Chanwn A. Francois v. Executive Towing & Recovery, Inc.
Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT
CHANWN A. FRANCOIS,
Appellant,
v.
EXECUTIVE TOWING & RECOVERY, INC., Appellee.
No. 4D2025-2502
[September 16, 2026]
Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; John Matthew Brooks Hurley, Judge; L.T. Case No. 062025SC015695AXXXNO.
Eduardo A. Maura and Luis F. Quesada of Ayala Law, P.A., Miami, for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
CIKLIN, J.
Chanwn A. Francois (“Francois”) appeals a final judgment entered in favor of Executive Towing & Recovery, Inc. (“Executive”) following a bench trial. Because a towing operator’s lien is purely statutory, strict compliance with section 713.78, Florida Statutes (2024), is required. Here, the record establishes that Executive failed to provide the required notice within five business days after Francois’ vehicle was stored. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Francois’ vehicle was stolen and promptly reported stolen. The vehicle was subsequently found in a residential parking lot where the homeowners’ association, unaware of the vehicle’s ownership, requested that Executive tow it.
Executive towed and commenced storage of the vehicle on October 16, 2024, the day after it was reported stolen. On October 26, 2024, Executive sent a “Towing Notice of Claim of Lien and Proposed Sale” addressed to Francois, but it was not delivered to Francois and was instead returned to Executive.
Francois eventually learned from law enforcement of the whereabouts of his vehicle, and he filed a statement of claim against Executive, alleging illegal towing and wrongful possession of property in violation of section 713.78. Francois’ subsequent motions to prevent Executive from selling his vehicle were denied, and the trial court entered final judgment in favor of Executive, stating in part that Executive “strictly complied with the requirements of Florida Statute § 713.78.”
Section 713.78 provides that when a vehicle is lawfully towed, a towing-
storage operator may charge the owner of the vehicle certain fees, and the towing-storage operator has a lien on the vehicle for those fees. § 713.78(2)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2024). Under section 713.78(4)(c), the towing- storage operator must provide notice to the registered owner, among others, within five business days after the date of storage of the vehicle. “Failure to make good faith efforts to comply with the notice requirements of . . . section [713.78] precludes the imposition of any storage charges against the vehicle or vessel.” § 713.78(9), Fla. Stat. (2024).
“The Florida Supreme Court has held that liens which are ‘purely creatures of statute’ can only be acquired, created, or attached to property if the statutes from which they derive are strictly followed.” Dwork v. Exec. Ests. of Boynton Beach Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 219 So. 3d 858, 861 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Buck, 594 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. 1992)). Because the common law does not provide for imposing a lien for towing and storage fees, Murrell v. Trio Towing Serv., Inc., 294 So. 2d 331, 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), strict compliance with section 713.78 is required for a lien to be enforceable, see, e.g., RSC Corp. v. Hertz Vehicles, LLC, 90 So. 3d 358, 362-63 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012); Meadow Groves Mgmt., Inc. v. McKnight, 689 So. 2d 315, 316 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
Thus, a towing operator may not enforce a lien where the towing operator fails to follow section 713.78’s notice procedures. See Dowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 269 So. 3d 662, 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).
The notice requirements of paragraph (4)(c) are not discretionary; nor are they a technicality. Based on the plain language of the statute, timely notice is mandatory and serves several essential purposes, including making the vehicle owner aware that (1) towing and storage charges have been incurred, (2) a lien exists to secure payment of those charges, and (3) the towing-storage operator can enforce the lien . . . by selling the vehicle if the charges remain unpaid after 35 days. § 713.78(4)(c), Fla. Stat. Additionally, because the notice here
set the date, time, and location of the sale, this was the only notice of sale required to be sent directly to the vehicle owner. See § 713.78(6), Fla. Stat. For these reasons, time is of the essence.
Id. (footnote omitted) (affirming trial court’s determination that public sale of vehicle was null and void where towing operator failed to meet statutory notice requirement).
Here, the approved statement of the evidence and proceedings establishes that Executive towed and stored Francois’ vehicle on October 16, 2024. Executive did not send or otherwise attempt to deliver the required notice until October 26, 2024, beyond the five-business-day period prescribed by section 713.78(4)(c). Executive therefore failed to strictly comply with section 713.78’s notice requirements.
Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with our conclusion that Executive failed to timely comply with section 713.78’s notice requirements.
Reversed and remanded.
CONNER and FORST, JJ., concur.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.
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