No. 05-238
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2006 MT 97N
ALLISON CHAPMAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CREDIT ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and For the County Cascade, Cause No. DDV 2004-939, Honorable Dirk M. Sandefur, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Allison Chapman, pro se, Geraldine, Montana
For Respondent:
Dirk Larsen, Larsen Law Firm, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 5, 2006
Decided: May 9, 2006 Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be
cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court and its case title, Supreme Court cause number and disposition shall be included in
this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and
Montana Reports.
¶2 On June 26, 2000, and again on May 24, 2002, Allison Chapman (Chapman)
received medical care at a Benefis Healthcare, Inc. (Benefis) facility in Great Falls,
Montana. Dissatisfied with the treatment (which allegedly exacerbated the physical
conditions that had prompted Chapman’s visits), Chapman refused to pay for the
services. Following unsuccessful efforts to collect payment from Chapman, Benefis
retained Credit Associates, Inc. (Credit Associates), which on June 12, 2003, mailed
Chapman a collection letter. Chapman replied in a letter dated June 19, 2003, stating that
she would not be paying anything on the debt and demanding, pursuant to the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o, that Credit Associates
“cease any and all communication with me.”
¶3 Credit Associates received Chapman’s cease and desist letter the next day (June
20, 2003). Notwithstanding, it mailed a second letter to Chapman on June 23, 2003,
enclosing verification data that it claims it was obligated to send her pursuant to the
FDCPA (see 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)). Then, on July 15, 2003, counsel for Credit
Associates sent Chapman another letter, this time informing her that his firm had been
2 employed to collect from her the balance due on her account. In addition, Credit
Associates allegedly contacted Chapman by telephone on two separate occasions between
June 12, 2003, and July 15, 2003, demanding immediate payment under threat of
litigation. (Credit Associates denies that it made these calls.)
¶4 Three lawsuits have been filed based on the foregoing events. First, on or about
September 8, 2003, Credit Associates filed suit in the Chouteau County Justice Court
(Cause No. 03-CV-6803, Credit Associates, Inc. v. Allison Chapman) seeking a judgment
against Chapman in the amount of $405.65. Chapman filed an Answer on or about
October 21, 2003, in which she denied liability, raised the FDCPA as an “affirmative
defense,” and moved to dismiss the action. The Justice Court denied her motion; the
action proceeded to a bench trial on January 15, 2004; and on January 20, 2004, the court
entered judgment in favor of Credit Associates. Chapman thereafter filed an appeal with
the District Court; however, she did not file an undertaking as required by § 25-33-
201(1), MCA. Thus, her appeal was dismissed on July 8, 2004.
¶5 Meanwhile, on October 2, 2003, while the action in Justice Court was pending,
Chapman, appearing pro se, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Montana (Cause No. CV-03-136-GF-CSO, Allison Chapman v. Credit
Associates, Inc.), alleging that Credit Associates had violated the FDCPA by attempting
to collect on the debt to Benefis after receipt of Chapman’s June 19, 2003, letter. On
August 2, 2004, Chapman filed a motion to dismiss the action without prejudice,
indicating that she would be re-filing the suit in state court. Credit Associates filed no
opposition, and the court granted the motion on September 1, 2004.
3 ¶6 Also on August 2, 2004, Chapman, again appearing pro se, filed the instant action
against Credit Associates in the District Court for the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade
County. In her complaint, she alleged that the post-June 19, 2003, communications by
Credit Associates concerning the Benefis debt violated the FDCPA, and she requested
damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.1
¶7 On January 18, 2005, Credit Associates filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
pursuant to Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., arguing that its communications did not violate the
FDCPA and that, even if its communications did violate the FDCPA, Chapman’s claim
was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and also by the doctrine of res
judicata. The District Court heard oral arguments on February 23, 2005, and on March 9,
2005, granted the motion. The court explained that of the communications alleged by
Chapman to have violated the FDCPA, the most recent occurred on July 15, 2003. Thus,
when Chapman filed her complaint on August 2, 2004, she was fifteen days beyond the
one-year statute of limitations for claims under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).
The court also rejected Chapman’s suggestion that by commencing the FDCPA action in
state court on the same day that she moved to dismiss the FDCPA action in federal court,
1 Chapman also named Benefis as a defendant. She alleged that Benefis had breached two medical services contracts by failing to properly care for her on the two separate occasions discussed above, for which she sought $25,000 in damages. On November 16, 2004, the District Court dismissed Benefis from the case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., reasoning that Chapman’s breach of contract claim was, in essence, a claim of medical malpractice as defined by § 27-6-103(5), MCA, and, as such, it had to be submitted for review under the Montana Medical Legal Panel Act prior to her filing a complaint in a district court, see § 27-6-301, MCA. Chapman does challenge this dismissal on appeal.
4 the federal and state court actions were one continuous action (that related back to the
earlier filing date of the federal action). This appeal followed.
¶8 Where Congress has expressly set a limitations period on a federal claim, state
statutes of limitations, including state tolling provisions, do not apply. See Brown v.
Hartshorne Public School Dist. No. 1 (10th Cir. 1991), 926 F.2d 959, 961 (“When
Congress has provided a federal statute of limitation for a federal claim, . . . state tolling
and saving provisions are not applicable.”). Rather, “[t]he Congressional statute of
limitation is definitive.” Holmberg v. Armbrecht (1946), 327 U.S. 392, 395, 66 S.Ct.
582, 584, 90 L.Ed.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
No. 05-238
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2006 MT 97N
ALLISON CHAPMAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CREDIT ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and For the County Cascade, Cause No. DDV 2004-939, Honorable Dirk M. Sandefur, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Allison Chapman, pro se, Geraldine, Montana
For Respondent:
Dirk Larsen, Larsen Law Firm, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 5, 2006
Decided: May 9, 2006 Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be
cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court and its case title, Supreme Court cause number and disposition shall be included in
this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and
Montana Reports.
¶2 On June 26, 2000, and again on May 24, 2002, Allison Chapman (Chapman)
received medical care at a Benefis Healthcare, Inc. (Benefis) facility in Great Falls,
Montana. Dissatisfied with the treatment (which allegedly exacerbated the physical
conditions that had prompted Chapman’s visits), Chapman refused to pay for the
services. Following unsuccessful efforts to collect payment from Chapman, Benefis
retained Credit Associates, Inc. (Credit Associates), which on June 12, 2003, mailed
Chapman a collection letter. Chapman replied in a letter dated June 19, 2003, stating that
she would not be paying anything on the debt and demanding, pursuant to the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o, that Credit Associates
“cease any and all communication with me.”
¶3 Credit Associates received Chapman’s cease and desist letter the next day (June
20, 2003). Notwithstanding, it mailed a second letter to Chapman on June 23, 2003,
enclosing verification data that it claims it was obligated to send her pursuant to the
FDCPA (see 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)). Then, on July 15, 2003, counsel for Credit
Associates sent Chapman another letter, this time informing her that his firm had been
2 employed to collect from her the balance due on her account. In addition, Credit
Associates allegedly contacted Chapman by telephone on two separate occasions between
June 12, 2003, and July 15, 2003, demanding immediate payment under threat of
litigation. (Credit Associates denies that it made these calls.)
¶4 Three lawsuits have been filed based on the foregoing events. First, on or about
September 8, 2003, Credit Associates filed suit in the Chouteau County Justice Court
(Cause No. 03-CV-6803, Credit Associates, Inc. v. Allison Chapman) seeking a judgment
against Chapman in the amount of $405.65. Chapman filed an Answer on or about
October 21, 2003, in which she denied liability, raised the FDCPA as an “affirmative
defense,” and moved to dismiss the action. The Justice Court denied her motion; the
action proceeded to a bench trial on January 15, 2004; and on January 20, 2004, the court
entered judgment in favor of Credit Associates. Chapman thereafter filed an appeal with
the District Court; however, she did not file an undertaking as required by § 25-33-
201(1), MCA. Thus, her appeal was dismissed on July 8, 2004.
¶5 Meanwhile, on October 2, 2003, while the action in Justice Court was pending,
Chapman, appearing pro se, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Montana (Cause No. CV-03-136-GF-CSO, Allison Chapman v. Credit
Associates, Inc.), alleging that Credit Associates had violated the FDCPA by attempting
to collect on the debt to Benefis after receipt of Chapman’s June 19, 2003, letter. On
August 2, 2004, Chapman filed a motion to dismiss the action without prejudice,
indicating that she would be re-filing the suit in state court. Credit Associates filed no
opposition, and the court granted the motion on September 1, 2004.
3 ¶6 Also on August 2, 2004, Chapman, again appearing pro se, filed the instant action
against Credit Associates in the District Court for the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade
County. In her complaint, she alleged that the post-June 19, 2003, communications by
Credit Associates concerning the Benefis debt violated the FDCPA, and she requested
damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.1
¶7 On January 18, 2005, Credit Associates filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
pursuant to Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., arguing that its communications did not violate the
FDCPA and that, even if its communications did violate the FDCPA, Chapman’s claim
was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and also by the doctrine of res
judicata. The District Court heard oral arguments on February 23, 2005, and on March 9,
2005, granted the motion. The court explained that of the communications alleged by
Chapman to have violated the FDCPA, the most recent occurred on July 15, 2003. Thus,
when Chapman filed her complaint on August 2, 2004, she was fifteen days beyond the
one-year statute of limitations for claims under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).
The court also rejected Chapman’s suggestion that by commencing the FDCPA action in
state court on the same day that she moved to dismiss the FDCPA action in federal court,
1 Chapman also named Benefis as a defendant. She alleged that Benefis had breached two medical services contracts by failing to properly care for her on the two separate occasions discussed above, for which she sought $25,000 in damages. On November 16, 2004, the District Court dismissed Benefis from the case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., reasoning that Chapman’s breach of contract claim was, in essence, a claim of medical malpractice as defined by § 27-6-103(5), MCA, and, as such, it had to be submitted for review under the Montana Medical Legal Panel Act prior to her filing a complaint in a district court, see § 27-6-301, MCA. Chapman does challenge this dismissal on appeal.
4 the federal and state court actions were one continuous action (that related back to the
earlier filing date of the federal action). This appeal followed.
¶8 Where Congress has expressly set a limitations period on a federal claim, state
statutes of limitations, including state tolling provisions, do not apply. See Brown v.
Hartshorne Public School Dist. No. 1 (10th Cir. 1991), 926 F.2d 959, 961 (“When
Congress has provided a federal statute of limitation for a federal claim, . . . state tolling
and saving provisions are not applicable.”). Rather, “[t]he Congressional statute of
limitation is definitive.” Holmberg v. Armbrecht (1946), 327 U.S. 392, 395, 66 S.Ct.
582, 584, 90 L.Ed. 743, 746. With respect to actions brought under the FDCPA,
Congress has set the limitations period at one year. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (“An
action to enforce any liability created by this subchapter may be brought . . . within one
year from the date on which the violation occurs.”). Thus, as the District Court reasoned,
Chapman’s action—filed on August 2, 2004, more than one year after the last allegedly
unlawful communication on July 15, 2003—is procedurally barred.
¶9 Chapman maintains that the instant action was filed on December 3, 2003, well
within the one-year statute of limitations. (This date presumably derives from the United
States District Court’s Order, issued on December 3, 2003, to serve Chapman’s
complaint on Credit Associates.) She reasons that the action “was dismissed without
prejudice by order of the United States District Court, without objection by Credit
Associates Inc.,” and “was refiled in state court within the time allowed by law, therefore
this suit was not barred by statute of limitations.”
5 ¶10 Chapman’s argument, however, depends on the mistaken premise that her action
filed in the United States District Court and her action filed in the Montana Eighth
Judicial District Court are the same action—ostensibly because both actions involve a
claim against Credit Associates under the FDCPA, and because she filed a motion to
dismiss the former action on the same day that she filed the complaint in the latter action.
To the contrary, her federal and state actions are distinct. Notably, they coexisted
between August 2, 2004 (when she filed the complaint in the Eighth Judicial District
Court) and September 1, 2004 (when the United States District Court dismissed her
federal action). It is also noteworthy that the state action involved a claim (against
Benefis) that had not been raised in the federal action. In any event, actions are not
transferable between these two independent court systems in the manner suggested by
Chapman. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (providing for the removal and remanding of certain
actions between state and federal courts, which does not apply to Chapman’s situation).
¶11 Furthermore, an action filed in federal court and then voluntarily dismissed—as
was Chapman’s federal action—is treated as if it had never been filed. See Beck v.
Caterpillar Inc. (7th Cir. 1995), 50 F.3d 405, 407. “[A]s a general rule, a voluntary
dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties as though the action had never been
brought. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the limitation period is not tolled
during the pendency of the dismissed action.”2 Brown, 926 F.2d at 961 (citations
2 The same is true under § 27-2-407, MCA, on which the District Court and Credit Associates relied. This provision states that “[i]f an action is commenced within the time limited therefor and a judgment therein is reversed on appeal without awarding a new trial or the action is terminated in any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a
6 omitted). Thus, FDCPA’s one-year limitation period was not tolled by the pendency of
Chapman’s FDCPA claim filed in the United States District Court.
¶12 In light of the foregoing discussion, the statute of limitations issue is dispositive of
Chapman’s appeal. Because this issue is clearly controlled by settled federal law, we
have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of our 1996
Internal Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, which provides for memorandum
opinions.
¶13 Affirmed.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON /S/ PATRICIA COTTER /S/ JIM RICE /S/ BRIAN MORRIS
dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits, the plaintiff . . . may commence a new action for the same cause after the expiration of the time so limited and within 1 year after such a reversal or termination.” Section 27-2-407, MCA (emphasis added).