ACCEPTED 13-14-00742-CR THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS 10/15/2015 4:47:19 PM Dorian E. Ramirez CLERK
Cause Nos. 13-14-00742-CR, 13-14-00743-CR & 13-14-00744-CR ************************************************ FILED IN 13th COURT OF APPEALS COURT OF APPEALS CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 10/15/2015 4:47:19 PM CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS DORIAN E. RAMIREZ Clerk ************************************************
CHARLES DANE HILL, Appellant
VS.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
************************************************ On Appeal from Cause Nos. 13-11-9140, 13-11-9158 & 13-11-9159 th in the 24 Judicial District Court of Jackson County, Texas ************************************************
STATE’S REPLY BRIEF
************************************************ ROBERT E. BELL District Attorney State Bar Card No. 02086200 Jackson County Courthouse 115 West Main Street Edna, Texas 77957
JIM VOLLERS State Bar Card No. 20609000 2201 Westover Road Austin, Texas 78703 ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE i IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
1. Robert E. Bell Criminal District Attorney, Jackson County State Bar Card No. 02086200 Jackson County Courthouse 115 West Main Street Edna, Texas 77957 Email: ef_mitchell@yahoo.com
Jim Vollers Attorney at Law State Bar Card No. 20609000 2201 Westover Road Austin, Texas 78703 Email: jimvollers@att.net Attorneys for the State
2. Charles Dane Hill Appellant
3. Hon. W. A. (Bill) White Attorney at Law P.O. Box 7422 Victoria, Texas 77903 Email: lawbill0994@att.net. Attorney for Appellant
4. Honorable Juergen “Skipper” Koetter, District Judge 24th Judicial District, Jackson County Courthouse 115 West Main Street Edna, Texas 77957 Email: koetter@cscd.net Trial Judge
ii TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
APPELLANT’S ISSUES PRESENTED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. ONE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S REQUEST FOR JURY INSTRUCTION ON SELF-DEFENSE BECAUSE APPELLANT PLED “NOT GUILTY” WHEN TRIAL BEGAN.
APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. TWO: THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT APPELLANT KNEW JASON McCARRELL WAS A PUBLIC SERVANT WHEN SHOOTING AT HIM.
STATEMENT OF FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. ONE (RESTATED). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. TWO (RESTATED) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
SUMMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 iii CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
iv INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CASES: PAGE
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010) . . . . 12
Calloway v. State, 43 S.W.2d 645 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988) . . . 9
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) . . . .12, 13
Ex parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d 125 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). . . . . 10
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) . . . . . . 12
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13
Kiffe v. State, 361 S.W.3d 104 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 17
Miles v. State, 488 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Crim.App. 1972) . . . . . . 9
Moreno v. State, 341 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Crim.App. 1960) . . . . 9
O’Neal v. State, 491 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973) . . . . . 9
Parsons v. State, 271 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Crim.App. 1954) . . . . 9
Smith v. State, 475 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.Crim.App. 1971) . . . . . 9
Venable v. State, 397 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.Crim.App. 1966), cert. den., 384 U.S.266, 86 S.Ct. 1477, L.Ed.2 525 . . . . . 9
Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) . . . . 13
TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE:
Rule 44.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
v PUBLICATIONS:
5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, § 1464(1), PP. 654-57 . . . . . . . . . . 9
vi Cause Nos. 13-14-00742-CR, 13-14-00743-CR & 13-14-00744-CR ************************************************ COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS ************************************************
************************************************ On Appeal from Cause Nos. 13-11-9140, 13-11-9158 & 13-11-9159 th in the 24 Judicial District Court of Jackson County, Texas ************************************************
************************************************
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:
COMES NOW, THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee herein, by
and through its Criminal District Attorney, and files this, its reply brief
in the above-styled cause, requesting that the judgment of the trial
court be in all things affirmed, and as grounds therefore would show
unto the Court the following:
1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After a jury trial upon appellant’s plea of not guilty, appellant
was found guilty of the offenses of aggravated assault on a public
servant with a deadly weapon in Cause No. 13-11-9140, Count 2;
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in Cause No. 13-11-9158,
Count 1, Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3; and deadly conduct in Cause No.
13-11-9159. The jury assessed appellant’s punishment in Cause No.
13-11-9140 at 20 years confinement in the Institutional Division of
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice; in Cause No. 13-11-9158
at ten (10) years confinement in the Institutional Division of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice; and in Cause No. 13-11-9159
at five (5) years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice. The sentences all run concurrently.
APPELLANT’S ISSUES PRESENTED
APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S REQUEST FOR JURY INSTRUCTION ON SELF-DEFENSE BECAUSE APPELLANT PLED “NOT GUILTY” WHEN TRIAL BEGAN.
2 APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. TWO
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT APPELLANT KNEW JASON McCARRELL WAS A PUBLIC SERVANT WHEN SHOOTING AT HIM.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 5, 2013, appellant participated in various festivities
including a fishing tournament (R. Vol. 5, p. 124) and an outdoor
festivity in Victoria. During that time, he consumed beer (R. Vol. 5,
p. 127), vodka-soaked Gummy Bears (R. Vol. 5, p. 74), and LSD (R.
Vol. 5, pp. 208-210). In the evening, he ended up at the home of
Adam Twardowski, a neighbor (R. Vol. 5, pp. 136-141). While there,
appellant called a Twardowski child an ugly name and was told to
leave. Appellant went to his pickup truck, obtained a pistol and fired
shots at the house (R. Vol. 5, pp. 142-148). Michael Cornwell, a
guest, attempted to take the pistol from appellant and ended up in a
struggle with him (R. Vol. 5, pp. 146, 147). The pistol was fired by
appellant near Cornwell’s head and the bullet passed through the
pickup roof (R. Vol. 5, pp. 55-57). While Cornwell was trying to take
the pistol, appellant inflicted a number of bites on Cornwell’s arm (R.
Vol. 5, p. 58). Cornwell succeeded in getting the pistol when
3 Twardowski intervened and struck appellant twice in the face with his
fist (R. Vol. 5, pp. 55, 56). Appellant was aware that the police were
being called and he cursed Cornwell for calling them (R. Vol. 5, p.
66). Appellant then drove off in his pickup toward his residence and
ended up running the pickup into the ditch near his driveway (R. Vol.
5, p. 183). The Hill residence was 1,228 feet from the Twardowski
residence and the distance from Twardowski’s driveway to the Hill
driveway was 1,435 feet (State’s Exhibit 8). Both of these residences
were located on County Road 313 East (State’s Exhibit 8).
Valerie Twardowski, Adam’s wife, called 911 and reported what
had happened and asked for assistance (R. Vol. 5, p. 145). While
she was talking to 911, a shot was reported from the direction of the
Hill residence (R. Vol. 5, p. 148).
Deputy Jason McCarrell, of the Jackson County Sheriff’s
Department, was dispatched to the scene (R. Vol. 4, p. 23). After
turning onto County Road 313 East, he continued past the Hill
residence and realized that he was on the wrong side of the
residence and turned and came back to the Twardowski residence
(R. Vol. 4, pp. 30, 31). He had been driving with his emergency
4 lights on until he turned onto County Road 313, at which time he
turned them off (R. Vol. 4, p. 32). When he arrived at the
Twardowski driveway, four adults came out of the house and talked
with him and gave him information about what had occurred (R. Vol.
4, p. 35). As McCarrell finished talking to them, Deputy Carlos
Sertuche pulled in behind him (R. Vol. 4, p. 36). McCarrell and
Sertuche then proceeded down the road toward the Hill residence
using thermal imagers to look for appellant (R. Vol. 4, pp. 38, 39).
As they proceeded down the road toward appellant’s driveway, both
deputies had their high-beam headlights on and their take-down
lights on (R. Vol. 4, pp. 43, 44). They located Hill’s pickup truck just
before the entry to the Hill residence driveway (R. Vol. 4, pp. 39, 40).
While on the way to Hill’s driveway, McCarrell had spotted a full-
grown man walking around the edge of the driveway to the east of
the house (R. Vol. 4, p. 40). He continued to watch the individual he
had seen, got out of his car and checked the wrecked pickup truck to
see if anybody was in it, and then he and Sertuche drove into the Hill
driveway toward the house (R. Vol. 4, pp. 40, 41).
5 As McCarrell proceeded down the driveway, he was able to see
an individual he believed to be Charles Hill standing in the front yard
holding a rifle (R. Vol. 4, p. 42). As soon as he saw this individual,
he stopped his car, turned his lights off and grabbed his rifle and got
out of the car (R. Vol. 4, pp. 42, 43). In driving from the Twardowski
residence all the way to the point that he stopped in the Hill
driveway, McCarrell had on his high-beam headlights and take-down
lights, which were white LED lights integrated into the light bar and
are very bright, brighter than just normal headlights (R. Vol. 4, p.
43). Sertuche was about 20 to 30 yards behind McCarrell and also
had his LED take-down lights on until they stopped (R. Vol. 4, p. 44).
The vehicles at the Twardowski residence did not have take-down
lights on them (R. Vol. 4, p. 44). When Sertuche stopped behind
McCarrell, he turned off all of his lights except his parking lights (R.
Vol. 4, pp. 44, 45). Using his thermal device and staying behind his
car for cover, McCarrell could see appellant pointing the rifle directly
at him or holding it in such a manner as he appeared to be trying to
load it or clear a jam (R. Vol. 4, pp. 45-51). McCarrell finally raised
up to see appellant again and sees that he is standing there with the
6 rifle pointing directly at him again, he immediately drops down
behind the car and less than a half a second later hears appellant fire
(R. Vol. 4, p. 54). Being trained to move when fired at, McCarrell
moved and took cover behind the engine block and the front wheels
of the car, then looked up to find appellant still pointing the rifle
directly at him, so he fired three rounds from his rifle at appellant (R.
Vol. 4, p. 55). One of the shots struck appellant’s rifle, his hand,
fingers and arm. State’s Exhibit 82, the video recreation, reflects that
the trajectory of the bullet striking the rifle and appellant’s arm and
hand in which it did could only happen when the rifle was pointed
directly at the place from where the shot was fired. This and other
exhibits show reflective insignia on McCarrell’s vehicle showing that it
was a police car.
After the shooting, Officers Sertuche and McCarrell were
leaving the scene in Sertuche’s car when Officer Merritt arrived.
Merritt drove past them and pulled up behind McCarrell’s car (R. Vol.
4, p. 181). When they could finally contact him, Merritt was told he
should leave because appellant had a night-sight device. Merritt
chose to stay and felt that he was hidden well behind his car (R. Vol.
7 4, p. 181). Merritt testified that from where he was located he could
see the whole front yard and could clearly see the Hill house. When
he heard groaning from the house and appellant finally came out of
the house and approached the cars. Merritt then turned his flashlight
on as appellant approached him. Appellant was cursing the police as
he approached (R. Vol. 4, pp. 181-195). Appellant was finally
secured and then turned over to medics.
APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. ONE (RESTATED)
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S REQUEST FOR JURY INSTRUCTION ON SELF-DEFENSE BECAUSE APPELLANT PLED “NOT GUILTY” WHEN TRIAL BEGAN.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It appears that appellant misstates the record when he
indicates to this Court that the trial court denied appellant’s request
for a charge on self-defense merely because he pled “not guilty” at
the beginning of the trial. In reality the record shows that the court’s
ruling stated “The law is also clear that if you want to assert your
right to self-defense, you must first admit the elements of the offense
that has been charged. The defendant has pled not guilty to all of
the elements of the offense as charged and therefore has not 8 qualified himself to claim the right to self-defense.” (R. Vol. 7, p. 9).
Therefore, appellant’s argument that the trial court denied him a
charge on the issue of self-defense merely because he pled not guilty
is both misleading and untrue.
Also, even if that in actuality was what the trial judge did, it is
really immaterial if he ruled correctly in denying the charge on self-
defense because it wasn’t raised. In this case, it simply was not
raised and the trial judge was correct.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
In Calloway v. State, 43 S.W.2d 645 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988),
the court pointed out:
“Further, it is well-established that the mere fact that a correct ruling is given for the wrong reason will not result in a reversal. If the decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case it will not be disturbed. Miles v. State, 488 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). See also Parsons v. State, 271 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Cr.App.1954); Moreno v. State, 341 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Cr.App.1960); Venable v. State, 397 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.Cr.App.1966), cert. den., 384 U.S. 266, 86 S.Ct. 1477, 16 L.Ed.2d 525; Smith v. State, 475 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); O'Neal v. State, 491 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, § 1464(1), PP. 654–57.” (43 S.W.2 645, 651, 652).
9 Also, Rule 44.2, Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides
that any error other than constitutional error which is a defect,
irregularity, or variance and does not affect substantial rights must
be disregarded. If the court ruled correctly, it certainly did not affect
any substantial rights even if he had simply ruled that a not guilty
plea barred a charge on self-defense.
Appellant does not really set forth any facts, or refer to the
record to any evidence or testimony that raises the issue of self-
defense. It was aptly pointed more recently in Ex parte Nailor, 149
S.W.3d 125 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004), that “A defendant is entitled to an
instruction on the law of self-defense if there is some evidence he
intended to use force against another and he did use force, but he
did so only because he reasonably believed it was necessary to
prevent the other’s use of unlawful force.” (149 S.W.3d 125, 133).
In an interview with Ranger Bradley Freeman on October 6, 2013
appellant told the Ranger that when a car stopped in his driveway he
got his 270 and shot in the air.” That is clearly not evidence that he
used force against another only because he reasonably believed it
was necessary to prevent the other’s use of unlawful force, it was
10 merely a denial of an element of the charge. Since appellant admits
that to raise the issue of self-defense appellant must admit to
committing the offense and then offer self-defense as justification
and completely fails to point to any place in this record where there
is any evidence that appellant acted in self-defense presents
absolutely nothing for review. Apparently appellant is simply relying
upon the fact that the way he interprets the judge’s ruling on the
issue of self-defense, which is only part of what the judge said,
constitutes error. The above-cited authorities clearly show that this
point of error has no merit and should be overruled.
APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. TWO (RESTATED)
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT APPELLANT KNEW JASON McCARRELL WAS A PUBLIC SERVANT WHEN SHOOTING AT HIM.
Where an individual: (1) engaged in conduct likely to bring
police intervention; (2) knew police had been called; (3) was in
position in his front yard to see two well-marked and well-illuminated
police cars come down a road and turn into his driveway; and (4)
saw the two cars drive toward his house and stop, there is ample
11 evidence from which a rational jury could find, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that he knew the drivers of the cars were police officers.
Therefore, there is ample evidence from which a rational jury could
conclude that appellant knew he was firing at a police officer when
he fired his rifle.
The proper standard for review of an issue of insufficiency of
the evidence is set forth in Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893
(Tex.Crim.App. 2010), where the court stated:
“As the Court with final appellate jurisdiction in this State, we decide that the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” (323 S.W.3d 893, 913).
Elaboration upon this standard is found in Kiffe v. State, 361
S.W.3d 104 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012), where that court
said:
“An appellate court determines whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex.Crim.App.2007)). In 12 viewing the record, direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally. Id. Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Id. An appellate court presumes that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict and defers to that resolution. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S.Ct. at 2793; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. An appellate court also defers to the factfinder's evaluation of the credibility and weight of the evidence. See Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750.” (361 S.W.3d 104, 108).
Since appellant engaged in conduct such as firing a pistol at a
house and almost shooting an individual in the head with a pistol and
then firing a rifle at their house from his residence nearby where a
normal person would know that law enforcement officers would
respond and investigate, and he was aware that they had been
called, he should certainly expect that law enforcement officers would
arrive in his driveway. First of all, before the officers got there,
appellant was near his house with a rifle and ammunition at a place
near his house where he could observe two automobiles on the road
approaching his driveway and turning into the driveway with their
take-down lights and high-beam headlights on and with reflective
markings on both vehicles showing they were police vehicles,
especially since the second vehicle was approximately 20 yards 13 behind the first and illuminating it with his lights. Further, with
appellant aiming a rifle at the officer in the front vehicle, it is
perfectly obvious that he could see the officer in the front car even
when he turned his headlights and take-down lights off. Under those
conditions appellant would recognize these approaching vehicles as
law enforcement officers. It must be remembered that appellant was
sighted near his residence collecting his rifle and ammunition out in
front of his house, which was 135 yards from the roadway known as
313 East. In that position, and knowing law enforcement had been
called by reason of his actions, appellant in all probability saw
Deputy McCarrell passing by the Twardowski house and the Hill
residence on 313 East and turning around and driving back past it
again to the Twardowski house in an automobile that was plainly a
police vehicle with reflective markings on it, using it’s high-beam
headlights and it’s take-down lights. All of this took place in plain
view as shown by State’s Exhibit 4 which shows an open field
between the Hill residence and the Twardowski residence, with the
road being only 135 yards from appellant’s location. Shortly after
that Deputy McCarrell, followed by Deputy Sertuche, also in a police
14 vehicle, left the Twardowski residence and drove down 313 East with
Sertuche following and illuminating McCarrell’s vehicle with his
headlights and his take-down lights for some 1,435 feet to the
driveway into the Hill residence. During this drive, Deputy McCarrell
could see appellant walking around in front of the Hill residence.
Then these two vehicles turned into the Hill driveway and travelled
some 93 yards where they stopped 83 yards from the Hill residence,
both officers having their bright headlights and take-down lights on
during this entire trip, all the while with McCarrell’s car was being
illuminated from behind and both cars having reflective markings on
them showing that they were police cars. When they stopped, both
automobiles were darkened by turning off their headlights and the
overhead lights because appellant had been spotted pointing a rifle
at McCarrell with such accuracy that McCarrell felt appellant must
have night-vision equipment. In addition to the illumination provided
by these two automobiles as they approached the Hill residence
coming down the driveway, there was a light at the corner of the
driveway where the driveway turned toward the house.
15 The circumstances that also should be considered are that
Officer David Merritt arrived at the scene after the shots were fired
and as Officers McCarrell and Sertuche were leaving. Merritt parked
his car behind McCarrell’s car and hid behind the car away from
someone whom he knew was shooting at officers. Officer Merritt
heard groans coming from the direction he thought was in the house.
Shortly thereafter, appellant came out and approached the cars.
Merritt said that he could see appellant and see the house and then
when appellant got close he turned on his flashlight. It is obvious
that under those circumstances Merritt did not have his car lights on
or his emergency lights on. However, when appellant was
interviewed by Ranger Freeman on October 6, 2013, he made
statements about knowing that Merritt was a police officer and he
was in a cop car that was white and like the cop car in Jackson
County. He stated, “But I knew it was a cop and that’s why I walked
out there to them.” Obviously, if he knew that Merritt’s car was a
cop car, he had to be able to see the car in front of it, therefore
knowing that McCarrell’s car was also a cop car.
16 When all of the evidence, including the circumstantial evidence,
is considered in this case, there is clearly sufficient evidence for a
reasonable finder of fact to conclude that appellant knew that the
automobile which he fired at was a police vehicle. Therefore, it is
respectfully submitted, that, as pointed out in Kiffe, supra, “the
necessary inferences are reasonably based upon the combined and
cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict.” The circumstantial and direct evidence
when considered in its totality is clearly sufficient to establish guilt
and when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict is
sufficient to support each element of the offense charged against
appellant in this case, including his knowledge that he was firing at a
police officer.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully
submitted that the evidence in this cause is sufficient and the
judgment of the trial court should be in all things affirmed.
17 Respectfully submitted,
Robert E. Bell District Attorney State Bar Card No. 02086200 Jackson County Courthouse 115 W. Main Street Edna, Texas 77957
/s/ Jim Vollers_______________ Jim Vollers State Bar Card No. 20609000 2201 Westover Road Austin, Texas 78703
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this the 15th day of October, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served electronically through the electronic filing manager on the party listed below:
Hon. W. A. (Bill) White, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 7422, Victoria, Texas 77903, Attorney for Appellant, at lawbill0994@att.net.
Robert E. Bell, District Attorney, Jackson County Courthouse, 115 West Main Street, Edna, Texas 77957, Attorney for Appellee, at ef_mitchell@yahoo.com.
Honorable Juergen “Skipper” Koetter, District Judge, 24th Judicial District Court, Jackson County Courthouse, 115 West Main Street, Edna, Texas 77957, Trial Judge, at koetter@cscd.net.
18 If the email of the party or attorney to be served was not on file with the electronic filing manager, the pleading was served by email.
/s/ Jim Vollers Jim Vollers
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this document contains 4,578 words (counting all parts of the document).
/s/ Jim Vollers________________ Jim Vollers 2201 Westover Rd. Austin, Texas 78703 (512) 478-6846 SBN 20609000 JimVollers@att.net
COUNSEL OF RECORD