Charge to Grand Jury

30 F. Cas. 1026, 3 Phila. 527
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Georgia
DecidedNovember 15, 1859
StatusPublished

This text of 30 F. Cas. 1026 (Charge to Grand Jury) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1026, 3 Phila. 527 (circtdga 1859).

Opinion

WAYNE, Circuit Justice

(charging the grand jury).

A circumstance has recently occurred' in this city which impresses the larger portion of its people, I may say all, with few exceptions, that the same vessel has been positively taken from this port to be engaged again in tbe same unlawful trade. This incident, with some exceptions that you fnay be called upon to act upon it, and upon biMs for violation for the slave trade acts, induces me. for tbe information of yourselves and our people at large, to charge you upon tbe legislation of congress upon that subject, and to give its history. I shall assert nothing without the documentary annals of our country to sustain what I shall say, with such references to them as will enable any one and every one who hears me to verify or to dis-affirm the conclusion of my investigation, if the latter can be done.

I proceed now to give the legislation of congress for the prohibition of the slave trade. It shall be chronological and minute, for instruction generally, and as a warning to such persons who at any time may he seduced by a corrupt avarice to engage in that inhuman trade. These enactments are in conformity with the constitution, and with that clause of it which declares that the “migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.” The clause has its place in the enumerated powers of congress.

The first act was passed on the 22d March. 1794 [1 Stat. 347], when General Washington was president. It was intended to prevent any citizen or resident of the United States, from equipping vessels within the United States to carry on trade or traffic in slaves to any foreign country. The Tryphenia v. Harrison [(Case No. 14,209]. That is. though slaves might be brought into the United States until tbe year 1808, in vessels fitted out in our ports for that purpose, they could not be carried by [1027]*1027our citizens or residents in the United States in such vessels into any foreign country. '.The forfeiture of the vessel which has been fitted out, attached when the original voyage was begun in the United States, notwithstanding a pretended transfer of her in a foreign port, and the commencement of a new voyage from such port.- The Plattsburg, 10 Wheat. [23 U. S.] 133. This act is still in force. The forfeiture attaches, though the equipments of the voyage may not have been completed, it being suffi-cieht that any preparations were made for the unlawful purpose. The act also imposes a penalty of $2,000 upon any person fitting out such vessel, or aiding or abetting to do bo. And as a prevention of such a traffic was the object to be attained, the act was applied to foreign vessels in this particular, that if one of them in our port shall be suspected to be intended for the slave trade, her owner, master, or factor, each and all of them, upon the oath of a citizen of the United States to that intent, may be required to give bonds to the treasurer of the United States, that none of the natives of Africa or negroes of any foreign country, should be taken on board of her, to be sold as slaves in any foreign port whatever, within nine months afterwards. In addition, a citizen of the United States is liable to forfeiture of $200 for every person he may receive on board of such vessel for the purpose of selling them as slaves. This statute accomplished its purpose for a time. But when it was found that some of our citizens and foreigners residing in the United States, who had been accustomed to traffic in slaves, misused their privilege to bring slaves into the United States, by engaging their vessel for taking slaves from one country to another, congress passed the act of May 10, 1800 [2 Stat. 70], It subjected to forfeiture any right or property in a vessel so employed, and the owners to pay a sum of money equal to double the value of their inter.est in her.

The judicial interpretation of this act, is that a vessel caught in such a trade, though it be before she has taken slaves on board, is liable to forfeiture. That a forfeiture was also incurred if slaves were carried as freight from a foreign port to another in the same kingdom; or from one foreign port to another in any other country. The act, too, declares that it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States or for any person residing in them to serve on board of any vessel of the United States employed in the transportation of slaves from one foreign country to another; and that for doing so they should be indicted and be subjected to a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars and imprisonment not exceeding two years. That he shall also be liable to the same fine and imprisonment for being voluntarily employed on board of a foreign vessel for the same purpose. The judicial interpretation of this act is, that actual transportation of slaves is not necessary to incur its penalties. It is enough that the vessel -was bound to the coast of Africa with the intent to take slaves on -board, and that the person charged with violating the act, knew that, and voluntarily served on board of her. U. S. v. Morris, 14 Pet. [39 U. SJ 464. It is not necessary to do more than to mention that there are other sections of this act providing for the capture of vessels engaged in such a trade: also for their forfeiture for the benefit of the captors, and precluding all persons interested in such vessel, her enterprise or voyage, from all rights to claim any slave on board of her, and denying to them any damages or retribution on account of her capture. This act further directs the commander of the ship, making the seizure of such a vessel, to take her officers and crew, and any person found on board of her. into custody, and to convey them to the civil authority of the United States, in some of the judicial districts, for prosecution. It had been early found that some of those persons most concerned in violating the laws, (just as it has been recently attempted,) claimed to be exempt from its penalties, on the ground of being passengers on board of the vessel seized. Congress met the artifice by declaring that all persons making such a declaration should nevertheless be taken into custody for prosecution, and any commander who shall seize such a vessel, with such a person on board of her, and who attempts to exercise his judgment in respect to the validity of such an excuse breaks the law. It was early afterwards decided, by Judge Bee, of South Carolina, that any person might make a seizure of such vessel for condemnation under the act. His ruling was affirmed by the supreme court of the United States in the case of The Josefa Segunda, 10 Wheat. [23 U. S.] 331. The act also gives to the president of the United States the naval forces to be employed in enforcing it. It provides for the punishment of the master of the vessel seized, subjecting him to a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars and imprisonment of not less than two and not more than four years.

The next act of congress was passed on the 2d March, 1807 [2 Stat. 426], when Mr. Jefferson was president. I will hereafter show that it was done upon his official suggestion; and I only do so how from unwillingness to divert your minds into another train of thought from the legislation itself.

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30 F. Cas. 1026, 3 Phila. 527, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charge-to-grand-jury-circtdga-1859.