Charge to Grand Jury—Treason

30 F. Cas. 1042, 2 Sprague 292
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedMarch 15, 1863
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 30 F. Cas. 1042 (Charge to Grand Jury—Treason) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Charge to Grand Jury—Treason, 30 F. Cas. 1042, 2 Sprague 292 (D. Mass. 1863).

Opinion

SPRAGUE, District Judge

(charging grand ’jury). It is your duty to inquire into all offen-ces against the United States within the jurisdiction of this court. The greatest crime known to the law is treason; self-preservation being the highest duty of government. Without it, [1043]*1043there can be no administration of law, civil or criminal. This crime is defined by the constitution itself. It declares that treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. A person may be guilty of treason without himself taking up arms, and even while at a distance from any military assembly. That crime may now be committed within this state, by co-operating with rebels who are in arms, in distant parts of the country; the rule being that “all those who perform any part, however minute or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors.” Any person who. knowing that treason has been committed, shall “conceal, and not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same” to certain high officers, is guilty of a criminal offence denominated misprision of treason. .

Until the year 1861, these were the only provisions of the criminal law for the suppression of acts directly tending to the destruction of the government.

There were indeed statutes making it criminal to obstruct, resist, or impede the execution of legal process, or to assault, beat, or wound any officer or other person duly authorized, in serving such process, or to endeavor corruptly, or by threats or force, to influence any juror, witness, or- officer in any court of the United States, or by threats or force to impede, or endeavor to impede, the due administration of justice therein. But these were regarded as minor offences, subjecting the offender only to moderate punishment, by fine and imprisonment.

Under these laws, a marshal of the United States might be forcibly resisted, and he and his aids actually murdered, while in the execution o-f lawful process within a state, and yet the courts of the United States could sentence the offenders to no higher punishment than imprisonment for one year, and a fine of three hundred dollars. The state law might or might not prohibit such acts, and affix an adequate penalty.

Such was the condition of our criminal jurisprudence for the protection of the life of the government, and to secure the enforcement of the laws, up to the time of the breaking out of this Rebellion. How far it fell short of the duty of congress, is now seen by the light of the conflagration which was permitted to be kindled.

The Criminal Code touched no measure that had not ripened into an overt act of levying war, or actual interference with the administration of the law. All the incipient and preparatory measures, leading to the overthrow of the government, were left without punishment or reprehension.

Since the commencement of this Rebellion, congress has, by penal enactments, endeavored to secure the fidelity of officers and employés of the United States.

There are several statutes prescribing new oaths 'of office, and affixing the penalties of perjury to their violation. The first was passed in August, 1861 (Acts 1861, c. 64; 12 Stat. 326). and requires, that every officer, clerk, or employé in the several departments of the government, or in any way connected therewith, shall take an oath to support and defend the constitution and government of the United States against all enemies, whether domestic or foreign, and- to bear true faith, allegiance and loyalty to the same, any ordinance, resolution, or law of any state convention or legislature to the contrary notwithstanding. Here, you will observe, is a most important and striking provision, unknown to any previous official oath. It requires not only fidelity to the government, but the support and defence thereof against all enemies, domestic as well as foreign. Nor is this all; there is added this emphatic language: “Any ordinance, resolution, or law of any state convention or legislature to the contrary notwithstanding.” This, gentlemen, is a most explicit renunciation and abjuration of-the deadly heresy of a paramount state sovereignty,—that heresy which has been so persistently and successfully inculcated for many years past, especially in the Southern states, and has at length produced the bitter fruit of open rebellion. This doctrine of paramount state sovereignty, and of paramount state allegiance, has taken possession of the minds of tens of thousands; nay, has become public opinion in several states, and this not only against the whole spirit of the constitution, but in the face of its most express and emphatic language.

Our fathers foresaw this danger, and most carefully guarded against it. They meant, to create a government with the highest attributes of sovereignty, and with the power of self-preservation. They marked out the sphere of that government with all practicable clearness and precision, and within that sphere made it supreme.

They took especial care that this supremacy should not be left to inference. The sixth article of the constitution declares, in express terms, that “this constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme .law of the land.”

This seems to be sufficiently positive and unequivocal. But the framers of the constitution -did not stop even there, but added these words: “any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding;” thus pointedly and laboriously, in words as apt and expressive as our language affords, guarding against and repelling the idea, that a state could by any act, however solemn, even by its organic or fundamental law, resist or interfere with the constitution and laws of the United States, in their operation over the whole country. And yet the doctrine that the laws of the United States, constitutionally enacted, are not supreme, but that the law of a state may override them, and even authorize its inhabitants to rise up in resistance and overthrow the government, has been not only theoretically maintained, but carried into actual and direful practice. The disastrous consequences of this heresy of paramount state allegiance cannot be measured. We have seen some of them, but the end is not yet. Under its influence, we have seen the government, in the incipient stages of a great rebellion, when its life was threatened and its very existence at stake, stand as inactive as if struck with paralysis. At such a time, we have seen the chief magistrate of this great country looking on as if in utter helplessness, taking no efficient measure. either of prevention or repression, but declaring, in a solemn message, that the constitution did not contemplate making war upon a state.—a declaration which, in its application to the then condition of the country, meant that if a state saw fit to make a law to overthrow the government of the United States, and resist the execution of its laws, the government has no right, in order to enforce the laws and maintain its authority, to put down such resistance by using the requisite force; that is, that the state law is to be supreme, and practically triumphant oyer the constitution and laws of the United States.

Under the influence or pretence of this doctrine, we have seen high functionaries and officials. of almost every grade, guilty of the most appalling perfidy.

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Related

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261 F. 141 (Eighth Circuit, 1919)

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Bluebook (online)
30 F. Cas. 1042, 2 Sprague 292, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charge-to-grand-jurytreason-mad-1863.