Chapman v. Ellis

254 S.W. 615, 1923 Tex. App. LEXIS 538
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 7, 1923
DocketNo. 994. [fn*]
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 254 S.W. 615 (Chapman v. Ellis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chapman v. Ellis, 254 S.W. 615, 1923 Tex. App. LEXIS 538 (Tex. Ct. App. 1923).

Opinion

O’QUINN, J.

This suit was brought March 4, 1922, by appellees against appellants to cancel an oil and gas lease. Plaintiffs pleaded forfeiture and abandonment. Defendants denied that either existed. The ease was tried before the court without a jury and judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs, hence this appeal.

The lease contract in question was executed by Mrs. G. M. Ellis to A. R. Lewis on February 15, 1919, who assigned same to R. S. Chapman. The portions of said lease material to a determination of the questions here presented are:

(1) “That we, Mrs. G. M. Ellis and T. E. Lewis of Navarro County, Tex., the parties of the first part, in consideration of the sum of one cent per acre paid by A. R. Lewis, party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the further consideration hereinafter mentioned, have granted, bargained, sold, and conveyed, and do by these presents grant, bargain, sell, and convey unto the said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, all of the oil, gas, and coal and other minerals in and under the following described land, together with the right of ingress and egress at all times, for the purpose of drilling, mining, and operating for mineral and to conduct all operations and lay all pipe necessary for the production, mining and transportation of all oil, gas, water, coal, and other minerals, with the right to use sufficient water, gas, or oil to operate said property, and shall have the right to remove all machinery, fixtures, and improvements placed thereon at (any) time, reserving, however, to the parties of the first part the equal one-eighth (%) of all oil produced and saved upon said premises to be delivered in the pipe line to the credit of the parties of the first part free of charge.”
(2) “To have and to hold the above-described premises, unto the said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, on the following conditions: In case operations for the either drilling of a well for oil, gas, or mining other minerals, is not commenced and prosecuted with due diligence within six months (6) from this date, then this grant shall immediately become null and void as to both parties; provided that second party may prevent such forfeiture from year to year by paying the first party the 'sum of $1 per acre per year until such is commenced, or until shipments from such mines have begun, and it is agreed that completion of a well shall operate as a full liquidation of all rental under this provision during the remainder of the term of this lease, which payments can be made the Corsicana *616 .National Bank of Corsicana, Tex., or payable' -direct to the parties of the first part.”
(3) “This grant is not intended as a mere ■.franchise, but intended as a conveyance of the property above described for the purpose herein mentioned, and it is so understood by both parties to this agreement. It i? further agreed and understood that the lease on the above-described land is to remain in full force and effect for a period of five years, by paying the rental of $1 per acre per year.”

The lease was dated February 15,1919, and the record discloses that no well was commenced within six months from that date, as required by the terms of the lease, but August 15, 1919, at the expiration of the six months, rent was paid for a year, as provided in the lease, and at the expiration of that year, August 15, 1920, no drilling having been begun, rent was again paid for another year, or until August 15, 1921. About November, 1920, drilling was commenced, which continued up to about January 1, 1921, at which time the well was down to 820 feet, and no oil was found, but the well was filled with salt water and work on same ceased, and the well considered a dry hole. Later, in the latter part of February or the 1st of March, 1921, the casing was pulled, the well filled with mud to prevent caving, and in March the machinery moved to another oil field some four or five miles away, but the derrick was left standing, which was some time later blown down. The well was in what was known as the “Angus field,” in which oil sand was usually found at about 680 to 800 feet. No further drilling was begun by the expiration of the third year, August 15, 1921, and Mrs. Ellis demanded payment of another year’s rent, which was declined, appellant Chapman contending that having completed a well, within the meaning of the contract, he was relieved from further payment of rentals, the completed well being in full liquidation of all claims for rent. Mrs. Ellis did not agree to this contention, and. insisted that she was entitled to rent, or that the contract was forfeited. No more rent was paid, so this suit was filed March 4, 1922. Appellant Chapman offered evidence that he intended to drill the well deeper, but was prevented from so doing by the claim of Mrs. Ellis that the lease was forfeited and by the filing of this suit, and that he had not abandoned the lease or his effort to develop same.

Appellants’ fourth and first assignments of error will be considered together, as they raise practically the same question. The fourth assignment asserts that the court erred in holding that appellants did not complete a well on the land involved within the meaning of that term as used’ in the lease, insisting that the undisputed evidence showed that they did complete a well. The first, assignment complains that the court erred in rendering judgment for appellees on the ground of abandonment for nonpayment of rent, for the reason that the uncontradicted evidence shows that at a time when all rentals had been paid the appellant Chapman caused a well to be drilled on the lands leased to the depth of the then known oil sands in that vicinity, and completed said well within the meaning of that term as embraced in said lease, which completed well was a full liquidation of all rentals provided for in the lease for the remainder of said five-year period.

[1, 2] If the well drilled by appellant was a “completed” well, within the meaning of the contract, then the assignments should be sustained. Appellants contend that any completed well, producing or nonprodueing, met the provision of the contract; while appellees contend that a completed well is a producing well, and that such well was intended. The lease provided:

“In case operations for either drilling of a well for oil, gas, or mining other minerals, Is not commenced and prosecuted with due diligence within six months (6) from this date, then this grant shall immediately become null and void as to both parties; provided that said second party may prevent such forfeiture from year to year by paying the first party the sum of $1 per acre per year until such is commenced, or until shipments from such mines have begun, and it is agreed that completion of a well shall operate as a full liquidation of all rental under this provision during the remainder of the term of this lease. * * * ”

The right to explore for oil or gas was for a period of five years. The contract does not define a “completed” well, and, to that extent, is ambiguous, and where ambiguity in the terms of a contract exists, the testimony of experts in matters of the kind called for in the contract is admissible to explain the ambiguity.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Seagull Energy E & P, Inc. v. Railroad Commission
226 S.W.3d 383 (Texas Supreme Court, 2007)
Chandler v. Drummet
557 S.W.2d 313 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1977)
Barrett v. Ferrell
550 S.W.2d 138 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1977)
Hondo Oil & Gas Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.
387 P.2d 342 (New Mexico Supreme Court, 1963)
Braun v. Mon-O-Co Oil Corporation
320 P.2d 366 (Montana Supreme Court, 1958)
Minerva Oil Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co.
84 N.E.2d 167 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1949)
Cox v. Miller
184 S.W.2d 323 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1944)
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Page
141 S.W.2d 691 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1940)
Cosden Oil & Gas Co. v. Moss
1928 OK 352 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1928)
Fox Petroleum Co. v. Booker
1926 OK 519 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1926)
Sigler Oil Co. v. W. T. Waggoner Estate
276 S.W. 936 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1925)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
254 S.W. 615, 1923 Tex. App. LEXIS 538, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chapman-v-ellis-texapp-1923.