Charles Dirks v. Joe Grasso

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 2, 2011
Docket09-56187
StatusUnpublished

This text of Charles Dirks v. Joe Grasso (Charles Dirks v. Joe Grasso) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Charles Dirks v. Joe Grasso, (9th Cir. 2011).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SEP 02 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

CHARLES DIRKS, No. 09-56187

Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:07-cv-02664-GAF- FMO v.

JOE GRASSO; et al., MEMORANDUM*

Defendants - Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 9, 2010 Pasadena, California

Before: NOONAN, BERZON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department officers appeal the district court’s

order denying in part their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law in a suit

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Professor Charles Dirks (“Dirks”). The

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. officers—Sargent Joe Grasso (“Grasso”) and Deputies Ricky Baker and Darren

Inana (“Baker” and “Inana”)—brought the renewed motion after a jury deadlocked

on Dirks’s unlawful arrest and First Amendment retaliation claims.

We review the district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo, taking

all disputed facts in the light most favorable to Dirks, the non-moving party.

Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 2010). A Sheriff’s Department

employee recorded the events leading up to Dirks’s arrest on video, and Dirks

made an audio recording. Viewing and hearing the recordings, we agree with the

district court that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity.

1. The district court correctly concluded that the officers are not entitled to

qualified immunity on Dirks’s unlawful arrest claim. At the time of Dirks’s arrest,

it was clearly established that an officer must have probable cause to execute a

warrantless arrest. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699-700 (1981).

Here, the officers could not have reasonably believed they had probable cause to

arrest Dirks.

The officers first claim they had probable cause to arrest Dirks for disturbing

the peace, a violation of California Penal Code §§ 415 and 415.5. At no point prior

to Dirks’s arrest could a reasonable officer have found, as required by California

law, that there was a “clear and present danger of imminent violence,” nor that the

2 intent of Dirks’s communication was merely to disturb. See In re Brown, 510 P.2d

1017, 1023 (Cal. 1973). A reasonable officer would have known that Dirks

intended to express his opposition to Grasso’s attempt to meet with, interrogate, or

fire a student Sheriff’s Cadet, Yesenia Franco (“Franco”). Dirks in no way

threatened the officers with violence, nor were his words likely to induce an

immediate, violent response by the officers. See United States v. Poocha, 259 F.3d

1077, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, a reasonable officer could not have

concluded that there was probable cause to arrest Dirks for a violation of California

Penal Code §§ 415 or 415.5.

The officers next claim they had probable cause to arrest Dirks for

obstruction of justice, a violation of California Penal Code § 148. However, verbal

criticism of police officers and refusal to respond promptly to police orders do not

support probable cause for a violation of § 148. See Mackinney v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d

1002, 1005-07 (9th Cir. 1995); People v. Bower, 597 P.2d 115, 122 (Cal. 1979). A

reasonable officer could not have concluded that there was probable cause to arrest

Dirks for violating § 148 based on Dirks’s failure to immediately leave the

sheriff’s substation, his objection to Grasso’s attempt to meet with Franco, or his

standing in the entrance to the substation while engaged in a discussion with

Grasso.

3 Baker and Inana argue that even if probable cause did not exist, they are

entitled to qualified immunity because they were acting pursuant to Grasso’s

orders. Baker and Inana cite no binding authority holding that following a

superior’s orders entitles officers to qualified immunity, and none exists. They

personally observed all the events leading up to the arrest of Dirks. Based on the

totality of facts and circumstances within their knowledge, Baker and Inana could

not reasonably have believed that probable cause to arrest Dirks existed. See

Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2009).

2. Grasso is not entitled to qualified immunity on Dirks’s First Amendment

retaliation claim. Grasso argues that Dirks failed to prove that Grasso’s desire to

chill protected speech was a substantial or motivating cause of Dirks’s arrest. See

Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999).

At the time of Dirks’s arrest, the First Amendment right to “verbally. . . oppose or

challenge police action without thereby risking arrest” was clearly established.

City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63 (1987). Even assuming, without

deciding, that the front lobby of a sheriff’s substation is a nonpublic forum,

Grasso’s argument fails. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Dirks,

Grasso arrested Dirks because he voiced his opposition to the planned interrogation

or termination of Franco for her off-duty activities at a contentious student

4 government meeting. The arrest was not a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral

restriction on Dirks’s speech. See Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303

F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2002). A reasonable officer could not have concluded that

it was constitutional to arrest Dirks for expressing his opposition to Grasso’s

conduct.

AFFIRMED.

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Related

Michigan v. Summers
452 U.S. 692 (Supreme Court, 1981)
City of Houston v. Hill
482 U.S. 451 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Wilkinson v. Torres
610 F.3d 546 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
United States v. Nolan L. Poocha
259 F.3d 1077 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
In Re Brown
510 P.2d 1017 (California Supreme Court, 1973)
People v. Bower
597 P.2d 115 (California Supreme Court, 1979)
Ramirez v. City of Buena Park
560 F.3d 1012 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)

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