Chaney v. Hobart International, Inc.

54 F. Supp. 2d 677, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14899, 1999 WL 304692
District Court, E.D. Louisiana·Decided April 21, 1999·No. CIV. A. 98-665·Published

Opinion

ORDER AND REASONS

FELDMAN, District Judge.

Before the Court is defendant Hobart Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.

Background

John Chaney was injured in an employment-related accident when his arm was amputated below the elbow by a meat grinder manufactured by Hobart International, Inc. The meat grinder was made and sold in 1962. At that time, the grinder had a “feed pan guard” mounted on top of the feed pan which prevented users from inadvertently placing their hands and arms in the grinding mechanism during operation. The feed pan guard was attached to the feed pan with drive screws. The use of drive screws prevented removal of the feed pan guard by unscrewing it. The meat grinder also has an interlock which prevents the machine from operating when the feed pan is not in the proper position.

At the time of Chaney’s accident, the feed pan guard was no longer attached to the feed pan. Chaney alleges that his sleeve was caught in the grinder when he slipped on a railing in the meat department where he worked, resulting in his injuries. He sues under the Louisiana Products Liability Act.

Law and Application

A. Standard for Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs that summary judgment is proper if the record discloses no genuine issue as to any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No genuine issue of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. *679 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A genuine issue of fact exists only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The Court emphasizes that the mere argued existence of a factual dispute does not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion. See id. Therefore, “[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,” summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). Summary judgment is also proper if the party opposing the motion fails to establish an essential element of his case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In this regard, the non-moving party must do more than simply deny the allegations raised by the moving party. See Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 974 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir.1992). Rather, he must come forward with competent evidence, such as affidavits or depositions, to buttress his claims. Id. Hearsay evidence and un-sworn documents do not qualify as competent opposing evidence. Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir.1987). Finally, in evaluating the summary judgment motion, the court must read the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

B. The Louisiana Products Liability Act

A plaintiff can recover under the Louisiana Products Liability Act if he can show that the product is “unreasonably dangerous” (1) in construction or composition (manufacturing defect), (2) in design (design defect), (3) through lack of an adequate warning, or (4) because it does not conform to an express warranty. La.Rev. Stat. § 9:2800.54(B). Chaney makes no claim of express warranty or manufacturing defect. He contends that the meat grinder was defectively designed: first, because the absence of a feed pan guard was a “reasonably anticipated alteration” of the product which rendered it unreasonably dangerous; and second, because no safety interlock prevented use of the machine without the feed pan guard in place. He further contends that the meat grinder should have had visible warnings against using it without a guard, as well as warnings against intentionally removing the guard.

1. Design Defect

Chaney contends that the absence of a feed pan guard which would have prevented his injury constitutes a design defect under the Act. For a manufacturer to be liable under a design defect theory, “[t]he characteristic of the product that renders it unreasonably dangerous... must exist at the time the product left the control of its manufacturer or result from a reasonably anticipated alteration or modification of the product.” La.Rev.Stat. 9:2800.54(C). It is undisputed that the machine had a feed pan guard attached when it left Hobart’s control. Hobart contends, moreover, that the removal of a safety feature such as the feed pan guard is not, as a matter of law, a reasonably anticipated alteration.

The Act defines “reasonably anticipated alteration” as either “a change in a product that the product’s manufacturer should reasonably expect to be made by an ordinary person in the same or similar circumstances,” or “a change arising from ordinary wear and tear.” La.Rev.Stat. § 9:2800.53(8). Hobart contends that because the feed pan guard was attached with drill screws, it could not be unscrewed and must have been sawed off. It maintains that this purposeful removal of a safety device was not reasonably forseea-ble, and draws attention to Louisiana cases in support of that proposition.

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Chaney v. Hobart International, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 677, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14899, 1999 WL 304692 (E.D. La. 1999).

54 F. Supp. 2d 677 (Chaney v. Hobart International, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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