Chang v. Bishop Francis Malooly of Catholic Diocese of Wilmington

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: October 3, 2025
• Docket: 273, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

WEIH STEVE CHANG, § § Plaintiff Below, § No. 273, 2025 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § BISHOP FRANCIS MALOOLY of the § C.A. N24C-04-220 Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, § FATHER JOHN MINK, SISTER § VIRGINIA PFAU and CARMELITA § MENTON of Saint Ann, CHRISTINE § DEMSEY of Immaculate Heart of Mary, § DESALES HALEY of Resurrection, § BARRY MULLINS of Catholic Youth § Ministry, JANICE TIGANI of Saint § Helena, VALERIE FARNAN of Saint § Mary Magdalen, and unnamed church § personnel, in their individual, diocesan, § and governmental capacities, jointly and § severally, § § Defendants Below, § Appellees. §

Submitted: September 17, 2025 Decided: October 3, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices. ORDER

After consideration of the notice to show cause, the response, and the motion

to stay, it appears to the Court that:

(1) This appeal arises from a civil RICO action Weih Steve Chang filed in

the Superior Court. He alleged that employees and representatives of the Catholic

Diocese of Wilmington (“CDOW”) engaged in misconduct. On May 30, 2025, the

Superior Court granted motions to dismiss filed by Bishop Francis Malooly, Father

John Mink, Christine Demsey, Commissioner DeSales Haley, Janice Tigani, and

Valerie Farnan. The opinion noted that several named defendants were deceased

and that unnamed defendants had not been served.

(2) On June 11, 2025, the Superior Court informed Chang that the matter

could not proceed because either service of process was not complete or Chang had

failed to act on claims against Sister Virginia Pfau, Carmelita Menton, Barry

Mullins, and Unnamed Church Personnel. The court directed Chang to report on the

status of the case within thirty days. On June 26, 2025, Chang filed this appeal from

the Superior Court’s May 30, 2025 opinion.

(3) On July 16, 2025, Chang responded to the Superior Court’s June 11,

2025 letter. He stated, among other things, that he had not yet served CDOW

because he was waiting for resolution of his November 26, 2024 motion to amend

the complaint caption to add CDOW. Chang also filed a motion for enlargement of

2 time to serve CDOW. The Superior Court notified Chang that it lacked jurisdiction

while his appeal was pending and that his motions were stayed pending resolution

of the appeal.

(4) On August 22, 2025, Chang filed a motion to stay the appeal in this

Court pending resolution of open matters in the Superior Court. The Senior Court

Clerk then issued a notice directing Chang to show cause why the appeal should not

be dismissed for his failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 42 when taking an

appeal from an apparent interlocutory order. In his response to the notice to show

cause, Chang acknowledges that the appeal is interlocutory and asks the Court to

accept it. He does not address his failure to comply with the requirements of Rule

42.

(5) Absent compliance with Rule 42, this Court is limited to the review of

a trial court’s final judgment.1 “A final judgment is generally defined as one that

determines the merits of the controversy or defines the rights of the parties and leaves

nothing for future determination or consideration.”2 Because the Superior Court has

not resolved all of the claims against all of the parties and motions remain pending,

this appeal is interlocutory.3 Chang has not complied with the requirements of Rule

1 Julian v. State, 440 A.2d 990, 991 (Del. 1982). 2 Showell Poultry, Inc. v. Delmarva Poultry Corp., 146 A.2d 794, 796 (Del. 1958). 3 Williams v. Mitchell, 2006 WL 2535098, at *1 (Del. Aug. 29, 2006) (“When a civil action involves multiple claims and multiple parties, a judgment regarding any claim or any party does not become final until the entry of the last judgment that resolves all claims as to all parties unless 3 42 so this appeal must be dismissed. Chang may file a notice of appeal after the

Superior Court issues a final order. Dismissal of this appeal renders the motion to

stay moot.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that this appeal is DISMISSED

under Supreme Court Rule 29(b). The motion to stay is DISMISSED as moot. The

filing fee paid by Chang shall be transferred to any later appeal he files from the

Superior Court’s final judgment.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice

an interlocutory ruling as to a claim or party is certified pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 54(b).” (internal quotations omitted)).