Charles Harrison v. Dr. Andrew Minardi

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: October 31, 2007
• Docket: CA-0007-0514
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-514

CHARLES HARRISON

VERSUS

DR. ANDREW MINARDI, ET AL.

************

APPEAL FROM THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF EVANGELINE, NO. 68,579 HONORABLE THOMAS F. FUSELIER, DISTRICT JUDGE

MICHAEL G. SULLIVAN JUDGE

Court composed of Marc T. Amy, Michael G. Sullivan, and James T. Genovese, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Dean J. Guidry Attorney at Law Post Office Box 5255 Lafayette, Louisiana 70502 (337) 266-2250 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant: Charles Harrison

Marc W. Judice Judice & Adley Post Office Drawer 51769 Lafayette, Louisiana 70505-1769 (337) 235-2405 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: Dr. Andrew Minardi Chuck R. West West & Vidrine Post Office Box 1019 Ville Platte, Louisiana 70586 (337) 363-2772 Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: Rapides Healthcare System, L.L.C. SULLIVAN, Judge.

Charles Harrison appeals the dismissal of his claims against Dr. Andrew

Minardi for his failure to post a cash or surety bond as provided in La.R.S.

49:1299.47(I)(2)(c). For the following reasons, we affirm.

Facts

On December 19, 2006, Mr. Harrison filed this medical malpractice suit against

Dr. Minardi and Rapides Healthcare System, L.L.C. d/b/a/ Savoy Medical Center

(Savoy Medical Center) for damages he allegedly suffered as a result of medical

treatment rendered by Defendants. In his Answer, Dr. Minardi sought to enforce the

requirement of La.R.S. 40:1299.47(I)(2)(c) that the plaintiff in a medical malpractice

suit post a cash or surety bond in the amount of all costs of the medical review panel

when the medical review panel’s opinion was unanimous in favor of the defendant

healthcare provider. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Minardi filed a Rule to Show Cause,

requesting that the trial court order Mr. Harrison to comply with this provision.

A hearing on the Rule to Show Cause was held on February 16, 2007. During

the hearing, counsel for Mr. Harrison made the trial court aware that he had alleged

in the petition that Mr. Harrison was indigent and unable to post cash or a surety bond

as required by La.R.S. 40:1299.47(I)(2)(c). The trial court observed that until

Mr. Harrison complied with the requirements of La.Code Civ.P. art. 5183 and

provided affidavits concerning his income and assets, his request to proceed in forma

pauperis was not before the court. Counsel for Mr. Harrison acknowledged that he

did not have the documentation needed for the trial court to grant Mr. Harrison

pauper status and that the trial court did not have a choice but to grant Dr. Minardi’s

request that he post a cash or surety bond. The trial court granted Mr. Harrison thirty

1 days, or until March 19, to post a cash or surety bond and stated that Mr. Harrison’s

failure to comply with the order would result in dismissal of his claims against

Dr. Minardi.

Mr. Harrison’s counsel questioned whether he could get a hearing on

Mr. Harrison’s status as a pauper, if the required affidavits were filed within that

thirty days, acknowledging, “I don’t get a hearing within thirty days then I am beyond

. . . that time in which I should have posted a surety bond, so I have to make an

application before then to hear the issue.” The trial court observed that it could not

prejudge the issue but stated that it would be inclined to consider a stay of its order

requiring a cash or surety bond if the affidavits were filed and a stay was requested

before March 19. On February 28, the trial court signed a Judgment on Motion to

Enforce Provisions of La.R.S. 40:1299.47(I)(2)(c) which conformed with his oral

ruling.

On March 22,1 Mr. Harrison filed a motion, requesting that the trial court

“reconsider and rescind its previous order denying pauper status and compelling” him

to post cash or a surety bond. The motion also requested an immediate emergency

hearing to address an appeal of the February 28 order “if rescission of it is not

granted.” The motion included an order allowing Mr. Harrison to proceed without

paying costs in advance. The motion did not include an order rescinding the prior

order requiring him to post a bond or an order setting a hearing on his request.

Affidavits executed by Mr. Harrison and another person attesting to Mr. Harrison’s

inability to pay court costs were attached to the motion. The affidavits are dated

1 Mr. Harrison avers that his Motion Reurging Motion Filed with Original Petition to Grant Petitioner Pauper Status Pursuant to La.C.C.P. 5181 et seq. was filed by facsimile on March 21; however, there is no documentation in the record which establishes that the Motion was filed before March 22. Whether the motion was filed March 21 or March 22 has no bearing on the merits of Mr. Harrison’s claims.

2 March 15. On March 26, the trial court crossed out the order to allow Mr. Harrison

to proceed as a pauper, wrote “[m]otion denied as untimely” under it, and signed the

modified order. That same day, the trial court signed an Order of Dismissal,

dismissing Dr. Minardi without prejudice.

On March 30, Mr. Harrison filed a Motion for New Trial and/or Motion and

Order for Suspensive Appeal. The trial court denied the Motion for New Trial, noting

that “[n]o reason exists for a new trial,” but granted the Motion for Suspensive

Appeal. Pauper status was granted for purposes of the appeal only.

On appeal, Mr. Harrison assigns three errors: 1) La.R.S. 40:1299.47(I)(2)(c)

is unconstitutional, 2) the trial court erred in failing to address his request to proceed

as a pauper before it signed the Order of Dismissal, and 3) the trial court erred in

denying his Motion for New Trial.

Discussion

Unconstitutionality of La.R.S. 40.1299.47(I)(2)(c)

The unconstitutionality of a statute is not properly before an appellate court

unless it was specifically pled in the trial court, and the grounds for the claim were

particularized. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-450 (La. 4/27/07), 956

So.2d 573. Mr. Harrison did not contest the constitutionality of La.R.S.

40:1299.47(I)(2)(c) in the trial court. Therefore, this assignment of error is not

properly before this court.

Dismissal of Dr. Minardi

Mr. Harrison contends that the trial court erred in failing to consider his status

as a pauper before it signed the Order of Dismissal and in denying his motion for new

trial. He urges that upon receipt of his affidavits, La.Code Civ.P. art. 5183 required

3 the trial court to immediately reconsider his request to proceed as a pauper, even

though his affidavits were submitted after the March 19 deadline to post a cash or a

surety bond.

The Code of Civil Procedure provides a procedure for one who cannot afford

to pay court costs to prosecute litigation without paying court costs in advance.

La.Code Civ.P. art. 5181-5188. This is a privilege, not a right, and one seeking to

take advantage of this privilege must apply for permission to do so and must submit

specific documentation. La.Code Civ.P. art. 5183. The request to exercise this

privilege can be made in the applicant’s first pleading or later in an ex parte motion.

Id. The grant of this privilege is within the trial court’s discretion, and denial of the

privilege can be reversed only if the trial court abused its discretion. Hollins v.

Moore, 220 So.2d 103 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1969); Hollier v. Broussard, 220 So.2d 175

(La.App. 3 Cir. 1969).

The Judgment on Motion to Enforce Provisions of La.R.S. 40:1299.47 (I)(2)(c)

allowed Mr. Harrison until March 19 to post a cash or surety bond in the amount of

$3,062.03 and further ordered that “if plaintiff fails to post . . . a cash or surety bond

. . . on or before [March 19], this Court will sign an Order Dismissing Dr. Minardi

with full prejudice from the case sub judice.”

Mr. Harrison missed the March 19 deadline and complains that the trial court

erred in not considering his request because Article 5183 does not limit the time

within which a litigant can seek permission to proceed as a pauper. This argument

ignores the trial court’s authority to establish a deadline to post a bond and is without

merit.

4 In Pearson v. Fontaine, 583 So.2d 493 (La.1991), the supreme court

recognized a trial court’s authority to limit the time within which a litigant can file

the documentation required to proceed as a pauper. The court issued a four-line order

which does not recite the facts on which the writ application was premised, but one

can glean from the order that the trial court set a deadline for the payment of costs and

that the applicant wanted to qualify as a pauper to avoid payment of the costs. The

supreme court ordered the trial court to allow the applicant fifteen days to comply

with the requirements of Article 5183 and stayed the trial court’s deadline for the

payment of costs until the applicant’s pauper request was considered. If the applicant

failed to file an application to proceed in forma pauperis within the fifteen-day

period, the stay order would automatically dissolve which would result in the litigant

having to pay the costs. See also King v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 552 So.2d 73

(La.App. 3 Cir. 1989), writ denied, 556 So.2d 1264 (La.1990), where this court held

that the trial court did not err when it disallowed the plaintiff’s request for a jury trial

after she failed to post a jury bond as ordered and failed to timely seek reinstatement

of permission to proceed as a pauper.

The trial court set a deadline by which Mr. Harrison had to post a bond.

Mr. Harrison did not post a bond and did not seek permission to proceed as pauper

by the March 19 deadline, although his counsel notarized the affidavits required by

Article 5183 on March 15. Accordingly, we find no error with the trial court’s

dismissal of Dr. Minardi.

Mr. Harrison sued Dr. Minardi and Savoy Medical Center. The trial court’s

March 19 deadline was set in response to Dr. Minardi’s request to enforce the

provisions of La.R.S. 40:1299.47(I)(2)(c). On March 22, Savoy Medical Center filed

5 a Rule to Show Cause why Mr. Harrison should not be ordered to post the bond

required by La.R.S. 40:1299.47(I)(2)(c). Mr. Harrison requested permission to

proceed as a pauper in his petition, and when he submitted the affidavits required by

La.Code Civ.P. art. 5183, his application for pauper status was complete. The

completion of the application was untimely with regard to Dr. Minardi’s motion for

the bond. However, because the completion preceded action by the trial court on

Savoy Medical Center’s motion for the bond, the trial court should have considered

it in connection with that motion.

Denial of New Trial

Mr. Harrison next asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motion

for new trial because his motion was timely filed. The trial court denied the motion

for new trial finding “[n]o reason exists for a new trial,” not because it was untimely.

Mr. Harrison apparently misread the trial court’s Order which denied the motion; the

order states in part: “Consequently, plaintiff’s filings were untimely and suit was

dismissed. No reason exists for a new trial.” The filings referenced are

Mr. Harrison’s pauper affidavits, not the Order dismissing Dr. Minardi. Therefore,

Mr. Harrison’s arguments on this assignment of error are irrelevant; however, in the

interest of justice, we will review the correctness of the trial court’s denial of a new

trial with regard to its dismissal of Dr. Minardi.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1972 sets forth peremptory grounds

for granting a motion for new trial. Our review of the facts establishes that none of

these grounds exist here. Pursuant to Article 1972, a new trial must be granted when

the judgment is contrary to the law and evidence, new evidence was discovered after

the trial, and when the jury was bribed or has behaved improperly. The second and

6 third grounds are completely inapplicable to the facts of this case and need not be

addressed. As to the first ground, we have previously concluded that the trial court’s

refusal to consider Mr. Harrison’s application to proceed as a pauper after its

March 19 deadline to post a cash or surety bond was not error with regard to

Dr. Minardi. For the same reasons, we find that refusal was not contrary to the law

and the evidence; therefore, no peremptory ground for a new trial exists.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1973 allows a trial court to grant a

new trial “if there is good ground therefor.” Hence, we are presented with the

question of whether Mr. Harrison’s attorney’s failure to file the affidavits required by

La.Code Civ.P. art. 5183 and request an order allowing Mr. Harrison to proceed as

a pauper by the March 19 deadline is a good ground for granting a new trial.

In Gauthier v. Gauthier, 04-198 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/10/04), 886 So.2d 681, writ

denied, 04-3019 (La. 2/18/05), 896 So.2d 15, this court held that an attorney’s failure

to act is not a valid ground for a new trial. The appellant in Gauthier complained that

the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to file his community property partition

detailed descriptive list after the deadline to do so had expired. This court found no

error, observing that the trial court had already granted the appellant an extension of

the statutory deadline, that the new deadline was missed by a significant amount of

time, and that no good reason for the delay was provided. This court specifically

determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider the

untimely list and rejected the appellant’s argument that because his attorney’s

negligence would result in a miscarriage of justice, he should be granted a new trial.

Counsel for Mr. Harrison notarized the pauper affidavits on March 15 but did

nothing more until after the March 19 deadline. He did not seek an extension of the

7 deadline and does not assert that he has a valid reason for not complying with the

deadline. We find no error with the trial court’s denial of the motion for new trial.

Disposition

The dismissal of Dr. Andrew Minardi is affirmed. The matter is remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.