Charles C. Fulton Building Co. v. Stichel

109 A. 434, 135 Md. 542, 1920 Md. LEXIS 13
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland
DecidedJanuary 14, 1920
StatusPublished
Cited by40 cases

This text of 109 A. 434 (Charles C. Fulton Building Co. v. Stichel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Charles C. Fulton Building Co. v. Stichel, 109 A. 434, 135 Md. 542, 1920 Md. LEXIS 13 (Md. 1920).

Opinion

Boyd, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellee sued the appellant for injuries- alleged to have been received by him in going down a, stairway of an office building in Baltimore City belonging to the appellant. The trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff (appellee), and this is an appeal from a judgment entered thereon. The trial Court granted the defendant’s fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh, and refused its first, second, third and eighth prayers-. The rulings on those rejected prayers are presented by the only bill of exceptions-. The first prayer sought to have the jury instructed that there was no evidence legally sufficient under the pleadings to show any negligence on the part of the defendant, the second that there was no evidence legally sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover and the third that the plaintiff had been guilty of such negligence contributory to his injury as would preclude his recovery.

There are two- counts in the narr., in each of which the negligence relied on. is-, that “while the plaintiff herein was lawfully and carefully descending the public stairway in said building with his hand on the rail or banister, his hand became imp-aled upon a spike or pointed piece of metal; that the defendant knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care ought to have known, o-f the existence of said spike and that said s-p-ike was likely to impale the hands of persons having occasion rightfully to use said stairway.” As we understand the *544 evidence, there might have been some question as to whether there was' not such a variance between the proof and the allegation of negligence in the narr. as would have been, under the former practice, a fatal variance under the first prayer. The allegation that while the plaintiff was descending the public stairway “with his hand on the rail or banister, his hand became impaled,” etc., indicates that the spike was on the rail on which his hand was, in descending the stairs, but the evidence shows that it was not on the rail or banister when the plaintiff was injured. But under the Act of 1914, Chapter 110 (Sec. 9-A of Art. 5, 3rd Vol. of Code), the fact that a prayer, which refers in general terms to the pleadings, was granted or refused shall not be sufficient to show that the point or question of a variance between the pleadings and the evidence was tried and decided in the Court below, as required by Section 9; “and the question of such variance shall not be considered as having been raised by any prayer or instruction below, unless such prayer or instruction shall state specifically the points wherein it is claimed that such variance exists.” We are, therefore, not at liberty to consider that variance, if it be conceded to exist. Section 91A of Article 75 (3rd Vol. of Code) does not relieve that difficulty. Rasst v. Morris, ante p. 243.

We can, then, only pass on the legal sufficiency of the evidence to show negligence on the part of the defendant, and the question of the alleged contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. We do' not understand the appellant to deny that an owner of an office or other building, in which he rents rooms to various tenants, but keeps control of the hallway, stairway, elevators, or any part of the building not rented to tenants is “under an obligation to use reasonable diligence to keep the portions, so retained under his control, of the building in a safe condition and free from improper obstructions,” as stated in Whitcomb v. Mason, 102 Md. 275, 282. The. rule as to the owner’s responsibility is well stated in 20 R. C. L. 55, par. 51, cited by the appellee, and there *545 are numerous eases in the note from .English, Federal (including the Supreme Court) and State courts. It is there said: “The authorities are entirely agreed upon the proposition that an owner or occupant of lands or buildings who directly or by implication invites or induces others to go thereon or therein owes to such persons a duty to have his premises in a reasonably safe condition and to. give warning of latent or concealed perils.” See also 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 245; 24 Cyc. 1125-1126; 16 R. C. L. 1071, par. 591. In 20 R. C. L. 56, par. 52, the “Basis of duty to persons going on premises” is. considered, and it is there said: .“The mere ownership of land or buildings does not render one liable for injuries, sustained by persons who have entered thereon or therein; the owner is not an insurer of such persons, even when he has invited them to enter. Nor is there any presumption of negligence on the part of an owner or occupier merely upon a showing that an injury has been sustained by one while rightfully upon the premises.. The true ground of liability is the proprietor’s superior knowledge of the perilous instrumentality and the danger therefrom to persons, going upon the property. It is when the perilous instrumentality is known to the owner or occupant, and not known to the person injured that a recovery is permitted * * *. And hence there is no liability for injuries from dangers that are obvious, or as well known to the person injured as to the owner or occupant.”

It will be well to first ascertain what the record discloses as to the actual condition of the stairway and banister, so as to determine whether the danger there, if any, was. obvious, and whether the plaintiff contributed to his injury by the Want of due care on his part. He testified that the stairway Was Well lighted — “plenty of light.,” as he repeated several times. There is no evidence tending to show that there is anything unusual in the construction of the stairway, or the iron mesh on the banister, and the accident occurred in the *546 middle of the day — between twelve and one o’clock. Unfortunately, the witnesses referred in their evidence to points, as from “here” to “there,” or in some way which was not always explained in the record, but some pictures taken of the locus in quo, which were admitted to he correct, and some measurements testified to help us to better understand what the witnesses were speaking of. The stairway between the third and second stories is divided into two flights-, with a small platform, apparently of the width of the stairway, and being probably about three feet square, judging from the pictures and measurements given, at the bottom of the first flight, coming down. On the first flight, coming down from the third story, there is a banister, and under that some ornamental work. At the bottom of that flight, near the end of the banister, there is a post, and then, at wlhat appears from the pictures to 'be at right angles, the second flight (counting from the third story) of that stairway goes down from the platform mentioned above. There is a rail from that post going down the second flight of the stairsi, but on that rail there is fastened an iron mesh work. The bottom of that mesh work is on that i*ail, b-ut on the top- of it there is a rail which runs parallel with the platform, and hence the mesh work increases- in height as it goes down the stairway. On the rail at the top- of the mesh wo-rk up-right spikes are fastened, which are about five inches high (above the rail), and about as thick at the top as a pencil, being a little thicker below.

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Bluebook (online)
109 A. 434, 135 Md. 542, 1920 Md. LEXIS 13, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charles-c-fulton-building-co-v-stichel-md-1920.