Charles Edward Lusk v. State
Opinion
NOS. 12-14-00205-CR
12-14-00206-CR 12-14-00207-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS
CHARLES EDWARD LUSK, § APPEALS FROM THE 241ST APPELLANT
V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE § SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Charles Lusk appeals his three convictions for delivery of a controlled substance. He raises one issue relating to the defense of entrapment as a matter of law. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A Smith County grand jury returned three indictments against Appellant for the offense of delivery of a controlled substance. In cause numbers 12-14-00205-CR and 12-14-00207-CR, the indictments alleged that Appellant delivered cocaine in the amount of one gram or more but less than four grams, including any adulterants and dilutants. In cause number 12-14-00206-CR, the indictment alleged that Appellant delivered cocaine in the amount of less than one gram, including any adulterants and dilutants.
Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the State’s indictments in each case based on entrapment as a matter of law. After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s motions. Thereafter, Appellant pleaded “guilty” to each indictment and “true” to the two enhancement paragraphs alleged in each case. The trial court withheld a finding of guilt and ordered a presentence investigation be conducted. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing,
the trial court found Appellant “guilty” in each case. In cause numbers 12-14-00205-CR and 12- 14-00207-CR, the trial court assessed punishment at fifty years of imprisonment. In cause number 12-14-00206-CR, the trial court assessed punishment at twenty years of imprisonment. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. This appeal followed.
ENTRAPMENT
In his sole issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the State’s indictments based on entrapment as a matter of law. As such, he asks this court to reverse the trial court’s judgments and render a judgment of acquittal in each case. Standard of Review and Applicable Law It is a defense to prosecution that the defendant engaged in the conduct charged because he was induced to do so by a law enforcement agent using persuasion or other means likely to cause persons to commit the offense. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.06(a) (West 2011). Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment. Id. Entrapment occurs when the activity of the police agent induces a person, with no predisposition to illegal conduct, to commit a crime. England v. State, 887 S.W.2d 902, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Sanders v. State, No. 12-12-00342-CR, 2013 WL 3271033, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
In the pretrial context, a defendant is entitled to dismissal under Section 8.06 “only when he can establish entrapment as a matter of law with conflict-free, uncontradicted, uncontested, or undisputed evidence.” Hernandez v. State, 161 S.W.3d 491, 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss based on entrapment “as a matter of law,” we determine de novo whether any rational trier of fact could conclude that the undisputed facts failed to establish all of the elements of entrapment. Id. at 500. If the facts shown during the hearing are disputed, entrapment as a matter of law cannot be determined at the pretrial stage. See id. at 499.1 Our review must take into account that the trial judge, as the trier of fact,
1 Even if a defendant’s testimony is not directly contradicted at the pretrial hearing, it may nevertheless be “disputed,” because the trial judge, as the sole trier of fact, is not required to believe that testimony. Hernandez v. State, 161 S.W.3d 491, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In such instances, a trial court does not err in overruling a motion to dismiss. Id.
was free to accept or reject all or any portion of any witness’s testimony. Varkonyi v. State, 276 S.W.3d 27, 33 (Tex. App.—El Paso, 2008, pet. ref’d). Discussion Appellant testified that on the evening of November 8, 2013, he was approached by a “carload” of people (undercover police officers) in a Motel 6 parking lot waving at him to come towards them.2 When he approached the vehicle, the undercover officers asked him if he knew “where anything’s at.” Appellant testified that, at first, he said “no.” But after about two or three minutes of conversation regarding whether they (both Appellant and the undercover police officers) were the police, the undercover officers convinced him to “do something for them.” That “something” was purchasing one hundred dollars’ worth of crack cocaine.
Appellant testified that before the undercover officers left, he told them that he was going to a gas station approximately one mile away to play games. Before he reached the gas station, the undercover officers located him, made a u-turn, and told Appellant, “Come on, man. We’ll take you to the Valero.” Appellant testified that it was at that time that he decided to “do something for them.” He explained that one of the passengers called him by his nickname, leading him to believe that he could trust them because they must have known him.
Once inside the officers’ vehicle, Appellant made a phone call and told them that he would take them to the place where he could get them crack cocaine. Appellant testified that had he not been asked to get the crack cocaine, he would not have made the phone call that led to the delivery of crack cocaine on that night and on two other occasions.
On cross examination, Appellant agreed that he was not threatened or pressured into purchasing and delivering the cocaine. He testified that he said “no” three times before he was “talked into” purchasing the cocaine and delivering it to the police officers. His testimony later revealed that when he initially declined to deliver cocaine, Appellant asked the undercover officers what he would get out of it. One of the officers replied that he would give Appellant ten dollars. Appellant testified that had the undercover officer told him they would not give him anything, he would not have done it.
After the defense rested, the State called Lukas Neubauer, an officer for the Tyler Police Department. Officer Neubauer testified that he was with the narcotics unit driving through the Motel 6 parking lot on the night of November 6, 2013, because it was an area where they have
2 Appellant did not know the individuals inside the vehicle were undercover police officers.
received “a lot of drug complaints,” and where they have made drug purchases in the past. He testified further that as they were driving through, he and the narcotics team saw Appellant walking in the parking lot, turned around, and drove up to him. As they approached Appellant, Officer Neubauer recalled, rolling down his window to talk to Appellant. He testified that Appellant was on his side of the vehicle when he spoke to him. Although Officer Neubauer could not remember the exact wording of what was said, he testified that the “gist” of the conversation was that they were looking to purchase crack cocaine.
According to Officer Neubauer, Appellant never told them “no” that evening, and demonstrated that he was not a police officer by showing them a crack pipe from his pocket. Officer Neubauer could not remember the specifics of his conversation with Appellant. But he testified that, in the past, they would offer anywhere from two to ten dollars or a “pinch” from the purchased drug as compensation to the individual who purchased and delivered the cocaine.
There is no recording of the undercover police officers’ original contact with Appellant.
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