Charles Farnsworth v. Teddi Armstrong

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 24, 2024
• Docket: 23-35253
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 24 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES V. FARNSWORTH, No. 23-35253

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05007-MJP

v. MEMORANDUM* TEDDI ARMSTRONG; JACKIE BRENNAN; BRUCE C. GAGE, Doctor; WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; FIVE UNKNOWN HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Marsha J. Pechman, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 17, 2024**

Before: WARDLAW, BADE, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Washington state prisoner Charles V. Farnsworth appeals pro se from the

district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026

(9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant Nee on

the basis of qualified immunity because Farnsworth failed to show that Nee

violated any clearly established constitutional right in treating Farnsworth. See

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (“Qualified immunity is applicable

unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.”);

Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 815 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A right is ‘clearly

established’ when its contours are sufficiently defined, such that ‘a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” (quoting

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999))).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Farnsworth’s

requests to join additional defendants or amend his complaint to add the new

defendants because Farnsworth failed to show that the proposed defendants were

necessary parties or that amendment would not be futile. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19

(setting forth requirements for joinder of parties); Deschutes River All. v. Portland

Gen. Elec. Co., 1 F.4th 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2021) (setting forth standard of review

for Rule 19 determinations); Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656

F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining

2 23-35253 that leave to amend may be denied when amendment would be futile).

Farnsworth’s request that the reply brief be considered by the court prior to

its disposition (Docket Entry No. 15) is granted.

AFFIRMED.

3 23-35253