Chappell & Co. v. Santangelo

D. Connecticut

Chappell & Co. v. Santangelo

30 F. Supp. 599, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1837

CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut

DecidedNovember 16, 1939

DocketNo. 146

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 30 F. Supp. 599 (Chappell & Co. v. Santangelo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Chappell & Co. v. Santangelo, 30 F. Supp. 599, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1837 (D. Conn. 1939).

Pincite

Opinion

HÍNCKS. District Judge.

1. The motion to separate is granted to this extent, viz: the plaintiff should amend each count to include by reference paragraphs 1 to 4 inclusive and paragraphs 94 to 100 inclusive; also a separate statement of the damages claimed on .each count. This ruling is required in order that each count shall be self-sufficient in itself. I .see no objection, however, to the blanket character of the prayer for equitable relief.

2. The motion for separate trials is denied. To be sure, under Rule 20(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S. C.A. following section 723c, separate trials may be ordered “to prevent delay or prejudice.” But I see no danger of “prejudice” from one inclusive trial. And delays would be fostered, rather than prevented, by separate trials. Indeed, a multiplicity of separate trials would, frustrate the liberal provisions-of Rule-20(a) as.to permissive joinders. The rule recognizes the economy of a procedure whereunder several demands arising from the same occurrence may be tried together, thus avoiding the reiteration of the evidence relating to facts common to the several demands.

Ordered accordingly.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

HÍNCKS. District Judge.

1. The motion to separate is granted to this extent, viz: the plaintiff should amend each count to include by reference paragraphs 1 to 4 inclusive and paragraphs 94 to 100 inclusive; also a separate statement of the damages claimed on .each count. This ruling is required in order that each count shall be self-sufficient in itself. I .see no objection, however, to the blanket character of the prayer for equitable relief.

2. The motion for separate trials is denied. To be sure, under Rule 20(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S. C.A. following section 723c, separate trials may be ordered “to prevent delay or prejudice.” But I see no danger of “prejudice” from one inclusive trial. And delays would be fostered, rather than prevented, by separate trials. Indeed, a multiplicity of separate trials would, frustrate the liberal provisions-of Rule-20(a) as.to permissive joinders. The rule recognizes the economy of a procedure whereunder several demands arising from the same occurrence may be tried together, thus avoiding the reiteration of the evidence relating to facts common to the several demands.

Ordered accordingly.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

30 F. Supp. 599, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1837, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chappell-co-v-santangelo-ctd-1939.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack