NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-200
CHARLES D. BONANNO, trustee,1 & another2
vs.
ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF GLOUCESTER & others.3
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Two of the defendants, Joseph and Gloria DiStefano
(defendants), own a vacant lot located at 13 Sleepy Hollow Road
in the private Hawks section of Wingaersheek Beach in the city
of Gloucester (defendants' property). On November 27, 2018, the
building commissioner of Gloucester determined that it was a
buildable lot. On June 13, 2019, the city's zoning board of
1 Of the Ozone Realty Trust.
2 Allison C. Bonanno, trustee of the Ozone Realty Trust.
3Building commissioner of Gloucester; Joseph DiStefano, individually and as trustee of the Joseph DiStefano Revocable Trust dated March 6, 2019; Gloria DiStefano, individually and as trustee of the Gloria L. DiStefano Revocable Trust dated March 6, 2019; Gerald McGovern; and Sheila McGovern. appeals (ZBA) affirmed the building commissioner's determination
(ZBA decision).
The plaintiffs, Charles D. Bonanno and Allison C. Bonanno,
as trustees of the Ozone Realty Trust (plaintiffs), own 11R
Sleepy Hollow Road (plaintiffs' property), an abutter to the
defendants' property. They filed an appeal in the Superior
Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 17, challenging the ZBA
decision. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on
the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an
action under G. L. c. 40A, § 17. In a written decision, a judge
of the Land Court rejected all but one of the aggrievement
claims raised by the plaintiffs to establish standing, as harms
that were either not particular to the plaintiffs or too
speculative. The judge determined that one of these grounds --
a claim of interference with the plaintiffs' use of their
easement -- was sufficiently particular to the plaintiffs, if
credited, to confer standing. Accordingly, the judge denied
summary judgment on that issue but allowed the defendants'
motion in all other respects.
The judge held a trial on the issue of standing. After
trial, the judge found that any impact on the plaintiffs' use of
their driveway easement caused by the defendants' proposed
structure would be de minimis or speculative and therefore did
2 not confer standing. The judge then dismissed the appeal. We
affirm.
Background. The parties are well acquainted with the facts
as detailed in the judge's thorough decisions and the parties'
statements of material facts not in dispute. Briefly, the
defendants seek to build a home on their property, a
historically natural, nonconforming vacant lot fronting Sleepy
Hollow Road. The northwest corner of the plaintiffs' property
directly abuts the southeast corner of the defendants' property.
The plaintiffs' property is a landlocked "rear" parcel that has
access to Sleepy Hollow Road solely by way of an easement twenty
feet wide, with ten feet on the northernmost portion, abutting
11 Sleepy Hollow Road, and the remaining ten feet on the
southernmost portions of the defendants' property and 13R Sleepy
Hollow Road.
The defendants propose to construct a new two-story house
on their property. They plan to put the foundation of the new
structure as close to Sleepy Hollow Road and the plaintiffs'
shared driveway easement as possible, using superseding setbacks
to have ocean views. The inland side of the proposed structure
is four feet from the driveway easement and fourteen feet from
the property line.
The plaintiffs use their property as a summer home. The
plaintiffs and their invitees use a variety of passenger
3 vehicles to access the property, including a Toyota Highlander,
taxicabs, and other cars belonging to family and friends.
Vendors and contractors service the property seasonally using
larger-sized vehicles. The plaintiffs do not know whether
contractors generally enter the easement by driving forward or
by backing into the property. The plaintiffs regularly bring a
boat trailer to their property. When leaving the property, the
plaintiffs sometimes drive forward onto Sleepy Hollow Road and
sometimes back out onto Sleepy Hollow Road.
Due to the current construction fencing in place at the
defendants' property, the plaintiffs have to "look through two
sides" of the fence when turning onto Sleepy Hollow Road. The
fencing does not impair sight lines to Sleepy Hollow Road from
the driveway easement. In the four to five years the fence has
been up, the plaintiffs have been able to successfully negotiate
turning into and out of the driveway.
Two traffic engineers conducted field reviews, analyzed
relevant plans, used modeling software to render sight lines,
and testified at trial as experts. The experts agreed that
passenger vehicles can make a multipoint turn to leave the
property driving forward onto Sleepy Hollow Road. Both experts
opined that larger vehicles -- including vehicles with trailers,
and delivery and service type vehicles such as box trucks --
cannot make multipoint turns in front of the plaintiffs'
4 property. The judge credited this testimony. The judge found,
with the benefit of a view, that passenger vehicles and smaller
trucks that are either driving forward or backing up onto Sleepy
Hollow Road can see beyond the defendants' proposed development
and will not have their sight lines impaired.
The plaintiffs' expert opined that the location of the
proposed structure will only impact the sight lines of larger
nonpassenger vehicles, including service vehicles or vehicles
with a trailer in tow, and only when they are backing out of the
driveway easement onto Sleepy Hollow Road. The judge found that
any harm this might cause to the plaintiffs' use of their
driveway easement was speculative.
After trial, the judge dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal.
The judge reasoned that the plaintiffs are not persons aggrieved
under G. L. c. 40A where their presumption of standing had been
rebutted and they failed to demonstrate a specific harm to them
that is more than de minimis or speculative. Allison Bonanno
appealed.4
Discussion. Persons aggrieved by a zoning board decision
have standing to contest it if they suffer "some infringement of
[their] legal rights" that is "more than minimal or slightly
appreciable, and the right or interest [is] one that G. L.
4 After judgment entered, a suggestion of death was filed for Charles Bonanno.
5 c.
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-200
CHARLES D. BONANNO, trustee,1 & another2
vs.
ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF GLOUCESTER & others.3
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Two of the defendants, Joseph and Gloria DiStefano
(defendants), own a vacant lot located at 13 Sleepy Hollow Road
in the private Hawks section of Wingaersheek Beach in the city
of Gloucester (defendants' property). On November 27, 2018, the
building commissioner of Gloucester determined that it was a
buildable lot. On June 13, 2019, the city's zoning board of
1 Of the Ozone Realty Trust.
2 Allison C. Bonanno, trustee of the Ozone Realty Trust.
3Building commissioner of Gloucester; Joseph DiStefano, individually and as trustee of the Joseph DiStefano Revocable Trust dated March 6, 2019; Gloria DiStefano, individually and as trustee of the Gloria L. DiStefano Revocable Trust dated March 6, 2019; Gerald McGovern; and Sheila McGovern. appeals (ZBA) affirmed the building commissioner's determination
(ZBA decision).
The plaintiffs, Charles D. Bonanno and Allison C. Bonanno,
as trustees of the Ozone Realty Trust (plaintiffs), own 11R
Sleepy Hollow Road (plaintiffs' property), an abutter to the
defendants' property. They filed an appeal in the Superior
Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 17, challenging the ZBA
decision. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on
the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an
action under G. L. c. 40A, § 17. In a written decision, a judge
of the Land Court rejected all but one of the aggrievement
claims raised by the plaintiffs to establish standing, as harms
that were either not particular to the plaintiffs or too
speculative. The judge determined that one of these grounds --
a claim of interference with the plaintiffs' use of their
easement -- was sufficiently particular to the plaintiffs, if
credited, to confer standing. Accordingly, the judge denied
summary judgment on that issue but allowed the defendants'
motion in all other respects.
The judge held a trial on the issue of standing. After
trial, the judge found that any impact on the plaintiffs' use of
their driveway easement caused by the defendants' proposed
structure would be de minimis or speculative and therefore did
2 not confer standing. The judge then dismissed the appeal. We
affirm.
Background. The parties are well acquainted with the facts
as detailed in the judge's thorough decisions and the parties'
statements of material facts not in dispute. Briefly, the
defendants seek to build a home on their property, a
historically natural, nonconforming vacant lot fronting Sleepy
Hollow Road. The northwest corner of the plaintiffs' property
directly abuts the southeast corner of the defendants' property.
The plaintiffs' property is a landlocked "rear" parcel that has
access to Sleepy Hollow Road solely by way of an easement twenty
feet wide, with ten feet on the northernmost portion, abutting
11 Sleepy Hollow Road, and the remaining ten feet on the
southernmost portions of the defendants' property and 13R Sleepy
Hollow Road.
The defendants propose to construct a new two-story house
on their property. They plan to put the foundation of the new
structure as close to Sleepy Hollow Road and the plaintiffs'
shared driveway easement as possible, using superseding setbacks
to have ocean views. The inland side of the proposed structure
is four feet from the driveway easement and fourteen feet from
the property line.
The plaintiffs use their property as a summer home. The
plaintiffs and their invitees use a variety of passenger
3 vehicles to access the property, including a Toyota Highlander,
taxicabs, and other cars belonging to family and friends.
Vendors and contractors service the property seasonally using
larger-sized vehicles. The plaintiffs do not know whether
contractors generally enter the easement by driving forward or
by backing into the property. The plaintiffs regularly bring a
boat trailer to their property. When leaving the property, the
plaintiffs sometimes drive forward onto Sleepy Hollow Road and
sometimes back out onto Sleepy Hollow Road.
Due to the current construction fencing in place at the
defendants' property, the plaintiffs have to "look through two
sides" of the fence when turning onto Sleepy Hollow Road. The
fencing does not impair sight lines to Sleepy Hollow Road from
the driveway easement. In the four to five years the fence has
been up, the plaintiffs have been able to successfully negotiate
turning into and out of the driveway.
Two traffic engineers conducted field reviews, analyzed
relevant plans, used modeling software to render sight lines,
and testified at trial as experts. The experts agreed that
passenger vehicles can make a multipoint turn to leave the
property driving forward onto Sleepy Hollow Road. Both experts
opined that larger vehicles -- including vehicles with trailers,
and delivery and service type vehicles such as box trucks --
cannot make multipoint turns in front of the plaintiffs'
4 property. The judge credited this testimony. The judge found,
with the benefit of a view, that passenger vehicles and smaller
trucks that are either driving forward or backing up onto Sleepy
Hollow Road can see beyond the defendants' proposed development
and will not have their sight lines impaired.
The plaintiffs' expert opined that the location of the
proposed structure will only impact the sight lines of larger
nonpassenger vehicles, including service vehicles or vehicles
with a trailer in tow, and only when they are backing out of the
driveway easement onto Sleepy Hollow Road. The judge found that
any harm this might cause to the plaintiffs' use of their
driveway easement was speculative.
After trial, the judge dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal.
The judge reasoned that the plaintiffs are not persons aggrieved
under G. L. c. 40A where their presumption of standing had been
rebutted and they failed to demonstrate a specific harm to them
that is more than de minimis or speculative. Allison Bonanno
appealed.4
Discussion. Persons aggrieved by a zoning board decision
have standing to contest it if they suffer "some infringement of
[their] legal rights" that is "more than minimal or slightly
appreciable, and the right or interest [is] one that G. L.
4 After judgment entered, a suggestion of death was filed for Charles Bonanno.
5 c. 40A is intended to protect" (quotation and citations
omitted). Murchison v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Sherborn, 485
Mass. 209, 213 (2020).
1. Summary judgment. We review de novo the judge's
decision granting summary judgment. Stone v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals of Northborough, 496 Mass. 366, 373 (2025). "Because a
judge does not engage in fact finding when ruling on [a motion]
for summary judgment, we do not give deference to the judge's
decision." 81 Spooner Rd., LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of
Brookline, 461 Mass. 692, 699 (2012).
Here, the plaintiffs raised issues of density, interference
with the use of their easement, pedestrian safety, restricted
visibility, and impact on views. The judge rejected all of
these claims of aggrievement on summary judgment, except
interference with the use of the easement. All of these
concerns, except impact on views, are "typical" interests that
G. L. c. 40A is designed to protect, Murchison, 485 Mass. at
214, and thus we assume the plaintiffs have met that portion of
the standing requirements.5 However, simply identifying a zoning
5 Concerns about visual impacts do not generally confer standing, unless a town or city specifically defines visual impacts as a protected interest in the ordinance. Martin v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 434 Mass. 141, 146-147 (2001); Monks v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Plymouth, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 685, 688 (1994). The judge concluded that the plaintiffs had
6 violation or an interest protected by G. L. c. 40A, § 17, is not
the end of the analysis.
"[E]stablishing standing requires a plaintiff to do more
than merely allege a zoning violation." Murchison, 485 Mass. at
214. The plaintiffs must demonstrate that they will be harmed
in a manner that is "different from general concerns shared by
the rest of the neighborhood." Id. at 215. In short, the
plaintiffs must show how the proposed project will directly
affect the use and enjoyment of their property. Thus, for
example, in Dwyer v. Gallo, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 292, 296-297
(2008), even though abutters had identified the project's
violations of the density provisions of the local bylaw, their
standing was demonstrated only when they also established direct
harm by describing "the close proximity of [the proposed
structures] to [their] rear deck and sunroom," the loss of
privacy already resulting from preliminary tree clearing, and
their impaired views that affected their "privacy and use and
enjoyment of their property."
Here, while the plaintiffs articulated concerns protected
by G. L. c. 40A, they failed to present any evidence that those
not identified any such protected interest in the ordinance. We agree. Accordingly, their complained-of visual impacts (namely, impact on their views of the sunset) are insufficient to constitute aggrievement.
7 concerns will directly harm their use and enjoyment of their
property. Although as abutters, the plaintiffs enjoyed a
presumption of standing, see Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals
of Newburyport, 421 Mass. 719, 721 (1996); Sheehan v. Zoning Bd.
of Appeals of Plymouth, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 52, 54 (2005), that
presumption of standing has been challenged, and "the question
becomes whether the evidence supports the plaintiffs' claims of
aggrievement." Murchison, 485 Mass. at 213.
First, the judge determined, the plaintiffs' claim that
pedestrian safety could be impacted by the defendants'
development "is not particular to the [plaintiffs] but is rather
a harm to a general civic interest that is insufficient to
confer standing." We agree. See Harvard Sq. Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Planning Bd. of Cambridge, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491, 495 (1989)
(general civic interest in enforcement of zoning laws is not
enough to confer standing); Murray v. Board of Appeals of
Barnstable, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 473, 476 (1986).
Second, the judge saw no evidence that the defendants'
proposed structure will cause overcrowding or violate density
provisions of the zoning ordinance. Again, we agree. See
Murchison, 485 Mass. at 214 (plaintiff must show "evidence of an
injury particular to the plaintiffs, as opposed to the
neighborhood in general, the injury must be causally related to
violation of zoning laws, and it must be more than de minimis").
8 The plaintiffs did not produce evidence that the neighborhood is
overly crowded or that the defendants' proposed project will
materially contribute to any overcrowding, beyond the personal
opinions of Charles Bonanno. "This was not enough." Stone, 496
Mass. at 377. See id. (plaintiffs' "personal assessment that
noise [from proposed warehouse] . . . will have an impact on the
enjoyment of their home" was insufficient to establish standing
under G. L. c. 40A). Also, any evidence of overcrowding was not
like the testimony offered in Dwyer, 73 Mass. App. Ct. at 297;
it "did not demonstrate harm particular to the plaintiffs,
different from general concerns shared by the rest of the
neighborhood." Murchison, supra at 215.
2. Standing trial. As noted, the judge found that there
was a material issue whether the defendants' proposed project
would impact the plaintiffs' use of their driveway easement
sufficiently to confer standing. Accordingly, he held a
standing trial on this issue. In addition to taking testimony
from two experts and Charles Bonanno, the judge conducted a view
so he could evaluate the impact of the proposed project on the
sight lines at the intersection of Sleepy Hollow Road and the
driveway easement.
After a trial, "[a] judge's findings of aggrieved [person]
status are 'entitled to deference'" (citation omitted). Wendy's
Old Fashioned Hamburgers of N.Y., Inc. v. Board of Appeal of
9 Billerica, 454 Mass. 374, 384 (2009). Indeed, "[w]hether an
individual is aggrieved is a question of fact for the trial
judge, . . . which should not be reversed unless clearly
erroneous" (citations omitted). Sheehan, 65 Mass. App. Ct. at
54-55. Again, any harm to an interest which zoning laws are
designed to protect "must be more than de minimis." Murchison,
485 Mass. at 214.
Because the defendants rebutted the plaintiffs' evidence of
standing based on alleged interference with their use of their
driveway easement, the burden rested with the plaintiffs to "put
forth credible evidence to substantiate [their] allegations" of
aggrievement. Murchison, 485 Mass. at 215; quoting Marashlian,
421 Mass. at 721.
At a trial, standing is decided on "all the evidence with
no benefit to the plaintiffs from the presumption" (citation
omitted). Marashlian, 421 Mass. at 721. Although the court
does not view claims of aggrievement narrowly, id. at 722,
neither conjecture nor speculative personal opinion substitutes
for proof. Murchison, 485 Mass. at 215. "[T]he plaintiff's
claimed injury must be more than speculative" (quotation and
citation omitted). Stone, 496 Mass. at 374.
The plaintiffs contend that the proposed development on the
defendants' property will harm their use of the driveway
easement because it will obstruct their view of Sleepy Hollow
10 Road as they back out of the driveway. After considering all of
the evidence, the judge found that any aggrievement with respect
to passenger vehicles and smaller trucks was de minimis, and the
claimed aggrievement with respect to nonpassenger vehicles was
speculative; as such, the evidence was insufficient to confer
standing.
First, the plaintiffs claim that the current construction
fence surrounding the defendants' property obstructs visibility
at the Sleepy Hollow intersection and interferes with the use of
their driveway easement. However, the judge noted that Charles
Bonanno had been able to successfully negotiate getting in and
out of the driveway in the four to five years the fence had been
up. Furthermore, at the view, the judge saw that the fence did
not impair sight lines to Sleepy Hollow Road.
Second, the plaintiffs claim that future construction of
the defendants' proposed development will impact the plaintiffs'
use of their driveway easement. The judge noted that the only
evidence the plaintiffs offered in support of this claim was
Charles Bonanno's anecdotal recounting of his experience when
the abutting rear lot owners performed construction on their
property, which he acknowledged was a "different situation."
The judge rejected these concerns because they were entirely
speculative. Subjective and unspecific concerns about the
possible impairment of interests are insufficient bases for
11 aggrievement. See Stone, 496 Mass. at 378 ("[n]either
speculation nor common sense is sufficient to establish
aggrievement"); Murchison, 485 Mass. at 215.
Finally, the plaintiffs claim that the proposed development
will impair the visibility of passenger vehicles and larger
nonpassenger vehicles backing out of the driveway easement. The
judge noted that both experts agreed that passenger vehicles
will be able to see beyond the defendants' proposed development
and will not have their sight lines impaired, regardless of
whether the passenger vehicles are driving forward onto Sleepy
Hollow Road or backing out.
Larger nonpassenger vehicles include landscaping trucks,
trucks towing trailers or boats, and other oversized panel
trucks. The plaintiffs did not provide testimony from service
truck drivers or other evidence establishing that operators of
these vehicles had difficulty viewing oncoming traffic on Sleepy
Hollow Road.6 Charles Bonanno himself acknowledged that he had
entered the driveway easement with his boat trailer driving both
forward and in reverse.7 Based on the evidence presented, the
6 As noted, the plaintiffs admitted that they did not know whether the landscaper generally enters the easement driving forward or backward into their property.
7 This admission supports an inference that any large nonpassenger vehicles, including vehicles with trailers, could back into the driveway easement from Sleepy Hollow Road.
12 judge found that the plaintiffs had failed to establish through
direct facts that the ability of any nonpassenger vehicles to
use the driveway easement will be impaired by the proposed
development, current fencing, or future construction.
Accordingly, the judge found speculative the plaintiffs' alleged
concern that nonpassenger vehicles will have their views
obstructed by the proposed development when backing out of the
driveway easement onto Sleepy Hollow Road. See Stone, 496 Mass.
at 377-378.
On the record presented, the judge did not clearly err in
finding that the plaintiffs failed to articulate a harm,
personal to them, that is "more than de minimis," Murchison, 485
Mass. at 214, or beyond "speculative" (citation omitted).
Stone, 496 Mass. at 374.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Meade, Desmond & Wood, JJ.8),
Clerk
Entered: February 4, 2026.
Therefore, to the extent that the project would interfere with the sight lines of such vehicles when they are backing out onto Sleepy Hollow Road, one obvious solution is to back into the driveway easement from Sleepy Hollow Road and depart driving forward.
8 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.