Chapin v. Department of Revenue

8 Or. Tax 361
CourtOregon Tax Court
DecidedMay 12, 1980
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 8 Or. Tax 361 (Chapin v. Department of Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chapin v. Department of Revenue, 8 Or. Tax 361 (Or. Super. Ct. 1980).

Opinion

CARLISLE B. ROBERTS, Judge.

The plaintiffs appealed from defendant’s Order No. VL 79-147 which affirmed Marion County’s assessed value of real property (Assessor’s Account No. 48347-GOO) for the tax year 1978-1979. The subject property is a one-half acre homesite located on 111.62 acres zoned for exclusive farm use (EFU). The parties agreed that the farm use property had a true cash value of $2,000 per acre.

The parties stipulated that the sole issue to be decided in this suit was the "true cash or market value of the one-half acre homesite.” (Stipulation filed November 5, 1979.) The plaintiffs’ basic argument was that a homesite located on a farm in an exclusive farm zone could have no higher value than the farmland surrounding the homesite, because the homesite could not be sold separately in the market. It followed, in their view, that the homesite (which was improved with a well and septic tank) should be valued at $1,000.

Additionally, the plaintiffs contended that a buyer of the total acres would not pay any additional sum over typical farm acre values for a homesite because ORS 215.213(1), listing nonfarm uses which "may be established in any area zoned for exclusive farm use,” provides for:

"(e) The dwellings and other buildings customarily provided in conjunction with farm use, referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of ORS 215.203.”

(This overlooks the impact of ORS 215.203(2)(a) which excepts from "farm use” the land used for "the construction and use of dwellings customarily provided in conjunction with the farm use.” An ambiguity is thus found in the statutes.) (Emphasis supplied.) The mythical buyer can establish a homesite anywhere he *[363] chooses on the acreage. However, the plaintiffs appeared to overlook the fact that wherever the new owner might choose to establish a homesite on the farm use property, that homesite would immediately be subject to a different valuation from the surrounding farmland. *

This court has pointed out that the purpose of the special farm use assessment classification was to give tax relief to owners of property who were using their property for farm purposes and to retard diversion of agricultural land to other uses. Ritch v. Dept. of Rev., 4 OTR 206 (1970).

The legislature defined "farm use” in ORS 215.203(2)(a) by stating:

"* * * 'farm use’ means the current employment of land including that portion of such lands under buildings supporting accepted farming practices for the purpose of obtaining a profit in money * *

This statute was interpreted as including the land under buildings which housed itinerant fruit pickers. In Benton v. Dept. of Rev., 7 OTR 162 (1977), the court held that, under the testimony submitted, these buildings in Hood River Valley supported "accepted farming practices.” Therefore, the supporting land was eligible for the special farm use assessment. However, this did not extend to the land supporting the landowner’s home. In Benton, supra, 170, the court stated:

"* * * The land which is to be excluded from special assessment for farm use is that land supporting the principal dwelling of the landowner or any other dwelling which is not necessary to or utilized in conjunction with the agricultural operation for which the land is used. * * *”

*[364] Therefore, the court holds that the one-half acre subject property must be valued as residential land, not as farmland.

The remaining issue before the court is the determination of value of the homesite on January 1, 1978. ORS 308.205 requires that property be valued at its true cash value on the assessment date. The three generally accepted methods for determining true cash value for ad valorem tax purposes are the market approach (comparable sales), the income approach and the cost approach. Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 7 OTR 203, 215-217 (1977).

Mr. Edward Lukinbeal, a real estate broker appearing as the plaintiffs’ witness, testified that it was not "customary” among brokers in Marion County to separate a homesite from farmland for valuation purposes. He testified that generally there is a differentiation in value between types of soil but not between a homesite and the rest of a farm. Mr. Lukinbeal is experienced in the real estate field, is familiar with the subject property and the surrounding area and was accepted as an expert witness, but even an expert’s opinion must be accompanied by supporting evidence and detail in order to persuade the court. Domogalla et al v. Dept. of Rev., 7 OTR 340 (1978). The plaintiffs’ witness’s conclusion offered little support for his opinion.

Mr. George Bushnell, an employee of the Marion County Assessor’s office, testified for the defendant and presented comparable sales in a market approach to valuation of the subject property. Each sale used in a market data appraisal must be subjectively and individually evaluated to determine the weight it merits in that particular valuation. Thornton v. Dept. of Rev., 4 OTR 243, 246 (1970).

Mr. Bushnell offered three comparable sales of homesites with improvements. (Def Ex A.) The land sizes were from 1.5 to 1.9 acres zoned AR-5, EFU and *[365] RA. No two properties are identical and some adjustments are generally required to make properties comparable. Widmer v. Dept. of Rev., 4 OTR 361 (1971). The greater the number of adjustments required, the greater the chances of error in valuation. At some point in the process of adjustment, the properties simply become too diverse to be comparable.

The subject property was established as a homesite before the promulgation of restrictions by the county’s health department and by the Department of Environmental Quality. Present health regulations require a separation of well and septic systems in such a fashion that a homesite will ordinarily take at least one acre. The subject homesite has no such separation. In addition, defendant’s comparable sales were homesites of more ample size that required no severance from farm use properties. These combined factors make comparability highly questionable.

Therefore, in the instant case, the court agrees with the plaintiff who alleged in his post-trial memorandum that these improved sales were not comparable to the subject property. All three were sales of small, partitioned, residential lots and so many subjective adjustments were required in an effort to achieve true comparability that the results are suspect.

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Related

Beach v. Department of Revenue
11 Or. Tax 256 (Oregon Tax Court, 1989)
Chapin v. Department of Revenue
627 P.2d 480 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1981)

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Bluebook (online)
8 Or. Tax 361, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chapin-v-department-of-revenue-ortc-1980.