1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHARLES-CLIFTON BEAL., 2:25-cv-3636-CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 JASON SCHULTZ, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Charles-Clifton Beal is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel and seeking 18 relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to the undersigned by Local Rule 302. 19 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the complaint fails to state a claim and 20 should be dismissed with leave to amend. 21 I. In Forma Pauperis 22 Plaintiff requests to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the 23 motion to proceed in forma pauperis makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The 24 motion is granted. By separate order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 25 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The order will direct the appropriate 26 agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the 27 Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent 28 of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will 1 be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in 2 plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00 until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 3 II. Screening Requirement 4 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 5 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 6 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 7 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 8 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 9 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 10 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 11 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 12 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 13 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 14 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 15 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 16 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 17 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 18 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 19 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 20 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 21 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 22 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 23 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 24 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 25 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 26 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 27 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 28 ///// 1 III. Allegations in the Complaint 2 In Claim One, plaintiff alleges that the law librarian, not named as a defendant, and Jason 3 Schultz, the warden at CSP-Sac “will not get and/or give…federal IRA forms to file…to 4 exercise” his religion. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) In Claim Two, plaintiff alleges that his conditions of 5 confinement are in violation of the Eight Amendment based on unsanitary conditions. Id. at 6. In 6 Claim Three, plaintiff alleges that on three occasions his mail was not sent to the IRS, and on two 7 occasions, his mail was not sent to federal court. Id. at 7. In Claim Four, plaintiff alleges that 8 John and Jane Does in the mail room stopped legal mail to the IRS and federal court. Id. at 8. In 9 Claim Five, plaintiff alleges “35 years was remove (sic) the next prison put it back on it is 10 retaliation.” Id. at 9. Named defendants are “Jason Schultz, Warden; Timothy William 11 Wagstaffe, DA; Song Kim, PD; and Jason B. Chin, Judge.” Id. at 1. 12 IV. Legal Standards 13 A. Linkage Requirement 14 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 15 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 16 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 17 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a 18 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 19 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 20 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 21 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must 22 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 23 plaintiff's federal rights. 24 B. Supervisory Liability 25 Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their 26 subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) 27 (“In a § 1983 suit ... the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, 28 each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding is only liable for his or her own 1 misconduct.”).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHARLES-CLIFTON BEAL., 2:25-cv-3636-CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 JASON SCHULTZ, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Charles-Clifton Beal is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel and seeking 18 relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to the undersigned by Local Rule 302. 19 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the complaint fails to state a claim and 20 should be dismissed with leave to amend. 21 I. In Forma Pauperis 22 Plaintiff requests to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the 23 motion to proceed in forma pauperis makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The 24 motion is granted. By separate order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 25 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The order will direct the appropriate 26 agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the 27 Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent 28 of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will 1 be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in 2 plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00 until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 3 II. Screening Requirement 4 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 5 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 6 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 7 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 8 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 9 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 10 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 11 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 12 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 13 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 14 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 15 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 16 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 17 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 18 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 19 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 20 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 21 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 22 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 23 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 24 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 25 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 26 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 27 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 28 ///// 1 III. Allegations in the Complaint 2 In Claim One, plaintiff alleges that the law librarian, not named as a defendant, and Jason 3 Schultz, the warden at CSP-Sac “will not get and/or give…federal IRA forms to file…to 4 exercise” his religion. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) In Claim Two, plaintiff alleges that his conditions of 5 confinement are in violation of the Eight Amendment based on unsanitary conditions. Id. at 6. In 6 Claim Three, plaintiff alleges that on three occasions his mail was not sent to the IRS, and on two 7 occasions, his mail was not sent to federal court. Id. at 7. In Claim Four, plaintiff alleges that 8 John and Jane Does in the mail room stopped legal mail to the IRS and federal court. Id. at 8. In 9 Claim Five, plaintiff alleges “35 years was remove (sic) the next prison put it back on it is 10 retaliation.” Id. at 9. Named defendants are “Jason Schultz, Warden; Timothy William 11 Wagstaffe, DA; Song Kim, PD; and Jason B. Chin, Judge.” Id. at 1. 12 IV. Legal Standards 13 A. Linkage Requirement 14 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 15 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 16 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 17 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a 18 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 19 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 20 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 21 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must 22 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 23 plaintiff's federal rights. 24 B. Supervisory Liability 25 Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their 26 subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) 27 (“In a § 1983 suit ... the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, 28 each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding is only liable for his or her own 1 misconduct.”). When the named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between 2 the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged; that is, a 3 plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either personally participated in or 4 directed the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights or knew of the violations and failed to act 5 to prevent them. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 6 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). 7 C. Mail 8 Under the First Amendment, prisoners have a right to send and receive mail. Witherow v. 9 Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). However, a prison may adopt regulations or 10 practices for inmate mail which limit a prisoner’s First Amendment rights as long as the 11 regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 12 78, 89, (1987). “When a prison regulation affects outgoing mail as opposed to incoming mail, 13 there must be a ‘closer fit between the regulation and the purpose it serves.’” Witherow, 52 F.3d 14 at 265 (quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 412 (1989)). Courts have also afforded 15 greater protection to legal mail than non-legal mail. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413. Isolated 16 incidents of mail interference or tampering will not support a claim under section 1983 for 17 violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d. Cir. 18 2003); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 19 944 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing 20 that a temporary delay or isolated incident of delay of mail does not violate a prisoner's First 21 Amendment rights). Generally, such isolated incidents must be accompanied by evidence of an 22 improper motive on the part of prison officials or result in interference with an inmate’s right of 23 access to the courts or counsel in order to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Smith, 24 899 F.2d at 944. 25 D. Access to Courts 26 A prison’s interference with legal mail may also violate an inmate’s right of access to the 27 courts which is protected by the First Amendment’s right to petition the government and the due 28 process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 290-291 (7th 1 Cir. 2004) (discussing the development of cases concerning a prisoner’s right of access to the 2 courts). Prison officials may not actively interfere with an inmate’s right to litigate. Silva v. 3 Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by Richey v. Dahne, 4 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2015). In order to state a claim for the denial of access to the 5 courts, a plaintiff must allege he suffered an actual injury, which is prejudice with respect to 6 contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a 7 nonfrivolous claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). 8 E. Conditions of Confinement 9 Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from 10 harmful conditions of confinement. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). A prison 11 official may be held liable for subjecting an inmate to harmful conditions of confinement if an 12 inmate suffers a sufficiently serious injury, and the prison official was deliberately indifferent to 13 the risk of harm. Id. at 834, 837. The relevant inquiry is whether prison officials, “acting with 14 deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious damage to 15 his future health.” Id. at 834 (internal quotation omitted). 16 V. Analysis 17 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state a claim upon 18 which relief can be granted under federal law. The complaint is largely unintelligible, and 19 although there are allegations regarding issues with plaintiff’s mail, there are no specifics nor any 20 named defendants other than the warden, Jason Schultz, who is likely not liable for any harms 21 based on supervisory liability alone. The complaint also names a number of defendants with no 22 factual allegations at all. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended complaint. 23 VI. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party 24 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not 25 intended as legal advice. The court has reviewed the allegations in your complaint and determined 26 that they do not state any claim against the defendants. Your complaint is being dismissed, but 27 you are being given the chance to fix the problems identified in this screening order. 28 Although you are not required to do so, you may file an amended complaint within 30 1 days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular 2 attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims. 3 VII. Amended Complaint 4 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 5 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 6 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in 7 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. 8 § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the 9 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory 10 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of 11 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 12 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 13 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 14 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 15 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 16 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 17 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 18 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 19 VIII. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party 20 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not 21 intended as legal advice. 22 The court has reviewed the allegations in your complaint and determined that service of 23 the complaint is not appropriate because you do not sufficiently describe what happened or 24 explain your belief as to why it happened. Your complaint is being dismissed, but you are being 25 given the chance to fix the problems identified in this screening order. 26 Although you are not required to do so, you may file an amended complaint within 30 27 days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular 28 attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims. 1 IX. CONCLUSION 2 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 3 1. Plaintiffs request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 4 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. All fees 5 || shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the California Department of 6 || Corrections filed concurrently herewith. 7 3. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed. 8 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 9 || complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 10 || Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 11 || number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” Failure to file an 12 || amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action 13 || be dismissed. 14 | Dated: May 27, 2026 / a □□ / a Ly a
16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 Ckd beal 25.3636.scrn 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28