IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2022-CA-00216-SCT
CHARLES H. MOTON
v.
CITY OF CLARKSDALE, MISSISSIPPI, HON. ROBERT M. TYNER AS THE EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM O. LUCKETT, JR., DECEASED, AND CAPTAIN MARK HAYNES, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SERGEANT-AT-ARMS
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/07/2022 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ANDREW K. HOWORTH TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: ELLIS TURNAGE WILTON V. BYARS, III LAUREN ELIZABETH WARD ROBERT MICHAEL TYNER, JR. COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: COAHOMA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ELLIS TURNAGE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: WILTON V. BYARS, III LAUREN ELIZABETH WARD NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 07/06/2023 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: 04/20/2023
BEFORE KITCHENS, P.J., COLEMAN AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
COLEMAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. The motion for rehearing is denied. The original opinion is withdrawn, and this
opinion is substituted.
¶2. Former City of Clarksdale Commissioner Charles Moton alleged that his December 2013 and May 2015 arrests at Clarksdale city commissioners meetings were in violation of
a litany of his state constitutional rights. The trial court dismissed Moton’s claims because
he failed to file suit within the statute of limitations. For the following reasons, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
¶3. At the time of his arrests, Charles Moton was serving as the Ward 3 commissioner of
the City of Clarksdale. At the December 23, 2013, bimonthly meeting of the Clarksdale
Board of Commissioners, then-Mayor Bill Luckett, Jr., presented copies of board meeting
decorum and rules of order along with a letter addressed to the board. The mayor then
allowed each commissioner to “say what they wanted to say.” However, after two minutes
and fifteen seconds of comment from Moton, the mayor ordered Moton to be removed from
the meeting pursuant to Section 11A of the board’s decorum policy. By command of the
mayor, Clarksdale Police Captain Mark Haynes, serving as sergeant-at-arms, escorted Moton
from the meeting and arrested him for disorderly conduct and failure to comply with the
request of a law enforcement officer pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 97-35-7(1) (Rev.
2020).
¶4. On May 22, 2014, the Clarksdale Municipal Court, in a bench trial, tried and
convicted Moton. He then appealed to the Coahoma County County Court. Moton filed a
timely notice of appeal to the Coahoma County Circuit Court on October 6, 2016. Later, on
May 26, 2015, Moton was removed from a second board meeting by Captain Haynes at the
direction of Mayor Luckett, arrested, and charged with disturbing the peace, public
2 drunkenness, and resisting arrest.1
¶5. On September 18, 2015, Moton was found guilty of disorderly conduct for failure to
comply with Section 97-35-7(1) stemming from the second arrest, he was sentenced to six
months’ probation, and he was ordered to pay court costs in the amount of $206.75 in
Clarksdale Municipal Court. Moton appealed once more to the Coahoma County County
Court. In the county court, the case stemming from the first arrest lay dormant until May 8,
2019, when charges were dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to Mississippi Rule of
Civil Procedure 41. Charges stemming from the second arrest were likewise dismissed for
failure to prosecute.
¶6. On June 11, 2021, Moton filed the underlying complaint in the matter sub judice,
alleging that both arrests violated his rights under the Mississippi Constitution. Namely,
Moton alleged violations of his right to free speech, due process, and equal protection, and
he argued that Defendants were liable for malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, and
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. He sought an award of
compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants responded by filing a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing
that Moton’s claims fell under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act and its imposition of a one
year statute of limitations and presuit notice requirement.
¶7. After briefing from both parties, the trial court held a hearing on the motion on
1 For the first time on appeal, Moton raises the issue of when his constitutional causes of action accrued. Because he failed to raise them before the trial court, they are waived. Kuiper v. Tarnabine, 20 So. 3d 658, 661 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2009).
3 January 19, 2022, and later granted Defendants motion to dismiss, finding that the statute of
limitations barred each of Moton’s claims. Aggrieved, Moton now appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8. An appellate court reviews de novo the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss under
Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. Webb v. DeSoto Cnty., 843 So. 2d 682, 684 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2003). The same
standard applies to issues concerning the statute of limitations, including the one found in the
Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Mississippi’s appellate courts likewise review de novo
questions of law, including the proper application of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Miss.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. S.C., 119 So. 3d 1011, 1013 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2013).
¶9. A motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) is decided on the face of the pleadings.
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Halliburton Co., 826 So. 2d 1206, 1211 (¶ 15) (Miss. 2001). “The
allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true, and the motion should not be granted
unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any set
of facts in support of his claim.” Jordan River Ests., LLC v. Favre, 212 So. 3d 800, 802
(¶ 4) (Miss. 2015) (citing Rose v. Tullos, 994 So. 2d 734, 737 (¶ 24) (Miss. 2008)).
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the trial court properly dismissed Moton’s common law tort claims pursuant to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Mississippi Code Section 11-46-1.
¶10. Charles Moton raised numerous common law tort claims against the Defendants.
Namely, he alleged causes of action for gross negligence, intentional infliction of emotional
4 distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy, seeking monetary
damages. The Mississippi Tort Claims Act provides the exclusive civil remedy against a
governmental entity for lawsuits seeking money damages arising out of tortious actions.
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1 to -7 (Rev. 2019); Keen v. Simpson Cnty. 904 So. 2d 1157, 1161
(¶ 22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v.
Oliver, 904 So.2d 1157 (Miss. 2017); Garretson v. Miss.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2022-CA-00216-SCT
CHARLES H. MOTON
v.
CITY OF CLARKSDALE, MISSISSIPPI, HON. ROBERT M. TYNER AS THE EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM O. LUCKETT, JR., DECEASED, AND CAPTAIN MARK HAYNES, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SERGEANT-AT-ARMS
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/07/2022 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ANDREW K. HOWORTH TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: ELLIS TURNAGE WILTON V. BYARS, III LAUREN ELIZABETH WARD ROBERT MICHAEL TYNER, JR. COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: COAHOMA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ELLIS TURNAGE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: WILTON V. BYARS, III LAUREN ELIZABETH WARD NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 07/06/2023 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: 04/20/2023
BEFORE KITCHENS, P.J., COLEMAN AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
COLEMAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. The motion for rehearing is denied. The original opinion is withdrawn, and this
opinion is substituted.
¶2. Former City of Clarksdale Commissioner Charles Moton alleged that his December 2013 and May 2015 arrests at Clarksdale city commissioners meetings were in violation of
a litany of his state constitutional rights. The trial court dismissed Moton’s claims because
he failed to file suit within the statute of limitations. For the following reasons, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
¶3. At the time of his arrests, Charles Moton was serving as the Ward 3 commissioner of
the City of Clarksdale. At the December 23, 2013, bimonthly meeting of the Clarksdale
Board of Commissioners, then-Mayor Bill Luckett, Jr., presented copies of board meeting
decorum and rules of order along with a letter addressed to the board. The mayor then
allowed each commissioner to “say what they wanted to say.” However, after two minutes
and fifteen seconds of comment from Moton, the mayor ordered Moton to be removed from
the meeting pursuant to Section 11A of the board’s decorum policy. By command of the
mayor, Clarksdale Police Captain Mark Haynes, serving as sergeant-at-arms, escorted Moton
from the meeting and arrested him for disorderly conduct and failure to comply with the
request of a law enforcement officer pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 97-35-7(1) (Rev.
2020).
¶4. On May 22, 2014, the Clarksdale Municipal Court, in a bench trial, tried and
convicted Moton. He then appealed to the Coahoma County County Court. Moton filed a
timely notice of appeal to the Coahoma County Circuit Court on October 6, 2016. Later, on
May 26, 2015, Moton was removed from a second board meeting by Captain Haynes at the
direction of Mayor Luckett, arrested, and charged with disturbing the peace, public
2 drunkenness, and resisting arrest.1
¶5. On September 18, 2015, Moton was found guilty of disorderly conduct for failure to
comply with Section 97-35-7(1) stemming from the second arrest, he was sentenced to six
months’ probation, and he was ordered to pay court costs in the amount of $206.75 in
Clarksdale Municipal Court. Moton appealed once more to the Coahoma County County
Court. In the county court, the case stemming from the first arrest lay dormant until May 8,
2019, when charges were dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to Mississippi Rule of
Civil Procedure 41. Charges stemming from the second arrest were likewise dismissed for
failure to prosecute.
¶6. On June 11, 2021, Moton filed the underlying complaint in the matter sub judice,
alleging that both arrests violated his rights under the Mississippi Constitution. Namely,
Moton alleged violations of his right to free speech, due process, and equal protection, and
he argued that Defendants were liable for malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, and
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. He sought an award of
compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants responded by filing a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing
that Moton’s claims fell under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act and its imposition of a one
year statute of limitations and presuit notice requirement.
¶7. After briefing from both parties, the trial court held a hearing on the motion on
1 For the first time on appeal, Moton raises the issue of when his constitutional causes of action accrued. Because he failed to raise them before the trial court, they are waived. Kuiper v. Tarnabine, 20 So. 3d 658, 661 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2009).
3 January 19, 2022, and later granted Defendants motion to dismiss, finding that the statute of
limitations barred each of Moton’s claims. Aggrieved, Moton now appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8. An appellate court reviews de novo the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss under
Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. Webb v. DeSoto Cnty., 843 So. 2d 682, 684 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2003). The same
standard applies to issues concerning the statute of limitations, including the one found in the
Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Mississippi’s appellate courts likewise review de novo
questions of law, including the proper application of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Miss.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. S.C., 119 So. 3d 1011, 1013 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2013).
¶9. A motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) is decided on the face of the pleadings.
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Halliburton Co., 826 So. 2d 1206, 1211 (¶ 15) (Miss. 2001). “The
allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true, and the motion should not be granted
unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any set
of facts in support of his claim.” Jordan River Ests., LLC v. Favre, 212 So. 3d 800, 802
(¶ 4) (Miss. 2015) (citing Rose v. Tullos, 994 So. 2d 734, 737 (¶ 24) (Miss. 2008)).
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the trial court properly dismissed Moton’s common law tort claims pursuant to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Mississippi Code Section 11-46-1.
¶10. Charles Moton raised numerous common law tort claims against the Defendants.
Namely, he alleged causes of action for gross negligence, intentional infliction of emotional
4 distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy, seeking monetary
damages. The Mississippi Tort Claims Act provides the exclusive civil remedy against a
governmental entity for lawsuits seeking money damages arising out of tortious actions.
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1 to -7 (Rev. 2019); Keen v. Simpson Cnty. 904 So. 2d 1157, 1161
(¶ 22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v.
Oliver, 904 So.2d 1157 (Miss. 2017); Garretson v. Miss. Dep’t of Transp., 156 So. 3d 241,
247 (¶ 20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (“We find Section 11-46-7 unambiguous—any claim for
monetary damages arising out of the State’s tortious acts must be brought under the Tort
Claims Act.”).
¶11. Moton’s complaint clearly and unambiguously outlines allegedly tortious acts
committed against him by the Defendants specifically requests monetary damages in an
amount not less than $750,000. Given the nature of the claims raised by Moton and his
specific request for monetary damages, it is clear the Tort Claims Act is invoked as the
relevant governing statute of Moton’s claims.
¶12. The Mississippi Tort Claims Act sets out a one year statute of limitations for all
actions brought subject to its provisions. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3)(a) (Rev. 2019).
Provided that procedural requirements are met, an additional 185 day period may be tolled,
however. Filing and service of a notice of claim under the act “will toll the statute of
limitations for ninety-five (95) days from the date the . . . statutorily designated official of
a political subdivision receives notice of claim.” Id. A plaintiff must allow for ninety-five
days to pass after notice is given before he may file a suit, except when the governmental
5 entity responds with a notice of denial of claim. Id. When all statutory requirements are met,
a plaintiff has one year and 185 days to file suit, at most.
¶13. In the matter sub judice, it is undisputed that Moton failed to provide any such Notice
of Claim to Defendants. Accordingly, the one year statute of limitations could not be tolled
beyond one year from the date the allegedly tortious acts were committed upon him, the dates
of his arrests on December 23, 2013, and May 26, 2015.
¶14. Although Moton argues that his filing of the suit tolled the statute of limitations for
his claim, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that the filing of a complaint does not toll
the statute of limitations when the time providing for presuit notice and for filing suit had
already run at the time the suit was filed. Tallahatchie Gen. Hosp. v. Howe, 154 So. 3d 29,
32 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2015) (Tort Claims Act statute of limitations tolled by filing complaint
within one year period). Counsel for Moton stated as such in the motion hearing by stating,
“there is no question about it and pretty much I have conceded and withdrawn the one year
claim based on the Mississippi Tort Claims Act that it was not filed within the one year
period for that first arrest.”
¶15. We hold that Moton’s common law tort claims were filed outside one year statute of
limitations and that he did not comply with the procedural requirements of the Mississippi
Tort Claims Act. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of his common law tort
claims.
II. Whether the trial court properly dismissed Moton’s constitutional law claims for failure to file within the statute of limitations.
¶16. Moton’s claims alleging a violation of his right to free speech, deprivation of
6 substantive due process, and a violation of his right to equal protection under the law do not
fall within the ambit of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. “The trial court did not err in
denying the city’s motion for summary judgment, for its immunity against tort claims does
not encompass claims of constitutional violations.” City of Jackson v. Jordan, 202 So. 3d
199, 205 (¶ 18) (Miss. 2016). Rather, Moton raises his speech and equal protection claims
under the Mississippi Constitution.
¶17. Given that there exists no statute of limitations specific to constitutional claims, the
claims must fall within Mississippi’s general statute of limitations, Mississippi Code Section
15-1-49(1) (Rev. 2019), which provides, “All actions for which no other period of limitation
is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action
accrued, and not after.” Moton challenges his arrests in 2013 and 2015 on constitutional
grounds. “[A] cause of action ‘accrues’ when it comes into existence as an enforceable
claim[.]” Bullard v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 941 So. 2d 812, 815 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2006)
(quoting Forman v. Miss. Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344, 346 (1943)).
Moton did not, however, bring his complaint until 2021, outside the three year statute of
limitations and beyond the date of accrual pursuant to Bullard.
¶18. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
III. Whether Moton’s claim for malicious prosecution was properly dismissed.
¶19. Moton also raised a claim of malicious prosecution. Assuming all of the elements in
Moton’s complaint are true and that Haynes acted with actual malice, it would be
inappropriate to analyze such a claim under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.
7 ¶20. Malice is an essential element of malicious prosecution. Strong v. Nicholson, 580 So.
2d 1288, 1293 (Miss. 1991). Malicious prosecution claims have a one year statutory
limitations period. Bankston v. Pass Rd. Tire Ctr. Inc., 611 So. 2d 998, 1003 (Miss. 1992).
To prove such a claim, a party must prove an act is done with malice, and if so, he proved
defendants were acting outside the course and scope of their employment for purposes of the
Tort Claims Act. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-5(2) (Rev. 2019). Here, Moton alleges that
the claims against him were dismissed on May 8, 2019, but he did not initiate the underlying
complaint until 2021. Because Moton did not file his claim within the statute of limitations
applicable to a malicious prosecution claim, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
¶21. We affirm the judgment of the trial court because the trial court correctly found that
Moton’s tort law claims were barred by the statute of limitations in the Mississippi Tort
Claims Act and his claims arising under the Mississippi Constitution were barred by the
general statute of limitations. Additionally, Moton’s claim for malicious prosecution was
properly dismissed because he filed the complaint after the one year statute of limitations
applicable to a malicious prosecution claim had expired.
¶22. AFFIRMED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., KITCHENS AND KING, P.JJ., MAXWELL, BEAM CHAMBERLIN, ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.