Cite as 2019 Ark. 340 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-09-990
CHARLES EDWARD JONES Opinion Delivered: November 21, 2019 PETITIONER
PRO SE PETITION TO REINVEST V. JURISDICTION IN THE CIRCUIT COURT TO CONSIDER A PETITION STATE OF ARKANSAS FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS RESPONDENT AND PRO SE MOTIONS TO SHOW CAUSE AND FOR STATUS AND DETERMINATION [PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH DIVISION, NO. 60CR-08-1753]
PETITION DENIED; MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE TREATED AS MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT PETITION TO REINVEST JURISDICTION AND DENIED; MOTION FOR STATUS MOOT.
KAREN R. BAKER, Associate Justice
Petitioner Charles Edward Jones has filed a petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the
circuit court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he alleges that
there was exculpatory information that was unknown and not addressed at trial. Jones
subsequently filed a motion “to show cause for coram nobis” in which he asserts additional
bases for the writ. Jones also filed a motion for status and determination in which he
requested that he be given either prompt attention to the matter or a status report.
Because Jones provides no meritorious basis for issuance of the writ, we deny the petition. The motion to show cause is treated as a motion to supplement the petition to reinvest
jurisdiction and denied. The motion for status is moot.
A jury convicted Jones of four counts of rape, and he was sentenced to four
consecutive terms of 480 months’ imprisonment. His convictions and sentences were
affirmed by the Arkansas Court of Appeals. Jones v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 324.
Before this court is Jones’s petition in which he requests permission to proceed in
the trial court with a petition for a writ of error coram nobis to challenge the judgment in
that case. The petition for leave to proceed in the trial court is necessary because the trial
court can entertain a petition for writ of error coram nobis after a judgment has been
affirmed on appeal only after we grant permission. Roberts v. State, 2013 Ark. 56, 425
S.W.3d 771. A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy. Id. Coram
nobis proceedings are attended by a strong presumption that the judgment of conviction is
valid. Id.; Westerman v. State, 2015 Ark. 69, 456 S.W.3d 374. The function of the writ is to
secure relief from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact that would have
prevented its rendition had it been known to the trial court and which, through no
negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward before rendition of the
judgment. Roberts, 2013 Ark. 56, 425 S.W.3d 771. The petitioner has the burden of
demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record. Id.
The writ is allowed only under compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to
address errors of the most fundamental nature. Id. A writ of error coram nobis is available
for addressing certain errors that are found in one of four categories: (1) insanity at the 2 time of trial, (2) a coerced guilty plea, (3) material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or
(4) a third-party confession to the crime during the time between conviction and appeal.
Id.; Howard v. State, 2012 Ark. 177, 403 S.W.3d 38.
This court will grant permission to proceed with a petition for the writ only when it
appears that, looking to the reasonableness of the allegations in the petition and the
probability of the truth of those allegations, the proposed attack on the judgment is
meritorious. Jones v. State, 2017 Ark. 334, 531 S.W.3d 384. This court is not required to
accept at face value the allegations in the petition. Id. The burden is on the petitioner in
the application for coram nobis relief to make a full disclosure of specific facts relied on
and not to merely state conclusions as to the nature of such facts. Rayford v. State, 2018
Ark. 183, 546 S.W.3d 475.
While Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) violations are within the purview of
coram nobis relief, the fact that a petitioner alleges a Brady violation is not, in itself, a
sufficient basis for the writ. Wallace v. State, 2018 Ark. 164, 545 S.W.3d 767. There are
three elements of a Brady violation: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the
accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) the evidence must
have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; (3) prejudice must have
ensued. Carner v. State, 2018 Ark. 20, 535 S.W.3d 634 (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
263 (1999)). When a petitioner alleges a Brady violation as the basis for his or her claim
for relief in coram nobis proceedings, the facts alleged in the petition must establish that
evidence was suppressed that was both material and prejudicial such as to have prevented 3 rendition of the judgment had it been known at the time of trial. Martinez-Marmol v. State,
2018 Ark. 145, 544 S.W.3d 49. Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. Id.
In the petition, Jones alleges that there was exculpatory information that was
unknown and not addressed at trial. Jones references three exhibits, which are
unidentified documents that appear to be (1) an excerpt from a pleading in federal court
that referenced a doctor’s testimony during Jones’s trial, (2) a portion of a medical report
on one of the minor victims indicating that she had a urinary tract infection, and (3) an
incident report made by a mandated reporter about the same victim.
One of the issues on direct appeal of the judgment involved the admission of a
doctor’s testimony concerning an eleven-year-old witness who reported an allegation of
rape against Jones in a separate rape case. This is the same doctor who was referenced in
the first document attached to Jones’s petition. The doctor testified that the witness had a
sexually transmitted disease and detailed how the disease was contracted to support the
witness’s testimony of penetration. Jones, 2010 Ark. App. 324. Here, Jones contends that
there was a “medical issue” in that one of the minor victims had a urinary tract infection.
Jones never explains how the victim’s condition raised an issue, and it is not clear why
Jones contends that the infection was significant. He draws a contrast between the victim’s
“medical issue” and the witness who had a “medical issue” concerning a sexually
transmitted disease, but he does so without explaining the significance of the difference.
4 Further, Jones alleges that, if the information about the victim’s infection had been
known,1 it would have changed the outcome of the trial. He appears to contend that the
fact that the victim had the infection was exculpatory and the condition somehow brought
about her allegations of rape, but he does not offer any further explanation.
Jones has not alleged that the information was withheld from the defense by the
prosecutor or stated facts to support his claim that the information was “unknown” at the
time of trial. Further, Jones has not demonstrated that the evidence was material.
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Cite as 2019 Ark. 340 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-09-990
CHARLES EDWARD JONES Opinion Delivered: November 21, 2019 PETITIONER
PRO SE PETITION TO REINVEST V. JURISDICTION IN THE CIRCUIT COURT TO CONSIDER A PETITION STATE OF ARKANSAS FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS RESPONDENT AND PRO SE MOTIONS TO SHOW CAUSE AND FOR STATUS AND DETERMINATION [PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH DIVISION, NO. 60CR-08-1753]
PETITION DENIED; MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE TREATED AS MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT PETITION TO REINVEST JURISDICTION AND DENIED; MOTION FOR STATUS MOOT.
KAREN R. BAKER, Associate Justice
Petitioner Charles Edward Jones has filed a petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the
circuit court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he alleges that
there was exculpatory information that was unknown and not addressed at trial. Jones
subsequently filed a motion “to show cause for coram nobis” in which he asserts additional
bases for the writ. Jones also filed a motion for status and determination in which he
requested that he be given either prompt attention to the matter or a status report.
Because Jones provides no meritorious basis for issuance of the writ, we deny the petition. The motion to show cause is treated as a motion to supplement the petition to reinvest
jurisdiction and denied. The motion for status is moot.
A jury convicted Jones of four counts of rape, and he was sentenced to four
consecutive terms of 480 months’ imprisonment. His convictions and sentences were
affirmed by the Arkansas Court of Appeals. Jones v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 324.
Before this court is Jones’s petition in which he requests permission to proceed in
the trial court with a petition for a writ of error coram nobis to challenge the judgment in
that case. The petition for leave to proceed in the trial court is necessary because the trial
court can entertain a petition for writ of error coram nobis after a judgment has been
affirmed on appeal only after we grant permission. Roberts v. State, 2013 Ark. 56, 425
S.W.3d 771. A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy. Id. Coram
nobis proceedings are attended by a strong presumption that the judgment of conviction is
valid. Id.; Westerman v. State, 2015 Ark. 69, 456 S.W.3d 374. The function of the writ is to
secure relief from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact that would have
prevented its rendition had it been known to the trial court and which, through no
negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward before rendition of the
judgment. Roberts, 2013 Ark. 56, 425 S.W.3d 771. The petitioner has the burden of
demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record. Id.
The writ is allowed only under compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to
address errors of the most fundamental nature. Id. A writ of error coram nobis is available
for addressing certain errors that are found in one of four categories: (1) insanity at the 2 time of trial, (2) a coerced guilty plea, (3) material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or
(4) a third-party confession to the crime during the time between conviction and appeal.
Id.; Howard v. State, 2012 Ark. 177, 403 S.W.3d 38.
This court will grant permission to proceed with a petition for the writ only when it
appears that, looking to the reasonableness of the allegations in the petition and the
probability of the truth of those allegations, the proposed attack on the judgment is
meritorious. Jones v. State, 2017 Ark. 334, 531 S.W.3d 384. This court is not required to
accept at face value the allegations in the petition. Id. The burden is on the petitioner in
the application for coram nobis relief to make a full disclosure of specific facts relied on
and not to merely state conclusions as to the nature of such facts. Rayford v. State, 2018
Ark. 183, 546 S.W.3d 475.
While Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) violations are within the purview of
coram nobis relief, the fact that a petitioner alleges a Brady violation is not, in itself, a
sufficient basis for the writ. Wallace v. State, 2018 Ark. 164, 545 S.W.3d 767. There are
three elements of a Brady violation: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the
accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) the evidence must
have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; (3) prejudice must have
ensued. Carner v. State, 2018 Ark. 20, 535 S.W.3d 634 (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
263 (1999)). When a petitioner alleges a Brady violation as the basis for his or her claim
for relief in coram nobis proceedings, the facts alleged in the petition must establish that
evidence was suppressed that was both material and prejudicial such as to have prevented 3 rendition of the judgment had it been known at the time of trial. Martinez-Marmol v. State,
2018 Ark. 145, 544 S.W.3d 49. Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. Id.
In the petition, Jones alleges that there was exculpatory information that was
unknown and not addressed at trial. Jones references three exhibits, which are
unidentified documents that appear to be (1) an excerpt from a pleading in federal court
that referenced a doctor’s testimony during Jones’s trial, (2) a portion of a medical report
on one of the minor victims indicating that she had a urinary tract infection, and (3) an
incident report made by a mandated reporter about the same victim.
One of the issues on direct appeal of the judgment involved the admission of a
doctor’s testimony concerning an eleven-year-old witness who reported an allegation of
rape against Jones in a separate rape case. This is the same doctor who was referenced in
the first document attached to Jones’s petition. The doctor testified that the witness had a
sexually transmitted disease and detailed how the disease was contracted to support the
witness’s testimony of penetration. Jones, 2010 Ark. App. 324. Here, Jones contends that
there was a “medical issue” in that one of the minor victims had a urinary tract infection.
Jones never explains how the victim’s condition raised an issue, and it is not clear why
Jones contends that the infection was significant. He draws a contrast between the victim’s
“medical issue” and the witness who had a “medical issue” concerning a sexually
transmitted disease, but he does so without explaining the significance of the difference.
4 Further, Jones alleges that, if the information about the victim’s infection had been
known,1 it would have changed the outcome of the trial. He appears to contend that the
fact that the victim had the infection was exculpatory and the condition somehow brought
about her allegations of rape, but he does not offer any further explanation.
Jones has not alleged that the information was withheld from the defense by the
prosecutor or stated facts to support his claim that the information was “unknown” at the
time of trial. Further, Jones has not demonstrated that the evidence was material.
Generally, newly discovered evidence, in itself, is not a ground for the writ, and a
conclusory statement that there is newly discovered evidence does not warrant coram nobis
relief. Hall v. State, 2018 Ark. 377, 562 S.W.3d 829. Allegations that are too vague and
lack the requisite factual support do not support issuance of the writ. Alexander v. State,
2019 Ark. 171, 575 S.W.3d 401.
In his motion to show cause, Jones would add claims in which he alleges that the
prosecution withheld statements made by the victims describing sex acts with minors that
Jones committed in Texas. While the statements clearly describe additional sex crimes
Jones committed in Texas, the statements fail to demonstrate that Jones did not commit
the rapes he was convicted of in Arkansas. His conclusory allegations do not demonstrate
1 Jones does not indicate when the information in the medical report about the victim’s infection was discovered. The State notes that the report attached to the petition appears to bear a file-mark indicating that it was filed in Jones’s federal habeas proceedings in 2014. 5 that this information was either material or withheld from the defense. Jones has failed to
provide any meritorious basis for the writ.
Petition denied; motion to show cause treated as motion to supplement petition to
reinvest jurisdiction and denied; motion for status moot.
HART, J., concurs.
JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Justice, concurring. I concur. As to the documentation
of the victim’s urinary tract infection, it seems Jones is arguing that this documentation
could have been used to impeach Dr. Farst’s testimony regarding the element of
penetration. The record presently before us is sparse, but the argument seems to be that
what Dr. Farst identified as lingering evidence of penetration could have been attributable
instead to the urinary tract infection. If so, this could potentially satisfy the first prong of
Brady. However, Jones’s petition is correctly denied because there is simply no assertion or
indication that the State withheld this evidence (what appear to be records from a private
medical facility) from Jones in any way, or that the State ever even had it.
Charles E. Jones, pro se petitioner.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Jason Michael Johnson, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for
respondent.