Chaney v. Commonwealth

149 S.W. 923, 149 Ky. 464, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 670
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedSeptember 25, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 149 S.W. 923 (Chaney v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chaney v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W. 923, 149 Ky. 464, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 670 (Ky. Ct. App. 1912).

Opinion

.Opinion of the Oouet by

Judge Winn

Affirming.

George. W. Chaney was indicted in the Woodford Circuit Court, charged with the offense denounced by section 1115 of the Kentucky Statutes, that of carnally [465]*465knowing a female nnder the age of sixteen years. Upon a trial he was found guilty and thereupon given the statutory indeterminate sentence of from ten to twenty years in the penitentiary. ' The supposed errors complained of can he disposed of briefly.

It is first complained that the court erred in refusing to grant a change of venue upon the defendant’s application. The application came on for hearing in due course and the trial judge overruled the motion. It has been repeatedly declared by this court that the exercise of the discretion given the trial court will not be reversed unless it appears from the record that this discretion has been abused; and no abuse appears here. Crockett v. Commonwealth, 100 Ky., 382; Greer v. Commonwealth, 111 Ky., 93; McElwain v. Commonwealth, 146 Ky., 104, and many other cases.

Upon the calling of the case for trial, the defendant asked for a continuance, based upon his affidavit of the testimony of two absent witnesses, to obtain whose presence due diligence was shown. The trial was not had at the first term after the indictment was found, and the affidavit of what the witnesses would testify was read as their depositions, as is provided in section 189 of the Criminal Code. The affidavit stated that the just and proper effect of the testimony of these absent witnesses could not be. obtained without their personal presence before the jury; but no facts were shown to sustain this statement. In the absence of such a showing we cannot say that the court abused the sound discretion given it by the section named; Bowling v. Commonwealth, 148 Ky., 9.

■ It is next objected that the jury was permitted to separate during the trial; but the offense was not a capital offense, and it was within the discretion of the trial court to permit them to separate. Criminal Code, section 244.

• It is next urged that the court erred in the formation of the jury in accepting as jurors those who had formed and expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. This action of the trial court, even if it were set out in the bill of exceptions, as it is not, is not subject to review by us. Miracle v. Commonwealth, 148 Ky., 453, and many other cases.

It is next urged that the defendant’s motion for a peremptory instruction should have been sustained, be[466]*466cause the testimony of the prosecutrix as to her age was uncorroborated. This position is not sound because, though the girl participated in the act, she was not an accomplice in the crime denounced by the statute. While strictly speaking, one cannot know his own age except upon hearsay information, the courts have commonly preferred to accept as testimony the practical certainty, based upon one’s information as to his age, rather than to insist on academic nicety. Wigmore’s Evidence, section 667. In prosecutions similar to this, the testimony of the prosecutrix as to her age has been admitted in State v. McLain, 49 Kan., 730; Commonwealth v. Phillips, 162 Mass., 504; State v. Bowser, 21 Mont., 133, and other cases.

Much is justly made in the brief of the appellant of the improbable character of the testimony upon which Chaney was convicted. It was formerly held that this court, where there was any evidence to sustain the conviction, was without power to reverse a judgment of conviction in a criminal case upon the absence of sufficient evidence, if there were any evidence. Pinkston v. Commonwealth, 127 S. W., 493, and cases cited. Section 281 of the Criminal Code Avas so amended in 1910 as that the court has now such right of reversal; but in construing the amended section, we said: “The credibility of the witness is for the jury, and this court Avill not disturb a verdict because the jury believed one set of witnesses rather than another. The verdict must be palpably against the evidence or it cannot be disturbed.” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky., 1. We now digest and sum up the testimony upon which Chaney’s conviction was had.

George W. Chaney, on the first of January, 1910, went to work at the Cleveland Orphan Home in Versailles. He resided in a dwelling house on the grounds of this institution, adjacent to the main building. He was general chore man about the institution. He was a married man with a family, and at the time of the facts testified to was some fifty-eight years of age. He had lived in Woodford County some fifteen or sixteen years. He testified that he had never been in any trouble before. C. M. BroAvning testified that he had known Chaney twenty-eight years and had never heard his reputation questioned. G. W. Beck testified that he [467]*467had known Chaney three years and that so far as he knew his reputation was good. James W. Miller, a trustee of the orphan institution, said that he knew Chaney as a mechanic at the elevator at which the witness was hauling wheat; that he, the witness, made inquiry among the people where Chaney worked, and acting on the information received, got the trustees to give him the place at the institution; that if he had thought Chaney’s character was not good, he would not have been employed. Hunter Brother testified that he had known Chaney four or five or six years; that he had never heard anything against him; that he based his opinion of Chaney’s good character upon the character of his personal dealings with him, and that his opinion was made up upon these dealings.

When Chaney went to work at the institution, one of the orphans dwelling there was the prosecutrix, Sarah Jane Wilson. According to her testimony, she was born on the 6th of June, 1896, and at the time of the occurrence of the act detailed by her was some three weeks short of fifteen years of age. Mrs. Annie Wilson, one of the teachers at the home, testified upon cross-examination that Sarah Jane’s word “couldn’t be depended on.” Francis Shryock, one of the girls in the institution, testified upon cross-examination that she knew Sarah Jane’s reputation for truth and veracity and that she believed it to be bad. Miss Nell Otter, the superintendent of the home, testified on cross-examination that she did not consider Sarah Jane’s reputation for truth ’very good; that she supposed that she would believe Sarah Jane if she were sworn solemnly to tell the truth and understood what she was doing; but that she thought that Sarah Jane might swear to something she did not fully understand.

So much for the parties. Sarah Jane testified that at six o’clock in the evening on the 16th of May, 1911, Chaney called to her to come to him, that he had some message for her from his daughter; that she went to him; that he unfastened her clothes, laid her down upon the grass, and had intercourse with her; that they had no conversation at the time; that he continued to have intercourse with her about once or twice a week until July 3rd; that before the occurrence of this act he had given her candy, fruit and tolu, and continued to up until the matter bec,ame public on the 3rd of July;'that [468]*468when the matter became public, Chaney asked her to go to. Montana with ■ him,. and she responded that she did not want to, as the.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Vaughn v. Commonwealth
255 S.W.2d 613 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1953)
Burkhart v. Commonwealth
228 S.W.2d 451 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1950)
Benge v. Commonwealth
176 S.W.2d 131 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1943)
Harris v. Commonwealth
105 S.W.2d 1051 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1937)
Gayheart v. Smith
42 S.W.2d 877 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1931)
Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corporation
40 S.W.2d 356 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1931)
Brown v. Commonwealth
10 S.W.2d 820 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1928)
Yates v. Commonwealth
277 S.W. 995 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1925)
Render v. Commonwealth
266 S.W. 914 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1924)
Ragland v. Commonwealth
265 S.W. 15 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1924)
Smith v. Commonwealth
264 S.W. 1059 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1924)
Brown v. Commonwealth
251 S.W. 994 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1923)
Terhune v. Commonwealth
244 S.W. 671 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1922)
McLaughlin v. Commonwealth
232 S.W. 628 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1921)
Cloninger v. Commonwealth
231 S.W. 535 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1921)
Utterback v. Commonwealth
226 S.W. 1065 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1921)
Williams v. Commonwealth
207 S.W. 447 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1919)
Miller v. Commonwealth
206 S.W. 630 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1918)
Graham v. Commonwealth
192 S.W. 683 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1917)
Day v. Commonwealth
191 S.W. 105 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1917)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
149 S.W. 923, 149 Ky. 464, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 670, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chaney-v-commonwealth-kyctapp-1912.