Chantalee MacAdagum, Individually and as Representative of the Purported Class v. Erie Insurance Exchange

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: July 17, 2026
• Docket: 2026-CA-0166
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: JULY 17, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2026-CA-0166-ME

CHANTALEE MACADAGUM, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PURPORTED CLASS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHRAND, II, JUDGE ACTION NO. 21-CI-01486

ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, A. JONES, AND L. JONES, JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: Chantalee Macadagum filed suit in the Boone Circuit Court

alleging that her insurer had violated the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act

(“MVRA”) by delaying payment of basic reparation benefits, i.e., personal injury

protection coverage (“PIP benefits”), to which she was entitled under her policy

following a car accident. She sought to amend her complaint to join other similarly situated individuals and moved to certify a class under CR1 23.02(b).

The circuit court denied class certification, and she brings this interlocutory appeal

pursuant to CR 23.06. The issues before this Court are whether the circuit court

abused its discretion in ruling that the proposed class was not ascertainable; that

the requirements of CR 23.01 were not met; and that the claims were not subject to

class-wide adjudication under CR 23.02(b).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review trial court decisions on class certification for abuse of

discretion. Hensley v. Haynes Trucking, LLC, 549 S.W.3d 430, 444 (Ky. 2018)

(citing Sowders v. Atkins, 646 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Ky. 1983)). This means that we

reverse only if the decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by

sound legal principles.” Id. (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson,

11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000)). This deferential standard reflects both the fact-

specific nature of certification inquiries and “the [trial] court’s inherent power to

manage and control pending litigation.” Id. (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum

Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 1998)). “The party seeking certification bears

the burden of proof.” Summit Med. Grp. Inc. v. Coleman, 599 S.W.3d 445, 449

(Ky. App. 2019) (citations omitted).

1 Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure.

-2- FACTS

This action initially arose from an automobile accident in 2019

involving Macadagum and another driver, Samantha Iles. (Iles was dismissed

from the case early in the action.) Macadagum filed suit in 2021, also seeking

underinsured motorists coverage (“UIM”) and PIP benefits from her insurer, Erie

Insurance Exchange (“Erie”). In 2023, Erie moved to compel Macadagum to

submit to an orthopedic independent medical exam (“IME”). The court ordered

her to do so. Shortly thereafter, she sought to amend her complaint with class

allegations, asserting that she and “other similarly situated” insureds of Erie had

been deprived of PIP benefits through Erie’s actions to delay payments. The

proposed amended complaint also sought to add claims for bad faith and violation

of the Uniform Claims Settlement Practices Act against Erie. Erie objected to the

motion to amend. In April 2024, the circuit court granted the motion to amend to

assert the bad faith claims, but denied the motion to amend to seek class

certification. One month later, the record reflects that the parties settled all claims

for bad faith, as well as the UIM claim.2

With only the PIP claim remaining, and discovery ongoing between

Macadagum and Erie, the matter was set for trial in September 2025. In August

2 On request of the parties, the court then amended its prior order to deny the motion for leave to file an amended complaint on all grounds.

-3- 2025, Macadagum again sought to amend her complaint and now moved for

certification of a class, proposing that the class should include “all persons insured

or otherwise covered by Eric Insurance Company, who had payment of PIP

benefits stopped, delayed or pended by a PIP employee or any Erie representative

absent an independent medical exam after the date of the Kentucky Supreme

Court’s decision in [Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Sanders, 569 S.W.3d

932 (Ky. 2018)].”

Erie again objected to the motion to amend and assert class

allegations. After briefing and oral arguments, the circuit court again denied

Macadagum’s motion to amend, holding that she was unable to meet the

requirements of CR 23.01, specifically the burden to demonstrate commonality,

typicality, or numerosity elements. Further, the court held that even if she had

satisfied the threshold requirements of CR 23.01, her proposed class did not fit

within one of the frameworks of CR 23.02(b). Macadagum filed a timely

interlocutory notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

A class action is an exception to the general rule that legal actions

shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest as it authorizes one or

more individuals to represent the interests of a larger group. Hensley, 549 S.W.3d

at 442 (citations omitted); CR 17.01. To obtain class certification, a plaintiff must

-4- satisfy both CR 23.01 and 23.02. Manning v. Liberty Tire Servs. of Ohio, LLC,

577 S.W.3d 102, 110 (Ky. App. 2019). CR 23.01 provides the prerequisites for

class certification as follows:

Subject to the provisions of [CR] 23.02, one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (a) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (b) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (c) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (d) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Those four prongs are usually shortened to “numerosity, commonality, typicality,

and adequacy of representation requirements.” Hensley, 549 S.W.3d at 442-43

(citing Nebraska All. Realty Co. v. Brewer, 529 S.W.3d 307, 311 (Ky. App. 2017)).

If any of the four prerequisites are not met, “the circuit court must deny class

certification.” Manning, 577 S.W.3d at 111.

In addition to meeting those requirements of CR 23.01, the party

seeking class certification must also establish that one of the provisions of

CR 23.02 has been met. Id. In this case, Macadagum relied upon CR 23.02(b),

arguing that Erie, as “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on

grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final

injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a

whole[.]” CR 23.02(b).

-5- Here, the circuit court went through each of the four prongs and

specifically found that, although the representative parties would fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class (i.e., the adequacy of representation

requirement), Macadagum had not met her burden of demonstrating the numerosity,

commonality, or typicality requirements of CR 23.01. Accordingly, we first address

those three requirements and Macadagum’s arguments on appeal.

A. Numerosity

“The numerosity [requirement] requires that the class be so numerous

as to make joinder of all members impractical. ‘There is no strict numerical test

for determining impracticability of joinder.’” Manning, 577 S.W.3d at 112 (first

citing CR 23.01, and then quoting In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079

(6th Cir. 1996)). Courts cannot rely upon speculation as to the proposed

representatives, and plaintiffs are required to show some evidence to reasonably

estimate the number of class members. Here, relying upon the deposition

testimony of a claims adjuster for Erie, Macadagum argued that the number of

class members could easily exceed several hundred. In particular, the adjuster

testified that caseloads for PIP adjusters during her time at Erie were between 65

and 100, and she recalled approximately four to five adjusters in her unit.

Therefore, Macadagum claimed that the class would include every single one of

-6- Erie’s insureds who had sought PIP benefits during the same period of time,

estimating that number to be approximately 260.

The circuit court found this estimation fundamentally flawed. As it

noted, just because an individual sought PIP benefits around that same time period

does not mean that all who sought benefits were denied or delayed. Furthermore,

as the circuit court noted, Macadagum was relying upon the testimony of a claims

adjuster who also testified that there was no such policy of denying or delaying

payments of PIP benefits until after an IME was obtained. Macadagum did not

identify any other individual who was similarly situated to her, and it would be

speculative to determine the number of people who were or might have been

similarly situated. Further, the numerosity analysis must focus on the

impracticability of joinder. Hensley, 549 S.W.3d at 446 (citing CR 23.01(a)).

Here, Macadagum did not demonstrate that joinder was impracticable, except to

the extent that she did not name any other potential class member.

“The substantive nature of the claim, the type of class suit, and the

relief requested [all] bear on how expansive a definition of the class will be

allowed and, accordingly, on the necessary showing of numerosity in relation to

impracticability of joinder.” Sowders v. Atkins, 646 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Ky. 1983)

(citation omitted). While we do not look to the merits of a claim in addressing an

appeal from a denial of class certification, we do look at whether the court below

-7- has addressed each of the prerequisites within the factual issues before it. Here,

the circuit court did address numerosity and found that it was lacking based on the

evidence before it. We find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s numerosity

conclusion.

B. Commonality

Commonality is the requirement that questions of law or fact are

common among the class members. CR 23.01(b). Accordingly, a plaintiff must

establish that the class members “have suffered the same injury[.]” Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (quoting General Telephone Co. of

Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). In other words, “their claims

must depend upon a common contention[,]” and “[t]hat common contention . . .

must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution – which means

that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the

validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id.

What is important to the commonality inquiry is not simply that

common questions exist in the class, “but rather, the capacity of a class-wide

proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the

litigation.” Id. (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of

Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U.L.REV. 97, 131-32 (2009)). While “CR 23.01(b)

requires that there must be questions of law or fact common to the class, . . . it does

-8- not require that all questions of law or fact be common.” Wiley v. Adkins, 48

S.W.3d 20, 23 (Ky. 2001). Moreover, CR 23.02(c) requires that questions

common to the class members must “predominate over the questions which affect

individual members.” Id. Likewise, the facts between members need not be

completely identical “as long as there is a common nucleus of operative facts.” Id.

Further, “even if ‘some individualized determinations may be necessary to

completely resolve the claims of each putative class member . . . those are not the

focus of the commonality inquiry.’ What is important to the inquiry is whether

‘the defendant’s conduct was common as to all of the class members.’” Nebraska

All., 529 S.W.3d at 312 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Cmty. Bank of No.

Virginia Mortg. Lending Pracs. Litig., 795 F.3d 380, 399 (3d Cir. 2015)).

Below, the circuit court addressed this requirement as follows:

[Macadagum]’s proposed amended complaint sets forth two proposed common questions: (a) “[w]hether [Erie] is subject to and failed to comply with the requirements of the Kentucky [MVRA], set forth in [KRS3] 304.39-030”; and (b) [w]hether [Erie]’s actions and omissions are in violation of [Macadagum]’s and class members’ rights under the [MVRA].” As [Erie] posits, these questions are remarkably broad, as any number of dissimilar violations of the MVRA can be imagined. However, when read in conjunction with her proposed class definition, [Macadagum] is clearly focused on the narrower question of whether [Erie] impermissibly delayed and denied PIP payments to proposed class members under the MVRA. This question, while more fit to satisfy the requirements of

3 Kentucky Revised Statute.

-9- commonality than the two she advances in her proposed pleading, is still insufficient for reasons related to those that imperil ascertainability; adjudication of her claim will not necessarily yield the same result as the adjudication of her purported class member claims. To obtain full recovery of the exclusive remedies available under the MVRA, [Macadagum] will need to individually demonstrate that her medical expenses were causally related to her 2019 accident. KRS 304.39-210(1)-(2); KRS 304.39-020(2). Further, to obtain the maximum interest for any overdue payments [Macadagum] will also need to prove that Erie’s delay in payment was “without reasonable foundation.” Id. Even if [Macadagum] prevails on these issues, the same factual inquiry must be replicated with each individual class member. Accordingly, whether [Macadagum] prevails on her individual claim, and to what extent, will not resolve the same questions concerning the success or failure of the other class member’s claims. Under these circumstances, her claim does not satisfy the commonality or typicality requirements of CR 23.01.

On appeal, Macadagum argues that the common issue of law applicable to all

members of the class is straightforward: whether Erie’s practice and policy of

authorizing adjusters to deny or delay payment of claims beyond the 30-day

statutory period based on a paper review, without first obtaining an IME, violates

the MVRA. She asserts that these are the same issues that were litigated and

determined as a class action in Sanders, 569 S.W.3d 923, making that case

dispositive precedent.

In contrast, Erie points out that Sanders offers no analysis at all

regarding the propriety of a class action based on alleged violations of the MVRA.

-10- Erie is correct. While Sanders addressed the insurance company’s obligations to

investigate claims under the MVRA, the circuit court in that case issued an order

both certifying a class but also granting summary judgment to the insurer. Id. at

924. It was only the issuance of the summary judgment in favor of the insurer that

was appealed by the plaintiffs. Id.

Our Supreme Court’s opinion in Sanders did not discuss at all

whether the plaintiffs’ alleged class satisfied the CR 23.01 requirements that are in

issue in this appeal. It is not even apparent from that opinion what grounds were

asserted below for the class certification. While we understand the similarities of

the underlying arguments here with those presented in Sanders, we cannot agree

that Sanders supports Macadagum’s position that class certification was

improperly denied. To the contrary, it simply provides no guidance at all on the

analysis of certification of a class under CR 23.01 and CR 23.02. Sanders dealt

solely with interpretation of the MVRA statute and required a de novo review of

the summary judgment granted in favor of the insurer. Id. at 925.

In contrast, we have an abuse of discretion review of a denial of class

certification by a court that carefully and comprehensively addressed each of the

requirements of CR 23.01 and CR 23.02. We find no abuse of discretion in the

circuit court’s conclusion that Macadagum was unable to meet her burden of

establishing commonality. Contrary to Macadagum’s assertion regarding the

-11- adjuster’s testimony, we do not agree that the evidence was uncontradicted that

Erie had a policy of denying payments without an IME. As the circuit court here

noted, having reviewed all of the testimony, the adjuster confirmed that it was

Erie’s policy to pend payments and review and investigate, but she also denied that

any policy existed to permit the denial of a claim based on a paper review alone,

without an IME – the conduct prohibited by Sanders. See id. at 929.

The trial court must undertake a “rigorous analysis” to determine

whether the prerequisites have been satisfied. Nebraska All., 529 S.W.3d at 316.

This analysis requires a “probe behind the pleadings” often touching upon the

merits of the proceeding. Id. (quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350-52). The trial court

here performed such an analysis. However, on appeal, we limit our analysis to the

narrow question of whether, as a procedural matter, the trial court properly

declined to certify the class action. In accordance with Hensley, we “scrupulously

respect the limitations of the crossover between (1) reviewing issues implicating

the merits of the case that happen to affect the class-certification analysis and (2)

limiting our review to the class-certification issue itself.” 549 S.W.3d at 436. We

find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that commonality did not exist.

C. Typicality

As evidenced, typicality and commonality often overlap in the class

certification analysis. Regarding typicality, Macadagum contends that her claims

-12- arise from the same course of conduct that could give rise to claims of others, i.e.,

Erie’s “policy” of delay and/or denial of claims without an IME. Erie argued that

adjudication of Macadagum’s claim would not necessarily yield the same result as

the adjudication of others purportedly within the class and was, therefore, not

typical of the class she sought to represent. The circuit court agreed, again looking

at the provisions of the MVRA and the remedies available thereunder. The court

noted that the remedy for a violation provides for higher interest for overdue

payments, but the statutes also explicitly require that an insurer’s delay be “without

reasonable foundation.” See Foster v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 189

S.W.3d 553, 557 (Ky. 2006). Even if Macadagum prevails, this inquiry into the

reasonableness or foundation for denial or delay would have to be replicated across

the entire class to adjudicate each member’s claim for remedies.

In contrast, we look to Summit, 599 S.W.3d 445, where we affirmed

the circuit court’s holdings that the commonality and typicality requirements for a

class certification were met. In Summit, the plaintiff sought class certification

against a medical practice for engaging in “deceptive or misleading billing

practices in violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act [KCPA]” by

charging an “office fee” in addition to preventative exam bills without informing

its patients. Id. at 447-48. On appeal, the medical practice challenged the trial

-13- court’s holding that the plaintiff satisfied the typicality requirement, asserting that

the plaintiff’s claim was “not typical of the class” based on the following:

(1) [Plaintiff] had a long history as a patient and had notice of the billing practices; (2) [plaintiff] (but not perhaps all patients) had signed an authorization for payment; (3) there was conflicting evidence of record concerning the typicality of discussions among physicians and patients regarding the possibility of additional charges and patient responsibility for same; (4) not all class members’ insurance policies were the same; (5) not all class members have typical KCPA claims; and (6) some claimants have had satisfactory resolutions to their complaints.

Id. at 450.

Before addressing these arguments, this Court reiterated “that the

focus when resolving the typicality issue should be on whether all claims were

‘based on the same legal theory[.]’” Id. at 450 (quoting Hensley, 549 S.W.3d at

448). We held that the trial court’s typicality analysis comported with that tenet: it

found that the plaintiff and the class members were charged with what amounted to

a “service fee” in addition to their treatment bills; the medical practice coded this

fee in a uniform manner; and the patients were left with an out-of-pocket balance.

In short, the trial court found that all were similarly damaged by the same billing

policy. Id. Accordingly, we found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Id.

-14- Here, evaluating each class member’s entitlement to PIP benefits and

whether the benefits have been delayed or denied, and if so, whether that was done

“without reasonable foundation” would require the court to conduct mini-trials

with respect to each member’s claims. Whether Macadagum prevails on her own

claim has no bearing on the success or failure of other putative class members.

In Manning, this Court upheld the denial of a motion for class

certification where the trial court found movants had failed to demonstrate that

“common questions [would] predominate over individual issues.” 577 S.W.3d at

118. In that case, tires located at a recycling facility caught fire and burned for

more than two days. Id. at 108. The purported class were residents within a one-

mile radius. Id. at 110-11. The circuit court found that the claims of the

representatives were not “typical” of other members of the class. On appeal, this

Court found that determination to be an abuse of discretion. Id. at 115.

Nonetheless, we upheld the denial of class certification because failure to satisfy

any one prong is fatal to formation of the class. Further, as here, the trial court in

Manning found that while there might be common issues of law, there would be

numerous questions that must be answered on an individualized basis relating to

causation, impact, and damages. Id. at 117. Having reviewed the circuit court’s

analysis of the issue, we find no abuse of discretion here in the court’s holding that

typicality was not met. Again, the circuit court conducted the “rigorous analysis”

-15- required, which necessarily includes some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s

underlying claim. Nebraska All., 529 S.W.3d at 316. Detailed factual findings and

legal conclusions were provided.

D. CR 23.02

This brings us to Macadagum’s failure to satisfy the criteria of CR

23.02. As noted, she was required to prove, in addition to all four prerequisites of

CR. 23.01, that the proposed class fits within the framework of CR 23.02(b). The

rule authorizes actions in which the party opposing certification has acted on

grounds generally applicable to the class, making injunctive or declaratory relief

available to the class as a whole. CR 23.02(b). In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,

the Court analyzed claims brought under this section and explained that the

conduct must be such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of

the class members, or as to none of them. 564 U.S. at 360. The Rule does not

permit class certification when each individual class member “would be entitled to

a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant.” Id.

In addressing this provision, the circuit court referenced the fact that

CR 23.02(b) is explicitly limited to cases in which injunctive or declaratory relief

is available. As noted earlier, the MVRA provides the exclusive remedy for claims

such as this, and that remedy is monetary. See KRS 304.39-210 (setting out the

remedies for failure to pay PIP benefits when owed). The circuit court found that

-16- this prevented Macadagum’s claim that the requested relief was injunctive rather

than monetary.

Further, the circuit court found that it could not determine that Erie

had “acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class[.]” CR

23.02(b). Referring again to the claims adjuster’s testimony, the trial court did not

agree that the testimony conclusively established a policy that contravened the

terms of the MVRA. See Gardner v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., No. 2022-CA-000306-

ME, 2023 WL 3398188 (Ky. App. May 12, 2023) (nonpublished)4 (in which this

Court analyzed the effect of Sanders, but noted distinctions that supported the

grant of summary judgment in favor of Geico).

On appeal as to this ruling, Macadagum again argues that Sanders is

dispositive because the effect of the Supreme Court’s holding in that case was to

find the practice of that insurer, Geico, to be a violation of the MVRA and then to

apply that decision to the entire class. Appellant asserts that the plaintiffs in

Sanders also sought declaratory and injunctive relief.

Again, while we are cognizant of the similarities in this case with the

class that was permitted by a trial court in Sanders, nothing in the Supreme Court’s

opinion directly addressed the issue presented in this appeal, i.e., whether the trial

court’s class certification ruling was an abuse of discretion. That was simply not

4 Non-binding and cited pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 41.

-17- an issue in that appeal. Macadagum asserts in her brief that “nothing in the

Supreme Court’s decision would prevent injunctive relief” to enforce provisions of

the MVRA. Likewise, nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion provides the

support needed for Macadagum’s position.

In Hensley, our Supreme Court held that CR 23.01 and CR 23.02

should be interpreted consistently with their federal counterparts. 549 S.W.3d at

436. It is well established that Kentucky courts rely upon federal caselaw when

interpreting a Kentucky rule of procedure that is similar to its federal counterpart.

Nebraska All., 529 S.W.3d at 311. As Erie points out, there is federal caselaw

similarly limiting an aggrieved party to the remedies provided by the MVRA. See

Pedroso v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:21-CV-540-CHB, 2023 WL

2587492 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 21, 2023) (dismissing claims for declaratory and

injunctive relief under the MVRA); Byrd v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co, No. 3:20-

CV-119-DJH-CHL, 2021 WL 1225961, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2012)

(dismissing declaratory judgment claims as the MVRA provides the exclusive

remedy for failure to pay PIP).5

Here, the Boone Circuit Court conducted a thorough analysis of

CR 23 and rendered a decision that comports with our established precedent in

5 RAP 41.

-18- such cases. Contrary to Macadagum’s position, Sanders simply does not provide

the authority required to reverse the circuit court’s ruling.

CONCLUSION

Finding no abuse of discretion, we AFFIRM the Boone Circuit

Court’s order denying class certification.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Colby B. Cowherd Mark A. Osbourn Michael A. O’Hara Louisville, Kentucky Crestview Hills, Kentucky Marjorie A. Farris Frederick R. Bentley III Louisville, Kentucky

-19-