Charles Bellon v.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: December 3, 2024
• Docket: 24-2897
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

BLD-033 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-2897 ___________

IN RE: CHARLES BELLON, Petitioner ____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (Related to W.D. Pa. Civ. Nos. 3-15-cv-00131 & 3-22-cv-00044) ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. November 14, 2024 Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 3, 2024) __________

OPINION* __________ PER CURIAM

Charles Bellon has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. We will deny the

petition, but we note that there appears no impediment to the District Court’s ability to

proceed.

I.

Bellon’s petition is addressed to his two federal habeas cases. He filed the first in

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 2015 challenging his 2006 convictions in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas for

Blair County. The District Court granted one of his habeas claims and ordered that a writ

would issue unless the Blair County court imposed a new sentence of no more than 10

years on Bellon’s convictions of possession with intent to deliver. On January 10, 2020,

the Blair County court reduced the maximum sentence on those counts to 10 years, but it

did not vacate its previous judgment or conduct a plenary resentencing.

Bellon later filed a motion in his 2015 habeas case to enforce the District Court’s

habeas judgment. He argued that (1) the habeas judgment required the Blair County

court to formally vacate its judgment and conduct a plenary resentencing, and (2) the

Blair County court’s January 2020 sentencing order was otherwise illegal. The District

Court denied the motion, and Bellon appealed.

We dismissed his appeal as moot because the Blair County court’s January 2020

order already complied with the habeas judgment. See Bellon v. Superintendent Benner

Twp. SCI, No. 21-2638, 2024 WL 138574, at *2 (3d Cir. Jan. 12, 2024). We noted that

the habeas judgment did not require the Blair County court to vacate Bellon’s sentence as

he claimed. See id. At *2 n.1. We also noted that Bellon was required to raise any other

challenges to the Blair County court’s January 2020 order in a new habeas petition,

which he had filed in 2022. See id. At *2 & n.2.

That 2022 petition instituted the second habeas case at issue here. But before

addressing that case, we note further developments in Bellon’s 2015 case. In the 2015

case, and about three weeks before we ruled in the appeal just discussed, Bellon filed a

motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) raising, inter alia, claims addressed to the Blair

2 County court’s January 2020 sentencing order. The District Court denied it and declined

to issue a certificate of appealability (“COA”). Bellon then filed a motion for a COA in

the District Court (ECF No. 140), which has not yet ruled on it.

The next day, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed a motion to stay Bellon’s

2022 habeas case. The Commonwealth requested a stay on the grounds that (1) Bellon’s

2015 case was still pending, and (2) Bellon had filed another petition under

Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act. On September 5, 2024, a Magistrate Judge

granted that motion and stayed the 2022 case. (ECF No. 21.) He specified that he did so

solely because Bellon’s 2015 case remained pending and that he was not relying on

Bellon’s most recent PCRA petition.

That order prompted Bellon to file a motion in his 2015 case to withdraw his

“appeal,” by which he meant his COA motion. (ECF No. 141.) He argued that his COA

motion should have resulted in an appeal. But he also asserted that he now wants to

withdraw the appeal so he can proceed in his 2022 case, which we previously advised is

indeed the proper way for him to pursue claims addressed to the Blair County court’s

January 2020 sentencing order.

II.

Bellon now has filed a mandamus petition seeking orders that would allow him to

proceed with his 2022 case. Specifically, he asks us to (1) direct the District Court to rule

on his motion to withdraw his “appeal” (i.e., his COA motion) in his 2015 case, and (2)

vacate the Magistrate Judge’s stay order in his 2022 case.

3 We deny both requests. As to the 2015 case, Bellon’s motion to withdraw his

appeal/COA motion has been pending only since September 13, so the lack of ruling is

not yet “tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction” as he claims. Madden v. Myers,

102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996). And because the 2015 case is still pending, the

Magistrate Judge’s decision to stay the 2022 case is not a “clear abuse of discretion” that

might warrant mandamus relief. In re Wilson, 451 F.3d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 2006)

(quotation marks omitted); see also In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817

(3d Cir. 1982) (“explaining that “matters of docket control . . . are committed to the

sound discretion of the district court”). Moreover, as we previously advised Bellon, any

challenge to the actions of a Magistrate Judge who is not acting on the parties’ consent

should be brought first in the District Court. See In re Bellon, No. 21-2638, 2021 WL

5632075, at *2 n.2 (3d Cir. Dec. 1, 2021) (per curiam) (citing Cole v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 366

F.3d 813, 817-18 (9th Cir. 2004)).

Thus, we will deny the petition. But we note our agreement with Bellon on one

point. Bellon argues that his COA motion at ECF No. 140 in his 2015 case should be

construed as a notice of appeal because the District Court already had denied a COA. We

agree, see 3d Cir. L.A.R. 3.4 (2011), and we note that the motion has not yet been sent to

our court for the docketing of an appeal. Bellon, however, later filed his motion at ECF

No. 141 to withdraw his appeal/COA motion. In his motion to withdraw, he asserts

unequivocally that he wants to forgo an appeal in his 2015 case in order to proceed with

his 2022 case. Thus, because Bellon’s COA motion has not yet resulted in the docketing

of an appeal in our court, the District Court can treat Bellon’s motion to withdraw his

4 appeal/COA motion as a motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal in that court under Fed.

R. App. P. 42(a).1 And if the motion is granted, the 2015 case will be concluded and will

no longer provide a basis to stay the 2022 case. We trust that the District Court and

Magistrate Judge will address these issues in due course.

III.

For these reasons, we deny the mandamus petition. Bellon’s motion to

supplement the petition—which does not request any additional relief, and which does

not otherwise explain how or why he wants to supplement his petition—is denied.

1 Perhaps complicating matters is a motion that Bellon recently filed at ECF No. 144 in his 2015 habeas case. In that motion, and despite already having asked to withdraw his appeal/COA motion and having already filed this mandamus petition, Bellon asked the District Court to treat his appeal/COA motion as a notice of appeal and forward it to this Court. This recent filing, which the District Court can address, is another reason why we conclude that mandamus relief is not warranted at this time. 5