Charles Iko v. NV Parole Board

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: January 17, 2026
• Docket: 3:26-cv-00022
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 CHARLES IKO, Case No. 3:26-cv-00022-ART-CSD 5 Petitioner, DISMISSAL ORDER 6 v.

7 NV PAROLE BOARD,

8 Respondent.

9 Petitioner Charles Iko, a Nevada state prisoner who is serving a sentence 10 of life with the possibility of parole for his first-degree murder conviction, filed a 11 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a motion for 12 leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and a financial certificate. (ECF Nos. 1 (“IFP 13 Application”), 1-1 (“Petition”), 4.) The Court finds that good cause exists to grant 14 the IFP Application. However, following a preliminary review of the Petition under 15 the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases,1 the Court dismisses the Petition. 16 Iko alleges that the Nevada Parole Board has exceeded the Eighth Judicial 17 District Court’s authority. (ECF No. 1-1 at 3.) The Eighth Judicial District Court 18 sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole after ten years, but he has been 19 in prison for almost 35 years, and the Nevada Parole Board has denied him parole 20 on ten different occasions. (Id.) Most recently, when Iko was before the Nevada 21 Parole Board on July 30, 2025, it stated that Iko needed to complete another 5 22 years before being considered for parole in the future even though he was only 23 required to complete another 3 years after each of his prior parole board denials. 24 (Id.) 25

26 1 Under Habeas Rule 4, the assigned judge must examine a habeas petition and 27 order a response unless it “plainly appears” that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Habeas Rule 4; see also Valdez v. Montgomery, 918 F.3d 687, 693 (9th Cir. 28 2019). 1 The Petition fails to allege a cognizable federal habeas claim. The 2 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) “places limitations on a 3 federal court’s power to grant a state prisoner’s federal habeas petition.” Hurles 4 v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 777 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 5 170, 181 (2011)). A state prisoner is entitled to federal habeas relief only if he is 6 being held in custody in violation of the constitution, laws, or treaties of the 7 United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). “Thus, a habeas corpus petition must allege 8 a deprivation of one or more federal rights to present a cognizable federal habeas 9 corpus claim.” Burkey v. Deeds, 824 F. Supp. 190, 192 (D. Nev. 1993). 10 In Moor v. Palmer, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated, “[t]o 11 the extent that Moor is requesting habeas relief on the basis of the [Parole] 12 Board’s violation or misapplication of Nevada statutes in and of themselves, he 13 fails to state a basis for federal habeas relief,” and “[t]o the extent that Moor is 14 asserting that the Board’s violation or misapplication of Nevada law violated his 15 federal due process rights, we reject that argument as well, because Moor has no 16 liberty interest in parole.” 603 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 2010). Regarding the 17 second statement, the Court of Appeals elaborated as follows:

18 Nevada’s statutory parole scheme, however, expressly disclaims any 19 intent to create a liberty interest. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.10705 (legislative declaration that “the release or continuance of a person 20 on parole or probation is an act of grace of the State . . . and it is not intended that the establishment of standards relating thereto create 21 any such right or interest in liberty or property. . . .”). The statute does not use mandatory language; instead, it provides that “the 22 Board may release on parole a prisoner who is otherwise eligible for 23 parole” and lists factors to be considered in exercising that discretion. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.1099(1), (2) (emphasis added). The 24 Nevada Supreme Court has held that the discretion conferred on the Board by Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.1099 “does not confer a legitimate 25 expectation of parole release and therefore does not create a 26 constitutionally cognizable liberty interest” in parole. Severance v. Armstrong, 96 Nev. 836, 620 P.2d 369, 370 (1980). 27 Id. at 661–62. 28 1 Given that Ike has no liberty interest in parole, he fails to allege a 2 || deprivation of one or more federal rights, so the Court dismisses the Petition. 3 It is therefore ordered that the IFP Application (ECF No. 1) is granted. 4 It is further ordered that the Petition (ECF No. 1-1) is dismissed without 5 || prejudice as not cognizable. A certificate of appealability is denied, as jurists of 6 || reason would not find dismissal of the Petition to be debatable or wrong. 7 It is further kindly ordered that the Clerk of the Court (1) add Nevada 8 || Attorney General Aaron D. Ford as counsel for Respondents, (2) electronically 9 || provide Respondents’ counsel copies of the Petition (ECF No. 1-1), this Order, and 10 || all other filings in this matter by regenerating the notices of electronic filing,? (3) 11 || enter final judgment dismissing this action without prejudice, and (4) close this 12 || case. 13 DATED THIS 17+ day of January 2026. 14

17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 2No response is required from Respondents other than to respond to any orders 28 || ofa reviewing court.