Chaney, Jermaine Dewitt

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided December 14, 2015·No. WR-84,266-01·Published

Opinion

Abel Aoosta,jElerk

Texes Eourt of Criminel Appeale P.D. Box 12508, Eapitol Stetion Austin, Texae 7B711

RE: Filing Applicent'e Dbjeotion... ' Trial Eause No. 1113B20-A; writ No. mR-BA,266-01

Deer Mr. Acosta:

Pleeee file the enclosed Applioent‘e Ubjeotion to the Trial

Eourt‘e Finding of Feot end Eonolueione of Lam with the Boort,

end formerd`to the proper official For reviem. 1 einoerly thank you for your time, end for any queetione,

1 can be reached et the address belom.

Respeotfully Submitted,

/s'/ Jermeine Demit`t Eheney RECE|VED|N JEImBinE DEMitt Chanev COURTOFCR|N||NALAPPEALS Merk m. Stiles Unit ` 3060 FM 351& Beeumont, Texes 77705

DEC 14 2015

AbeH Acosta, ©\erk

@q¢ ZU)LQIO‘

IN THE TEXAS EUURT'UF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS

Ex parte writ No. wR-Bh,ZGG-EW

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Jermaine Dewitt Ehaney

APPLIEANT'S UBJECTIUN TU TRIAL~EUURT'S FINDINE UF FAET AND EUNELUSIUN UF LAw

TD THE HUNURABLE JUDEES UF SAID CDURT:

Eomes now, Jermaine Dewitt Ehaney, Applicant in the application for writ of Habeas Corpus in the above numbered cause; and makes the following objections

to the Trial Court‘s Finding of Fact and Eonclusions of Law.

. 1. The Trial Eourt has deliberately ignored evidence which shows that Daniel Santien King made several credible declarations of guilt as

to the murder of Anthony white which were not made available to the Applicant at the time of his trial, but years later. These include: (A) A voluntary plea of guilty to the murder of

Anthony white in which he was sentenced in the BBBth District Eourt, Harris Eounty, Texas. see: (Exhibit, Appendix- memorandum). (B) A statement to the prosecutor (Brent Mayer) that Mr. Ehaney had nothing to do with the murder; which was suppressed by the State and favorable to the Applicant. (E) The same statement that (Jermaine had nothing to do with the murder) was revealed to Innocence Network investigators during the course of'their investigation. see: (Exhibit, Appendix- memorandum); This evidence was revealed well after the Applicant's trial and was not available at that time. The Applicant asserts

that he has met the threshhold showing of his 5chlup claim

through a credible declaration of guilt by another, supported

by Mr. Kings plea of guilty to the murder. Both powerful pieces

ofevidence. see Fairman v. Anderson, WBB`f.Ed 635 (Bth Eir.1999) "A credible declaration of guilt by another is as valid evidence as newly available scientific evidence or credible eyewitness testimony in exonorating a criminal defendant."

The mxdicant also asserts that the frial Eourt'Judge in adopting

the State's proposed finding of fact and conclusion of law;

failed to consider the very material fact that, Daniel King

made his credible declaration of guilt in the form of a guilty

plea in front of her, and that she accepted that plea and

sentenced Mr. King. This clearly shows bias in favor of the State and not the fair and impartial consideration that the Applicant

is constitutionally entitled to. see: Bracy v. Gramely, 520 U.S.

899, 177 B.Et. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997)

"A criminal defendant on either Direct or Bollateral review is entitled to fair and impartial consideration by an unbiased Hearing body. "

Therefore, the Applicant requests that an evidentiary hearing is

appropriate since the Applicant‘s 'Schlup Elaim' is supported by

evidence. see Eraves v. Dretke, 4h2 F.5d 33& (5th Eir.ZUDE) "If the petitioner's allegations are cooroborated by

\ testimony or evidence, then further factual development in an evidentiary hearing is apporpriate."

2. The Trial Court failed to consider the clear and convincing evidence presented by the Applicant contained within the record'dmt shows the identification of the Applicant by Thelma Leifester, was clearly coerced through misconduct by the Btate, in which both police officer's and an Assistant D.A. told Ms. Leifester she would not be arrested IF she identified the Applicant as the suspect. see: (RR.V.S,ppslBE-

lBB); (Applicant's memorandum in support, pp.17).

This, combined with Ms. Leifester‘s previous identification

of other people as the suspect (see: Exhibits, Appendix- memorandum), renders her in-court identification unreliable and inadmissible. see: Manson v. Brathwaite, 452 U.S. 98, 11& S.Ct. 22&3, 53 L.Ed.2d th (1977)

"when the prosecution offers testimony from an eyewitness

to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of an offense,

fundamental fairness requires that the identification

testimony be reliable." The Applicant asserts that the trial court had an independent duty to ensure that the Applicant received a fair trial. The identification of the.Applicant was not merely impermissably suggestive, but clearly coerced and the evidence of the coercion is plainly within the record. For the Trial Eourt to allow such an in-court identification based on misconduct by the State is an abuse of discretion ans a violation of the Applicant's right to due process which caused the Applicant egregious harm. see: Gonzeles v. State, 117 5.w.5d 337 (Tex. Erim.App.ZUU§)

"The trial court has an independant duty to ensure a criminal defendant receives a fair.trial."

The Trial Eourt by adopting the Etate‘s finding of fact and conclusions of law has errouneously and unreasonably ruled on the Applicant's ground concerning the hearsay testimony of Garrett Thomas and Daniel Kingls wife (Antoinette Miller).

ln both instances, the testimony involved what Mr. King said to Mr. Thomas and Ms.'Miller. while the State and the Trial Eourt insist that the hearsay issue was considered and ruled against in the Applicant's direct appeal, this ground in the -Applicant‘s Habeas application involves the fact that the Applicant was unable to cross-examine Mr. King as to his

out of court statements. This is a clear violation of the

confrontation clause. see: Erawford v. washington, 5h1 U.S. 36, 124 s.ct.:135u, L.Ed.zd 177 (200@) l'The confrontation clause applies not only to in-court testimony but also out of court statements introduced at trial. Regardless of admissability under the laws of evidence." '

That this testimony came from Mr. Thomas, who was incarcerated

in the Harris Eounty Jail at the same time as the Applicant,

and Ms. Miller, who admitted to making false statements to the

police because she was made at Mr. King. see: (RR.v.B, pp. 118-

124), and caused the trial judge to have her removed from the

court room, clearly shows the unreliability of such testimony

that was critical to the Applicant's conviction. Bombined with Mr.

King‘s statement that "Bermaine Ehaney had nothing to do with this

crime" presents more than a reasonable probability that had the

Applicant been able to cross-examine Mr. King and had the jury

been aware of Ms. Miller's false statements, the outcome of the

trial would have been different. see: Mason v. Scully§ 16 F.Bd`EB,

42 (2nd cir.zood)

“The assertations accusing the defendant without the testimony of the declarant of the out of court statements, violates the confrontation clause. Since without that testimony, credibility is inevitably suspect, making that evidence unreliable . "

4. The Applicant asserts that the Trial Eourt, by adopting the Btate‘s Finding of Fact and Eonclusions of Law§ allowed facts that are false and not in evidence in the Applcant's case.

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