Charles Edward Williams v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 5, 2004
• Docket: 07-03-00205-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NO. 07-03-0205-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL E

MARCH 5, 2004

______________________________

CHARLES EDWARD WILLIAMS, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE 411TH DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JACINTO COUNTY;

NO. 8590; HONORABLE ROBERT H. TRAPP, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before QUINN and REAVIS, JJ., and BOYD, S.J. ⁽¹⁾

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Following his plea of not guilty, appellant Charles Edward Williams was convicted by a jury of theft and punishment was assessed at two years confinement in a state jail facility, suspended for five years, and a $500 fine. Presenting a sole point of error, appellant contends his rights to due process and equal protection of the law were violated by the prosecution's use of a racially motivated peremptory challenge against venire member Calvin Harden. We affirm.

Appellant was charged with theft for cutting down timber pursuant to a purported contract without the property owner's authorization. When the case proceeded to trial and following voir dire examination, the trial court asked the venire persons, whose names were called, to be seated in the jury box. After the jury was sworn the court announced, "[t]hose of you not selected, I'm going to let you go at this time and excuse you. . . . Thank you very much. You are free to go."

Following preliminary instructions to the jury, the trial court asked defense counsel if there were any other matters that needed to be addressed. The following colloquy transpired:

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, you did not ask us if we had any objection to the jurors that were seated. In reviewing my notes, it appears that the prosecution struck three members of the jury panel who were black. One of them there was some articulated reasons for being struck. That was Angela Sykes. The other two, No. 12, Gloria Adams, and No. 19, Calvin Harden, I don't remember either of these saying a word during the entire jury selection process.

Under the Batson v. Kentucky case, which I know the Court is familiar with, the prosecution is required not to strike jurors on account of their race. And if a challenge is made pursuant to the Batson case, the prosecution will be required to explain why jurors of the defendant's race were stricken. And so I'm going to do so at this time.

The Court: Okay. At this time the Court is going to find that the 12 jurors that were seated have been sworn in. I don't - the Court is going to rule that your motion is not timely. If you wish to preserve error and make a bill, you can do that; but I'm going to find it's not timely made at this time.

[Defense counsel]: Well, I wasn't given a chance to do that, Judge.

The Court: I understand that. That's why I'm going to give you an opportunity, if you want them to articulate that. I'm overruling your motion. If you want to make it a bill for the record. I'll allow them to state their reasons.

After the prosecutor explained that he had independent knowledge that Calvin Harden was a relative of appellant and never responded to that question during voir dire, the trial court concluded that Harden was struck for a race-neutral reason. ⁽²⁾ Defense counsel did not offer any explanation to rebut the prosecution's reason.

A party making a Batson challenge must timely object and make a prima facie showing of discriminatory motives. ⁽³⁾ If the accused objects and makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the prosecution to come forward with a race-neutral explanation. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Once the prosecution offers a race-neutral explanation, the burden shifts back to the accused to show the explanation is only a pretext for race-motivated strikes. Id.; see also Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 630 (Tex.Cr.App. 2002). A trial court's ruling on a Batson challenge is reviewed in the light most favorable to it, applying a clearly erroneous standard of review. Williams v. State, 804 S.W.2d 95, 101 (Tex.Cr.App. 1991).

Appellant asserts his rights were violated by the State's exercise of a peremptory challenge to venire person Calvin Harden. The State argues that appellant failed to timely raise his Batson objection and, alternatively, that he failed to rebut the State's race-neutral explanation. We agree with the State.

To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must make a timely and specific objection. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). To preserve a Batson objection, a party must object to the peremptory strike before the jury is sworn and the remainder of the venire persons are dismissed. Parra v. State, 935 S.W.2d 862 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, pet. ref'd).

Appellant's objection to the prosecution's use of a peremptory strike on Calvin Harden came after the jury was sworn and the remaining venire persons were dismissed. Despite the trial court's generosity in allowing the prosecution to offer its race-neutral reason for striking Harden, error, if any, was not preserved for review. Additionally, appellant did not rebut the prosecution's race-neutral explanation. Appellant's sole point of error is overruled.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Don H. Reavis

Justice

Do not publish.

1. John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment.

2. Appellant only complains on appeal of the prosecution exercising a peremptory challenge on Calvin Harden.

3. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106. S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).

(c). That risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard is a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances. Id. Also, manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder because it requires a less culpable mental state. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.09 (3) (Vernon 1981); see also Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4, 9 -10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The obligation to submit an instruction on this particular lesser-included offense arises when the record contains some evidence that the defendant did not intend the resulting death nor knew that it was reasonably certain to occur. Jones v. State, 963 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref'd).

Next, appellant did not testify, but gave a written statement to police, which was admitted into evidence. In that statement, he said that Jacky was going to "come at [him]," and he admitted firing the gun. However, he also stated that he "didn't put the gun straight up" but held it and "fired it down." Appellant further said that he believed his brother was "gonna chase [him] down"; so, he shot at the victim's foot "to stop him." He also professed that the shooting was not "premeditated," that he did not want to shoot his brother, that he did not know Jacky was shot, and that he fired towards the ground and Jacky's foot only to stop Jacky from chasing him. Approximately four shots were fired. The police verified that there were three gouges in the pavement, indicating that someone had shot into the ground. An officer also testified that the recoil from four bullets shot in rapid succession would cause the weapon's aim or bullet's trajectory to rise. The foregoing is some evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that appellant fired at the ground to scare or warn Jacky and that he did so without the mens rea to commit murder (i.e. intentional or knowing). Thus, there was more than a scintilla of evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that if appellant was guilty, he was guilty only of the lesser offense.

Appellant argues that since he was pursuing the claim of self-defense, the trial court could not submit the instruction on manslaughter. This is allegedly so because one cannot act accidentally or recklessly in self-defense. While authority holds this to be true, e.g., Martinez v. State, 16 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd), Avila v. State, 954 S.W.2d 830, 843 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1997, pet. ref'd), Johnson v. State, 915 S.W.2d 653, 659 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd), it is also true that if some evidence appears of record supporting the submission of both self-defense and manslaughter, then the trial court may submit both issues to the jury. O'Brien v. State, 89 S.W.3d 753, 755-56 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.); accord, Jones v. State, 984 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (stating that if there is evidence which raises a lesser-included offense, an instruction on the lesser offense should be given even if the evidence does not fit in with the larger theme of the defendant's testimony). ⁽⁵⁾ Moreover, Martinez, Avila, and the others are distinguishable since the records there did not contain some evidence of recklessness. O'Brien v. State, 89 S.W.3d at 756.

Issues Two and Three - Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his second and third issues, appellant complains that the evidence is neither legally nor factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict. We overrule the issues.

The standards of review applicable to determining whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support a conviction are well-settled. We refer the parties to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed.2d 560 (1979), Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), and King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) for explanation. Further, we have already iterated the elements required to prove the offense of manslaughter as well as the evidence regarding the issue of recklessness.

Recklessness and danger are presumed if a defendant knowingly points a firearm at or in the direction of another. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §22.05(c) (Vernon 2003). In this instance, and as discussed in the preceding issue, there is some evidence that appellant acted recklessly in causing the death of Jacky. That evidence also would permit a rational jury to conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that though appellant aimed in his brother's direction and fired, he did not intentionally or knowingly cause his death. Furthermore, neither conclusion would be manifestly unjust or against the evidence of record. Accordingly, the verdict enjoys both legally and factually sufficient support.

Issues Four and Five - Extraneous Offense

Via his fourth and fifth issues, appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objection under Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence to the admission of evidence regarding an extraneous offense which affected his substantial rights. We overrule the issues.

The evidence appellant complains of is testimony from Anna Martinez (Anna), a former girlfriend of appellant who was dating Jacky at the time of his death. According to Anna, appellant threatened her around 2:00 a.m. on April 25, 2001, by telling her that she was going to end up dead since she was "disrespecting" him. Then, he patted what appeared to her to be the outline of a gun under his shirt. Appellant objected to this evidence on the basis that its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value.

Assuming arguendo, that the admission of this testimony was erroneous, we find the purported error harmless. As acknowledged by appellant in his brief, the State proffered the evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense. That is, the evidence was tendered in an effort to show that appellant intended to kill those who "disrespected" him, which, according to appellant, Jacky did on the night of the shooting. Furthermore, the trial court restricted its consideration to the issue of intent. Yet, the jury did not find that appellant intentionally or knowingly murdered his brother. That is, it did not find that he acted with the mens rea supposedly evinced by the threat to Anna. Instead, the jury found he acted recklessly when he pointed the gun towards the ground and shot in the direction of Jacky's foot. Thus, the jury either discredited the purportedly inadmissible testimony or found it unpersuasive. Given this, we cannot say that the evidence had any influence on the verdict much less the substantial influence required by Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) to illustrate harm.

Per Curiam

Do not publish.

1. John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §75.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2003).

2.

There is evidence that appellant and Jacky had a contentious relationship, and they argued frequently.

3.

The State is equally entitled to seek a charge on a lesser offense when it feels that the proof has fallen short of proving the charged offense. Ford v. State, 38 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. App.--Houston [14^th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd).

4.

There is no evidence that Jacky was carrying a weapon on the night he was shot by appellant. However, there is evidence that Jacky was larger than appellant and had won some boxing contests.

5.

There are also cases in which it has been held that recklessness is raised even though the defendant consciously pulled the trigger of a gun. See Bell v. State, 693 S.W.2d 434, 443-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (the defendant said he fired four shots in the air to scare someone although the shots went into an occupied trailer); Johnson v. State, 828 S.W.2d 511, 514 - 15 (Tex. App.--Waco 1992, pet. ref'd) (the defendant shot twice while wrestling with the victim); Mullins v. State, 767 S.W.2d 166, 169-70 (Tex. App.--Houston [1^st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd) (the jury could have inferred the defendant recklessly fired a warning shot intended to hit a vacant apartment); Hernandez v. State, 742 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) (the defendant testified he merely tried to scare the victim away).