Chanse T. Starr v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 25, 2016
• Docket: 90A02-1501-CR-62
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Aug 25 2016, 7:42 am Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK Indiana Supreme Court regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals and Tax Court court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT, PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Chanse T. Starr Gregory F. Zoeller Bunker Hill, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Larry D. Allen Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Chanse T. Starr, August 25, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 90A02-1501-CR-62 v. Appeal from the Wells Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Kenton Kiracofe, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 90C01-1204-FC-12

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A02-1501-CR-62 | August 25, 2016 Page 1 of 4 [1] Chanse T. Starr appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for additional

credit time. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] Following a guilty plea, the trial court sentenced Starr to eight years for Class C

felony burglary. Starr appealed his sentence and we affirmed. Starr v. State, No.

90A02-1306-CR-499 (Ind. Ct. App. August 11, 2014), trans. denied. On

December 15, 2014, Starr, pro se, filed a motion for additional credit time in

Wells County Circuit Court. Starr provided evidence he completed a substance

abuse program while incarcerated. On December 22, the trial court denied

Starr’s motion.

Discussion and Decision [3] We first note Starr proceeds in his appeal pro se. A litigant who proceeds pro se

is held to the same established rules of procedure that trained counsel is bound

to follow. Smith v. Donahue, 907 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans.

denied, cert. dismissed. One risk a litigant takes when proceeding pro se is that he

will not know how to accomplish all the things an attorney would know how to

accomplish. Id. When a party elects to represent himself, there is no reason for

us to indulge in any benevolent presumption on his behalf or to waive any rule

for the orderly and proper conduct of his appeal. Foley v. Mannor, 844 N.E.2d

494, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A02-1501-CR-62 | August 25, 2016 Page 2 of 4 [4] Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.3(b)(2014) 1 provides the requirements for an offender to

earn educational credit time and states in relevant part:

(b) . . . [A] person may earn educational credit if, while confined by the department of correction, the person:

(1) is in credit Class I, Class A, or Class B;

(2) has demonstrated a pattern consistent with rehabilitation; and

(3) successfully completes requirements to obtain at least one (1) of the following:

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(B) A certificate of completion of a substance abuse program approved by the department of correction.

The Department of Correction (DOC) has original jurisdiction over the

decision to grant additional credit time to an offender who completes an

educational program pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.3. Sander v. State, 816

N.E.2d 75, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). The DOC’s decision is subject to review by

the trial court. McGee v. State, 790 N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003),

trans. denied. A petitioner seeking credit time “must show in the first place what

1 Starr filed his petition for additional credit time in December 2014, and thus we refer to the statute in effect at that time.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A02-1501-CR-62 | August 25, 2016 Page 3 of 4 the relevant DOC administrative grievance procedures are, and then that he has

exhausted them at all levels.” Young v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (Ind.

2008).

[5] Starr did not show what the relevant DOC administrative grievance procedures

are, did not provide evidence he exhausted them, and argued he was not subject

to that requirement. As he did not make that showing, we cannot say the court

abused its discretion by denying his motion for additional credit time. See, e.g.,

Sander, 816 N.E.2d at 78 (affirming denial of credit time because petitioner did

not prove he exhausted administrative remedies).

Conclusion [6] Starr did not indicate what the DOC administrative grievance processes are, nor

did he demonstrate he had exhausted them. Accordingly, we affirm the denial

of his petition.

[7] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Brown, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A02-1501-CR-62 | August 25, 2016 Page 4 of 4