect

on the jury. See Hollies v. State, 967 S.W.2d 516, 521–22 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998,

pet. ref’d) (per curiam) (combination of supplemental instructions and jury polling might

result in constitutional violation). However, the determination of whether jury polling or

supplemental instructions will have an improper coercive effect on the jury must be

decided based on the facts and circumstances present in each case. Id.

In the present case, upon notification that the jury was deadlocked on certain

counts, the trial court inquired as to the numerical divide amongst the jury. See Odom,

682 S.W.2d at 448 (as here, appellant did not cite a single Texas case establishing that

making inquiry into numerical division is reversible error per se). It did not inquire into

how many were in favor of or opposition to conviction. See Hollies, 967 S.W.2d at 522

(“in a search for error of constitutional dimension, the fact that a trial court does not search

out and publicly target, specifically or inferentially, specific members of the jury and by a

supplemental Allen charge urge them to re-evaluate their views, is very important vis-à-

vis coercion of a verdict” (emphasis in original)). Its supplemental instruction simply

directed the jury to continue its deliberations. See Ford v. State, 14 S.W.3d 382, 395

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (“A trial court’s instruction to a jury to

4 continue deliberating will not be construed as coercive unless it pressures the jurors into

reaching a verdict or contains additional instructions as to the law.”). In this case, the trial

court’s inquiry into the numeric division of the jury, made without actively identifying jurors

with minority viewpoints and instructing them to reexamine their perspectives, is not

coercive. Howard, 941 S.W.2d at 124. As such, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judy C. Parker Justice

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