Chapple v. County of Sacramento

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 10, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-01939·Unknown

Opinion

] FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ) MARQUISE CHAPPLE, Case No. 2:24-cv-01939-TLN-CSK V2 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING STIPULATED B y PROTECTIVE ORDER (ECF No. 24) COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al.,

The Court has reviewed the parties’ stipulated protective order below (ECF No. 24), and finds it comports with the relevant authorities and the Court’s Local Rule. See L.R. 141.1. The Court APPROVES the protective order, subject to the following clarification. The Court’s Local Rules indicate that once an action is closed, it “will not retain jurisdiction over enforcement of the terms of any protective order filed in that action.” L.R. 11141 .1(f); see Bylin Heating Sys., Inc. v. Thermal Techs., Inc., 2012 WL 13237584, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2012) (noting that courts in the district generally do not retain jurisdiction for disputes concerning protective orders after closure of the case). Thus, the Court will not retain jurisdiction over this protective order once the case is closed. Dated: March 10, 2025 C i s UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 4, chapp 1939.24

{PROPOSED} STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER RE: PERSONNEL FILES

PORTER SCOTT Carl L. Fessenden, SBN 161494 ctessenden@porterscott.com Cruz Rocha, SBN 279293 crocha@porterscott.com 2180 Harvard Street, Suite 500 Sacramento, California 95815 TEL: 916.929.1481 © || FAX: 916.927.3706 Attorney for Defendants COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, SACRAMENTO COUNT SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, JIM COOPER, and NATHANIEL DAVIS Exempt from Filing Fees Pursuant to Government Code § 6103 ] MARQUISE CHAPPLE, CASE NO. 2:24-cv-1939-TLN-CSK Plaintiff, {PROPOSED} STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER RE: PERSONNEL FILES Vv. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, Complaint Filed: 7/16/2024 SACRAMENTO SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, JIM COOPER, and NATHANIEL DAVIS, Defendants. 93 A. PURPOSE AND LIMITATION Defendants believe that the disclosure and discovery activity concerning the materials described in this stipulated protective order is likely to involve production of information for which protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation would be warranted. Plaintiff has not been permitted to view the materials described in this stipulated protective order. The parties acknowledge that this protective order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or

PROPOSED} STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER RE: PERSONNEL FILES

discovery activity, and that the protection it affords extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to such protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). The parties further acknowledge that this stipulated protective order does not entitle any party to file information designated as protected or confidential under seal, where Local Rule 141 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and reflects the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the Court to file material under seal. The following definitions shall apply to this Protective Order: 1. The “Action” shall mean and refer to the above-captioned matter and to all actions now or later consolidated with the Action, and any appeal from the Action and from any other action consolidated at any time under the above-captioned matter, through final judgment. 2. “Documents” or “Confidential Documents” shall mean the documents that Defendants designate as “Confidential” and described in section C. 3. “Confidential” shall mean information designated “Confidential” pursuant to this stipulated protective order. Information designated “Confidential” shall be information that is determined in good faith by the attorneys representing the designating party to be subject to protection pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Confidential documents, material, and/or information shall be used solely for purposes of litigation. Confidential information shall not be used by the non-designating party for any business or other purpose, unless agreed to in writing by all parties to this action or as authorized by further order of the Court. 4. “Defendants” shall mean COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, SACRAMENTO SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, JIM COOPER, and NATHANIEL DAVIS. 5. “Plaintiff” shall mean MARQUISE CHAPPLE. 6. “Parties” shall mean Plaintiff and Defendants, identified above. Covered Information: Pursuant to Local Rule 141.1(c)(1), a description of the information eligible for protection under this stipulated protective order is limited to the following: 1. Personnel files of Defendant NATHANIEL DAVIS, including any documents related to investigation of conduct, complaints or investigations or complaints, and imposition of discipline. 2. The declaration of Defendant NATHANIEL DAVIS declaring his financial net worth. Particularized Need for Protection: Pursuant to Local Rule 141.1(c)(2), Defendants assert that there exists a specific, particularized need for protection as to the information covered by this stipulated protective order. Defendants represent to the Court and Plaintiff that the materials designated to be covered by this stipulated protective order are limited solely to those which would qualify for protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and does not include information designated on a blanket or indiscriminate basis. See, e.g., In Re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011). Showing of Need for a Protective Order: Pursuant to Local Rule 141.1(c)(3), protection afforded by this stipulated protective order is for the convenience of Defendants and the Court. Defendants seek to avoid litigation and expenditure of resources concerning a potential motion for protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). The entry of this stipulated protective order may prevent the parties and the Court from conducting the usual document-by-document analysis necessary to obtain protection, in favor of a procedure whereby presumptive protection is afforded based on Defendants’ good faith representations of the need for protection. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1986). As a result, production may be made with this stipulated protective order in place and, if necessary, it will permit discrete and narrowed challenges to documents designated for protection. Confidential Documents subject to protection may be designated as “Confidential” and produced subject to this stipulated protective order: 1. The Confidential documents shall be used solely in connection with the above-captioned civil case, and in the preparation and trial of the case. The terms of this stipulated protective order do not apply to documents produced by Defendants in other cases or matters. The parties do not waive any objections to the admissibility of the documents or portions thereof in future proceedings in this case, including trial. 2. The parties will designate the Confidential documents as confidential by affixing a mark labelling them “Confidential.” 3. The Confidential documents may only be disclosed to the following persons: a. Plaintiff and Mark E. Merin and Paul H. Masuhara of the Law Office of Mark E. Merin, and any partners and associates in that office; b. Defendants and Carl L. Fessenden and Cruz Rocha of Porter Scott, and any partners and associates in that office; c. Paralegal, clerical, and secretarial personnel or support staff regularly empl

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