Chapman v. State

672 So. 2d 637, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 4377, 1996 WL 200231
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedApril 26, 1996
DocketNo. 95-1076
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 672 So. 2d 637 (Chapman v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chapman v. State, 672 So. 2d 637, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 4377, 1996 WL 200231 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

DAUKSCH, Judge.

This is an appeal from a sentence. The state has conceded that it was improper for the grand theft to be an “additional offense” under the sentencing guidelines’ confusing scheme. The grand theft should be the “primary offense” so that the court can legally habitualize the appellant on the burglary conviction and thus maximize the penalty, as the judge wanted to do and should do. Watson v. State, 658 So.2d 118 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Ricardo v. State, 608 So.2d 93 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). The scoresheet should be redone and sentencing must be redone. On remand the court cannot depart for the reason that there is a pattern of escalating criminal behavior. The behavior was a continuing pattern but not escalating.

SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED.

GOSHORN and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

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Related

Hunter v. State
732 So. 2d 10 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1999)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
672 So. 2d 637, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 4377, 1996 WL 200231, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chapman-v-state-fladistctapp-1996.