Charles Duane Parsons v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00387-CR

CHARLES DUANE PARSONS, APPELLANT V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 251st District Court Randall County, Texas

Trial Court No. 31302C, Honorable Ana Estevez, Presiding

August 26, 2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Charles Duane Parsons, was found guilty of murder and the trial court made a finding that he acted under the influence of sudden passion. 1 In presenting this appeal, Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b), (d).

supported by an Anders 2 brief. We grant counsel’s motion, modify the judgment and bill of costs, and affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.

Appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of murder. Following a bench trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years’ incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant then brought this appeal.

In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel has certified that he has conducted a conscientious examination of the record and, in his opinion, it reflects no reversible error upon which an appeal can be predicated. Id. at 744; In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978), counsel has discussed why, under the controlling authorities, the record presents no reversible error. In a letter to Appellant, counsel notified him of the motion to withdraw; provided him with the motion, Anders brief, and a copy of the appellate record; and informed him of his right to file a pro se response. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (specifying appointed counsel’s obligations on the filing of a motion to withdraw supported by an Anders brief). By letter, this Court also advised Appellant of his right to file a pro se response to counsel’s Anders brief. Appellant has not filed a response. The State has not filed a brief.

By his Anders brief, counsel discusses areas in the record where reversible error may have occurred but concludes that the appeal is frivolous. We have independently examined the record to determine whether there are any non-frivolous issues that were

2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).

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preserved in the trial court which might support an appeal, but we have found no such issues. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409; Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). Following our careful review of the appellate record and counsel’s brief, we conclude that there are no grounds for appellate review that would result in reversal of Appellant’s conviction or sentence.

In our review of the record, we have identified two errors in the judgment that constitute non-reversible error. First, the judgment lists the statute of conviction as Texas Penal Code section 19.02(a)(2). However, that statutory provision simply defines “sudden passion.” The elements of the offense of murder are set forth in section 19.02(b). The judgment must reflect both the degree of offense and the specific offense of conviction. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.01, § 1(13), (14). We have the authority to modify incorrect judgments when the necessary information is available to do so. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b). Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s written judgment of conviction to reflect that the “Statute for Offense” is section 19.02(b) of the Texas Penal Code. 3

Second, the record shows that the judgment and bill of costs assessed Appellant a time payment fee of $15. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has determined that a time payment fee like the one imposed here “must indeed be struck for being prematurely assessed because a defendant’s appeal suspends the duty to pay court costs and therefore suspends the running of the clock for the purposes of the time payment fee.” Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Pursuant to Dulin, we strike

3 Elsewhere on the judgment, the “Findings on Sudden Passion” are shown as “True.”

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the time payment fee in its entirety. Id. at 133. We modify the judgment and the bill of costs by deleting the $15 time payment fee.

We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified. 4

Judy C. Parker

Chief Justice

Do not publish.

4 Counsel shall, within five days after the opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the

opinion and judgment, along with notification of Appellant’s right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4. This duty is an informational one, not a representational one. It is ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and exists after the court of appeals has granted counsel’s motions to withdraw. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 411 n.33.