Charles Bolton v. 3121 Brewster. LLC

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedAugust 29, 2024
Docket01-24-00009-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Charles Bolton v. 3121 Brewster. LLC (Charles Bolton v. 3121 Brewster. LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Charles Bolton v. 3121 Brewster. LLC, (Tex. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

Opinion issued August 29, 2024

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00009-CV ——————————— CHARLES BOLTON, Appellant V. 3121 BREWSTER, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the 11th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2023-30541

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Charles Bolton filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s

December 4, 2023 “Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment” in favor of appellee

3121 Brewster, LLC. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. This Court generally has jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments

and specific interlocutory orders that the Legislature has designated as appealable

orders. See CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447–48 (Tex. 2011); see also

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014. A judgment is final for purposes of

appeal if it either (1) actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court,

regardless of its language or (2) states with “unmistakable clarity” that it is intended

as a final judgment as to all claims and all parties. See Farm Bureau Cnty. Mut. Ins.

Co. v. Rogers, 455 S.W.3d 161, 163 (Tex. 2015).

The trial court’s December 4, 2023 order expressly stated that the relief

granted was a “partial summary judgment,” and did not state that it was a final,

appealable order disposing of all claims and all parties. See McNally v. Guevara, 52

S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001) (concluding there is no presumption that order granting

summary judgment addresses all outstanding causes of action or disposes of all

parties). Further, the trial court’s December 4, 2023 order specifically identified an

outstanding issue, appellee’s request for the recovery of attorney’s fees, and

expressly requested that appellee “submit evidence” regarding attorney’s fees “for

consideration and ruling by” the trial court. Because the trial court’s order does not

dispose of appellee’s pending claim for recovery of attorney’s fees, it is not a final

judgment. See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Debose, No. 01-08-00717-CV, 2009 WL

793851, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 26, 2009, pet. denied) (mem.

2 op.) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction where trial court granted summary

judgment but had not ruled on pending motion for attorney’s fees).

Further, an interlocutory order granting a motion for summary judgment of

some, but not all claims and parties in a lawsuit, has not been specifically designated

by the Legislature as an appealable interlocutory order. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. § 51.014. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s December 4,

2023 order is not a final, appealable order nor is appellant entitled to an interlocutory

appeal from the order.

On July 30, 2024, the Clerk of the Court notified appellant that it appeared

that we lacked jurisdiction over his appeal and directed appellant to file a written

response demonstrating that this Court had jurisdiction over the appeal. 1 Appellant

was further notified that the failure to respond to the notice within ten days would

result in dismissal of the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), (c), 43.2(f). Despite

the Court’s notice that the appeal was subject to dismissal, appellant did not

adequately respond.

1 “[C]ourts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction.” Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 146 n.14 (Tex. 2012) (internal quotations omitted); see also Royal Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ragsdale, 273 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (jurisdiction fundamental in nature and cannot be ignored). If this case is an appeal over which we have no jurisdiction, the appeal must be dismissed. See V.I.P. Royal Palace, LLC v. Hobby Event Ctr. LLC, No. 01-18-00621-CV, 2020 WL 3579563, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 2, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Ragsdale, 273 S.W.3d at 763.

3 We therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P.

42.3(a), (c), 43.2(f). All pending motions are dismissed as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Guerra, and Farris.

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Related

CMH HOMES v. Perez
340 S.W.3d 444 (Texas Supreme Court, 2011)
Williams v. Lara
52 S.W.3d 171 (Texas Supreme Court, 2001)
Royal Independent School District v. Ragsdale
273 S.W.3d 759 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2008)
Farm Bureau County Mutual Insurance Company v. Cristil Rogers
455 S.W.3d 161 (Texas Supreme Court, 2015)

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Charles Bolton v. 3121 Brewster. LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charles-bolton-v-3121-brewster-llc-texapp-2024.