Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc.

784 F. Supp. 231, 22 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1212, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1790, 1992 WL 28176
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 4, 1992
DocketCiv. 88-3040
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 784 F. Supp. 231 (Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 231, 22 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1212, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1790, 1992 WL 28176 (E.D. Pa. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

LOUIS H. POLLAK, District Judge.

In this action, the plaintiff, Charles Jac-quin et Cie, Inc., (“Jacquin”) alleges that defendants, Destilería Serralles, Inc., (“DSI”) and Crown Marketing International (“Crown”) infringed its trade dress in violation of section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and state common law. At trial, the jury found that Jacquin had established that its trade dress had secondary meaning. This court then entered an injunction prohibiting the defendants from infringing on the plaintiff’s trade dress in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Jac-quin appealed, claiming that the injunction should have embraced a wider geographic area. The Court of Appeals agreed, and remanded to this court for reconsideration of the geographic scope of the decree. See Charles Jacquin et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 467 (3rd Cir.1990). Jacquin seeks extension of the injunction to cover the states of Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia, and West Virginia.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

Jacquin is a maker and seller of alcoholic beverages; the firm has been in business since 1884. According to Jacquin’s figures, approximately one-half of its sales are of cordials. Norton J. Cooper, the principal shareholder and president of Jacquin, testified that the firm formerly sold approximately 300,000 cases of cordials per year, but that in recent years its sales have declined to about 250,000 cases a year.

In 1968, Jacquin developed a distinctively shaped 750 milliliter bottle for its line of cordials. Jacquin markets some of its cordials in bottles of other shapes and sizes, but this distinctive bottle, Jacquin’s leading symbol, is featured in approximately 75% of Jacquin’s advertisements, which include billboards, print ads, and other promotional materials.

Defendant DSI has been engaged in the sale of Puerto Rican rum since 1865. In 1986, anticipating the introduction of a new rum-based cordial, DSI requested that Owens-Illinois, Inc., design a bottle for the new product, using a Blackstone whisky bottle as a model. The following year, DSI entered into an agreement with Crown to distribute Don Juan Schnapps, packaged in the new bottle, in the continental United States.

After sending DSI a cease-and-desist letter, Jacquin initiated this action in April 1988, alleging that the packaging of Don Juan Schnapps infringed the trade dress of Jacquin’s cordial products in violation of *233 section 43 of the Lanham Act and state common law. Under the Lanham Act, Jac-quin was required to show that its trade dress had acquired secondary meaning, such that a consumer viewing the trade dress would assume that it came from a particular source. See Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 462 (3rd Cir.1983). The issue of secondary meaning was tried to the jury, which determined that Jacquin’s trade dress had acquired secondary meaning. The jury was not asked, however, to determine the geographic region in which the trade dress had secondary meaning. Instead, the parties submitted post-trial memoranda in which they addressed the question of the extent of Jacquin’s sales in several states. Based on the figures presented, I determined that Jacquin had established market penetration sufficient to create a likelihood of confusion only in Pennsylvania, and issued an injunction limited to that state.

The Court of Appeals reversed, finding error in both the mathematical calculations made and the standards applied. See Jacquin, 921 F.2d at 473-74. The Court of Appeals questioned the source of the numbers utilized and criticized the use of raw market share percentages, stating that this court must consider not only absolute market share, but also market share relative to the shares held by other cordials makers. See id. at 474. The Court of Appeals also suggested that this court explain why it did not credit the apparently uncontradicted testimony of Kevin O’Brien, Jacquin’s Vice-President of National Sales, concerning Jacquin’s market position in the states of New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Rhode Island. See id. at 474 n. 7. On remand, this court must determine, in accordance with the Third Circuit’s mandate, the extent of Jacquin’s market penetration in states other than Pennsylvania and the proper scope of the injunction.

II. The Legal Standard for Market Penetration

In determining the proper geographic scope of an injunction in a trademark infringement case, the court must determine the market penetration of plaintiff’s product. Only if plaintiff’s market penetration is “significant enough to pose a real likelihood of confusion among consumers in that area” is an injunction appropriate. Natural Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1397 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920, 106 S.Ct. 249, 88 L.Ed.2d 257 (1985). To assess the extent of plaintiff’s market penetration, a court in this Circuit must consider four factors: “(1) the volume of sales of the trademarked product, (2) the growth trends (both positive and negative) in the area; (3) the number of persons actually purchasing the product in relation to the potential number of customers; and (4) the amount of product advertising in the area.” Id. at 1398-99. Pursuant to the Eighteenth Amendment, the regulation of alcoholic beverages is a matter reserved to the several states, and each state independently regulates the sale of alcoholic beverages within its borders. Each state in which Jacquin markets its cordials is therefore an appropriate geographic area in which to evaluate Jacquin’s market penetration. See Jacquin, 921 F.2d at 473.

III. Application of the Legal Standard to Jacquin’s Sales

A. Volume of Sales of the Trademarked Product

In its brief, Jacquin continues to press the argument, presented previously both to this court and to the Court of Appeals, that because its sales in each of the states at issue exceeded the $5,000 per year amount treated as a de minimis threshold in Natural Footwear, it deserves injunctive relief in all those states. But the Court of Appeals, in reviewing Jacquin’s claims, appears to have rejected this argument, stating: “Whether a volume of sales is significant will vary with the product and market. The numbers that result in injunctive relief in one case may not be significant in another.” Jacquin, 921 F.2d at 473. Natural Footwear addressed the market for shoes, not the market for cordials; there is no assurance that a sales volume figure that is relevant in the shoe market will represent similar market penetration in the cordial market. I therefore *234 reject Jacquin’s argument that

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784 F. Supp. 231, 22 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1212, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1790, 1992 WL 28176, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charles-jacquin-et-cie-inc-v-destileria-serralles-inc-paed-1992.