Chapman v. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc.

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedSeptember 5, 1996
DocketI.C. No. 064018
StatusPublished

This text of Chapman v. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc. (Chapman v. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chapman v. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc., (N.C. Super. Ct. 1996).

Opinion

The undersigned have reviewed the prior Opinion and Award based upon the record of the proceedings before Deputy Commissioner Chrystal Redding Stanback. The appealing party has not shown good ground to reconsider the evidence; receive further evidence; rehear the parties or their representatives; or amend the Opinion and Award, except with the modification of Finding of Fact #25, and the deletion of Awards #3 and #4.

* * * * * * * * * * *

The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties at the hearing as

STIPULATIONS

1. The parties entered into a Form 21 Agreement approved on September 27, 1990, wherein all necessary jurisdictional stipulations are contained, including a stipulation that plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident on June 11, 1990 resulting in carpal tunnel syndrome.

2. The Defendant employer was self insured.

3. Plaintiff's average weekly wage was $278.40 yielding a compensation rate of $185.61.

4. A Form 24 Application was approved by the Commission on June 13, 1991; this form was stipulated into evidence with attachments.

5. Defendants paid plaintiff compensation payments from July 24, 1990 through June 5, 1991.

6. Medical records of Dr. Larry G. Anderson were stipulated into evidence on September 27, 1994. (6 pages)

7. The issues for determination include:

a. Whether the plaintiff was disabled from working as a result of her compensable disease after May 6, 1991;

b. What, if any, further compensation is plaintiff entitled to, including permanent partial disability.

The Full Commission adopts the findings of fact found by the Deputy Commissioner as follows, with the exception of a modification of Finding of Fact #25:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. At the time of the hearing, plaintiff was a sixty-five-year-old widow, born May 2, 1929. She is a high school graduate.

2. Plaintiff's prior work history includes working in a hosiery mill from 1949 to 1973 where she gave out work and answered the telephones. From 1973 to 1977 she worked part-time in a restaurant cleaning tables and washing dishes.

3. Plaintiff began working with defendant-employer Drexel Heritage on June 20, 1977 and worked for them continuously until July 17, 1990. While an employee of Drexel Heritage, she primarily worked on assembly lines, hinging doors and placing tacks in them; she also worked as an assembler in the cabinet department.

4. Plaintiff began experiencing problems with both hands and arms in June 1989 when she complained of tenderness along the radial aspect of the left wrist in a visit with Dr. Larry G. Anderson. Plaintiff was subsequently diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome in January 1990 by Dr. Anderson.

5. Dr. Anderson provided a splint for plaintiff's use on her right hand and recommended light duty work. Plaintiff continued to work.

6. On June 1, 1990 plaintiff referred herself to Dr. William Sims, a specialist in neurological surgery. At this time, plaintiff relayed a history of pain in her hands and arms and that her hands would become numb at night. Dr. Sims' physical examination revealed no muscle atrophy, normal strength and an ultimate diagnosis of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, which he related to plaintiff's work with defendant-employer.

7. On July 18, 1990, Dr. Sims performed carpal tunnel release surgery on plaintiff's right hand. Indications of the surgery revealed that the median nerve had been entrapped for a while.

8. Plaintiff continued post-operative treatment with Dr. Sims and as of August 1990, physical therapy was recommended due to plaintiff's complaints of swelling and tenderness in her right hand.

9. On October 1, 1990, plaintiff was referred to an occupational therapist at The Work Recovery Center. The notes from these visits reflect that plaintiff's condition was improving, that she was motivated and complied with treatment. The therapist recommended light duty work with decreased repetitive motion when plaintiff was ready to return to work.

10. This particular mode of treatment was suspended by the claims adjuster for defendants by letter dated October 11, 1990, pending a second opinion. Dr. Sims opined in his deposition testimony that the suspension of the occupational therapy set plaintiff back in her progress and delayed any return to work.

11. By letter dated May 13, 1991, Dr. Sims assigned a 15% permanent partial disability rating to plaintiff's right hand. Dr. Sims also opined that plaintiff would have had a 5% disability rating had specialized treatment been continued.

12. Cranbrook Claims Management, on behalf of defendants, referred plaintiff to Dr. Donald Glugover, and she had her first visit with him on October 15, 1990. Upon examination, Dr. Glugover found that plaintiff had a limitation of proximal interphalangeal joint motion and a contracture of the fifth pip joint of the right hand. He also diagnosed plaintiff with reflex sympathetic dystrophy. Dr. Glugover ordered a brace for plaintiff's right hand and noted that plaintiff exhibited symptoms of carpal tunnel syndrome in her left hand as well. Plaintiff was referred to physical therapy at Valdese General Hospital.

13. On January 16, 1991, Dr. Glugover performed carpal tunnel release surgery on plaintiff's left hand. He found that plaintiff had a definite flattening in the nerve that was caused by the tight transverse carpal ligament. The pressure in the veins that surround the nerve was relieved by the surgical procedure performed.

14. Dr. Glugover opined that plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by irritation within the carpal canal and that repetitive motion was the most probable etiology for her condition, with respect to both hands. His opinion was based on plaintiff's occupational history, and even though plaintiff also had a history of diabetes, Dr. Glugover related plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome to her work with defendant-employer.

15. Plaintiff was seen post-operatively in late January 1991, at which time she exhibited symptoms of depression. Towards the end of February, plaintiff was making good progress but still seemed "down", so Dr. Glugover prescribed a mood elevating medication.

16. On her March 18, 1991 visit with Dr. Glugover, plaintiff was still complaining of pain, so Dr. Glugover ordered EMG studies of the left hand to rule out continuing irritation of the median nerve. The findings of that study revealed that the median nerve had recovered from the injuries the carpal tunnel condition had caused to it.

17. By letter dated March 20, 1991, Dr. Glugover allowed plaintiff a trial return to work in two weeks with no repeated flexion/extension activities; no repetitive gripping; no use of vibratory tools and no lifting of more than three to five pounds. He also suggested that in another two weeks, plaintiff should attempt to return to her previous occupation, even though in his opinion, he did not feel she would be able to do so. In April and May 1991, Dr. Glugover issued work restrictions for plaintiff which consisted of no repetitive flexion or extension of either wrist and no repetitive pinch or medial grasp of either hand.

18. Dr. Glugover assigned plaintiff a 5% permanent partial disability rating to her left hand and a 15% permanent partial disability rating to the right hand.

19. On May 10, 1991, Vickie Cranford, personnel manager for defendant-employer, mentioned to plaintiff the availability of a puttying job at the plant.

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Bluebook (online)
Chapman v. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chapman-v-drexel-heritage-furnishings-inc-ncworkcompcom-1996.