1 2
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE
7 CHANEL HORNER, 8 CASE NO. 2:24-cv-01488-RSL Plaintiff, 9 v. 10 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO CITY OF SEATTLE; OFFICER ROBERT DISMISS 11 STROZIER; and LINCOLN TOWING ENTERPRISES, INC., 12
13 Defendants. 14
15 This matter comes before the Court on the motion to dismiss filed by defendants 16 City of Seattle and Officer Robert Strozier (Dkt. # 17); plaintiff Chanel Horner’s response 17 (Dkt. # 22); and the reply filed by defendants City of Seattle and Officer Robert Strozier 18 19 (Dkt. # 30). Having reviewed the motions and related declarations (Dkts. # 23, # 24), as 20 well as the record herein, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss as explained below.1 21 I. Background 22 Plaintiff Chanel Horner’s complaint alleges the following facts: In September 2022, 23 plaintiff was “unemployed, financially destitute, and . . . living in her vehicle, a bus.” Dkt. 24 25
26 1 Defendant Lincoln Towing Enterprises, Inc. has not filed a motion to dismiss. Therefore, none of plaintiff’s claims are dismissed as to Lincoln Towing. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 1 # 1-2 at ¶¶ 15–16. Plaintiff’s bus runs only on natural gas. Id. at ¶ 17. “In late August or 2 early September of 2022, Horner learned that on September 15, 2022, the City of Seattle 3 intended to do a sweep of all vehicles parked on the 5000 block of Colorado Avenue 4 5 South, in Seattle, Washington.” Id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff was living on that block, in her bus, 6 during the first half of Sept. 2022 and intended to move her bus prior to the City of 7 Seattle’s “sweep” on Sept. 15, 2022. Id. at ¶¶ 22–23. However, on the evening of Sept. 14, 8 2022, plaintiff discovered that her bus had run out of natural gas. Id. at ¶ 24. 9 10 Early in the morning of Sept. 15, 2022, plaintiff contacted an organization that helps 11 unhoused individuals and asked for help. Id. at ¶ 25. The organization, known as REACH, 12 agreed to send a tow truck to pick up plaintiff’s bus and take it to a nearby compressed 13 natural gas station. Id. at ¶¶ 25–26. Delivery of compressed natural gas “was not possible.” 14 15 Id. Meanwhile, a Seattle Police Department Parking Enforcement Officer, Robert Strozier, 16 “told Horner that a city tow truck was on the way and that if it got there before the private 17 tow truck, the city tow truck was going to tow her bus away.” Id. at ¶ 29. 18 Lincoln Towing is under contract with the City of Seattle to provide vehicle towing 19 services and is “an agent of the City of Seattle.” Id. at ¶ 8. Before any private tow truck 20 21 arrived, a tow truck from Lincoln Towing arrived. Id. at ¶ 23. 22 When the Lincoln Towing tow truck arrived, Horner asked Strozier if he could 23 simply wait for a private tow truck to arrive, or, if he could not do that, if he would direct Lincoln Towing to tow the bus to the nearby compressed gas 24 station. Strozier refused both requests saying that Lincoln Towing had to tow it and that it had to be towed to a Lincoln Towing impound lot. 25 26 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 1 Id. Lincoln Towing impounded plaintiff’s bus and towed it away “[a]t the direction 2 of Officer Strozier.” Id. at ¶ 33. 3 Plaintiff visited three Lincoln Towing impound lots later that day in an effort 4 5 to get her bus back. Id. at ¶ 34. At the first one, plaintiff’s bus was not there and, 6 when plaintiff asked how she could request a hearing to contest the impound, she 7 was told “by a Lincoln Towing employee” that it was too late in the day to do that 8 and the employee did not know how plaintiff could make a hearing request. Id. at 9 10 ¶¶ 35–36. At the second lot, a Lincoln Towing employee told plaintiff that “she did 11 not have a fax machine and could not submit a request for an expedited hearing.” 12 Id. at ¶ 37. At the third lot, plaintiff found her bus and “was told that she could not 13 make any request for an impound hearing because she was not the registered owner 14 15 of the vehicle.” Id. at ¶ 38. 16 “Despite Defendants City’s and Lincoln Towing’s insistence that she was not 17 entitled to any judicial hearing to review the lawfulness of the seizure and impound 18 of her bus, Horner eventually succeeded in obtaining an impound hearing in Seattle 19 Municipal Court.” Id. at ¶ 48. That hearing occurred on April 11, 2023, about seven 20 21 months after the impound. Id. at ¶ 49. By then, plaintiff’s bus had already been 22 returned to plaintiff, having been released to her by Lincoln Towing on Nov. 9, 23 2022, about two months after the impound, at the request of plaintiff’s attorney. Id. 24 at ¶ 39. “When the bus was returned to her, Horner discovered that many items of 25 26 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 3 1 her property had been stolen” and “the bus had been damaged.” Id. at ¶¶ 42–47. At 2 the April 11, 2023 impound hearing: 3 [T]he judge ruled that the impound of Horner’s bus had been “improper.” . . . 4 The court ruled that Officer Strozier “did not consider reasonable alternatives” 5 to an impound, as required by the U.S. Constitution, the Washington State Constitution, and decisions of the Washington Supreme Court. The Court also 6 ruled that a reasonable alternative was in fact “actually available.” Consequently, the court ruled “that the impound was improper and unlawful.” 7
8 Id. at ¶¶ 50 – 51. 9 The record before the Court shows that plaintiff filed suit in King County 10 Superior Court on Sept. 9, 2024, claiming, in ten separate causes of action, that 11 defendants’ impoundment of plaintiff’s bus violated Washington State law and 12 13 deprived plaintiff of her federal and state constitutional rights. Dkt. # 1-2. Plaintiff’s 14 lawsuit also sought to “permanently enjoin Defendants from impounding vehicles 15 when a reasonable alternative to impound exists as required under the Washington 16 State and U.S. Constitutions, except as under such conditions as the Court may 17 18 require.” Id. Plaintiff’s case was removed to this Court on Sept. 18, 2024. Dkt. # 1. 19 II. Discussion 20 A. Pleading Standard Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 21 The question for the Court on a motion to dismiss is whether the facts alleged in the 22 23 complaint sufficiently state a “plausible” ground for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 24 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In the context of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must 25 “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light 26 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 4 1 most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 2 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The Court’s review is generally limited 3 to the contents of the complaint. Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 4 5 1996). “We are not, however, required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits 6 attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that 7 are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” 8 Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). 9 10 To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 11 []Twombly, 550 U.S. [at 570]. A plausible claim includes “factual content 12 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” U.S. v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 13 991 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 14 Under the pleading standards of Rule 8(a)(2), a party must make a “short and 15 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). . . . A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ 16 or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” 17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to 18 defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th 19 Cir. 2004). 20 Benavidez v. Cty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2021). In addition, the 21 22 factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” 23 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 at 555 (2007). Finally, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper 24 “only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to 25 support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 26 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 5 1 B. First Cause of Action: Conversion 2 The parties’ disagreement over this claim is not whether the claim rests on 3 sufficient facts, but instead whether the claim fails as a matter of law. Dkts. # 17 at 11:7; 4 5 # 22 at 9:21; # 30 at 4:14. Plaintiff claims that by impounding her bus, defendants City of 6 Seattle and Robert Strozier “committed the tort of conversion by unjustifiably and willfully 7 interfering with Plaintiff’s possession of her property.” Dkt. # 1-2 at 7:23. Defendants 8 argue that because the impoundment of plaintiff’s bus was authorized under Seattle 9 10 Municipal Code 11.30.60, the impoundment was lawful and therefore cannot constitute 11 conversion. Dkt. # 30 at 6:5–8. See also Judkins v. Sadler-Mac Neil, 61 Wash. 2d 1, 3 12 (1962) (“A conversion is the act of wifully interferring [sic] with any chattel, without 13 lawful justification, whereby any person entitled thereto is deprived of the possession of 14 15 it.”) (emphasis added). 16 Plaintiff’s argument in support of the conversion claim centers on a Seattle 17 Municipal Court judge’s finding that while plaintiff “committed” the parking infraction 18 that triggered the impoundment of her bus under SMC 11.30.60A, the impoundment of 19 plaintiff’s bus was unreasonable. Dkts. # 22 at 10:5; # 23 at 126–127. Plaintiff then argues 20 21 that “binding Washington precedent . . . holds that if an impound is unreasonable then it is 22 per se unconstitutional.” Dkt. # 22 at 10:14–15. Put another way, the legal theory behind 23 plaintiff’s conversion claim is that “the municipal court’s finding of unreasonableness 24 automatically established that the impound of Horner’s bus was unlawful because it did 25 26 not comport with [Washington State] constitutional guarantees” (specifically Wash. Const. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 6 1 art 1, § 7, “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without 2 authority of law”). Id. at 11:12–16. Therefore, “[s]ince the impound was determined to be 3 unlawful, automatically it was also an actionable conversion.” Id. See also Dkt. # 23 at 4 5 123–127 (Seattle Municipal Court judge citing City of Seattle v. Long, 198 Wash.2d 136 6 (2021) and State v. Villela, 194 Wash.2d 451 (2019)).2 7 In Long, the Washington State Supreme Court considered the City of Seattle’s 2016 8 impoundment, also under SMC 11.30.60, of a truck that Steven Gregory Long was living 9 10 in at the time of the impoundment. 198 Wash.2d 136 at 142–3, 156 (2021). In Long, as 11 here, plaintiff did not question the constitutionality of SMC 11.30.60 or the lawfulness of 12 the impound under the terms of SMC 11.30.60. Instead, Mr. Long, like petitioner here, 13 challenged “the city’s failure to consider alternatives to impoundment.” Id. at 156. SMC 14 15 11.30.60 does not require the consideration of alternatives to impoundment. But Mr. Long, 16 like petitioner here, alleged that the failure to consider alternatives to impoundment in the 17 course of the impound made the impound an unreasonable seizure under Wash. Const. art 18 1, § 7. In other words, Mr. Long, like petitioner here, argued that a violation of Wash 19 Const. art 1, § 7 during the process of impoundment can retroactively make an 20 21 impoundment under SMC 11.30.60 unlawful.3 22 23 24
25 2 The transcript of the Seattle Municipal Court hearing that is offered by plaintiff at Dkt. # 23 is incorporated into plaintiff’s complaint by reference. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 26 3 The lead attorney for petitioner in this matter was also the lead attorney in Long. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 7 1 The Long court described a two-step process for determining whether Wash. Const. 2 art 1, § 7 has been violated. Id. at 156. “First, we determine whether the action complained 3 of disturbs one’s private affairs.” Id. Where, as here and in Long, the action does disturb a 4 5 person’s private affairs, “we look to a second inquiry: whether authority of law justifies the 6 intrusion.” Id. “Most relevant to this case,” the Long court stated, “a vehicle may be 7 lawfully impounded in the course of enforcing traffic regulations if the driver committed a 8 traffic offense for which the legislature has expressly authorized impoundment.” Id. at 156 9 10 (citing Villela, 194 Wash.2d 451 at 459 (2019)). The Long court further stated that where 11 “no probable cause exists to seize the vehicle and a reasonable alternative to impoundment 12 exists, it is unreasonable to impound the vehicle.” Id. at 157 (citing Villela, 194 Wash.2d 13 451 at 459 (2019) (emphasis added). Villela, in turn, makes clear that “enforcing traffic 14 15 regulations if the driver committed a traffic offense for which the legislature has expressly 16 authorized impoundment” is equivalent to having probable cause, in the sense that both 17 independently allow a vehicle to be “lawfully impounded.” 194 Wash.2d 451 at 459 18 (2019). Applying the holdings of Long and Villela to the facts of this case, where petitioner 19 does not contest the constitutionality of SMC 11.30.60 or the commission of the traffic 20 21 offense that triggered impoundment of her bus under SMC 11.30.60, the Court finds that 22 petitioner’s bus was “lawfully impounded” and that “authority of law justifie[d] the 23 intrusion” into petitioner’s rights under Wash. Const. art. 1, § 7.4 Long, 198 Wash.2d 136 24 25 4 Petitioner and defendants disagree as to whether lawfulness and reasonableness are “separate” inquiries in the 26 context of a vehicle impound. See Dkts. # 17 at 13:3; # 22 at 12. But in arguing that lawfulness and reasonableness are not “separate” inquiries, and that unreasonableness under Wash. Const. art. 1, § 7 “automatically” establishes the ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 8 1 at 156 (2021) (citing Villela, 194 Wash.2d 451 at 459 (2019)). To the extent that the 2 Seattle Municipal Court judge in this matter viewed the holdings of Long and Villela 3 differently, that view is not binding on this Court on a motion to dismiss arising out of the 4 5 present complaint.5 6 Given this Court’s finding that the impound here was lawful, plaintiff 6 cannot pursue a conversion claim. Id. See also Potter v. Washington State Patrol, 165 7 Wash.2d 67, 75, 69 (2008) (conversion claim allowed for unlawful impound where state 8 impound policy “exceeded the agency’s statutory authority”); Est. of Rogers by & through 9 10 11 unlawfulness of an otherwise lawful impound, petitioner incompletely quotes Villela. Dkt. # 22 at 10:14–16. Petitioner 12 presents the “binding” holding of Villela as being that if “a reasonable alternative to impound exists, then it is unreasonable to impound a citizen’s vehicle.” Id. In fact, the full sentence from Villela reads as follows: “However, if 13 there is no probable cause to seize the vehicle and a reasonable alternative to impound exists, then it is unreasonable to impound a citizen’s vehicle.” 194 Wash.2d 451 at 459 (2019) (quoting State v. Tyler, 177 Wash.2d 690, 698 (2013)). 14 The full sentence shows Villela is contrasting situations in which “there is no probable cause” with Villela’s immediately preceding discussion of situations in which “[a] vehicle may be lawfully impounded”—including “in the 15 course of enforcing traffic regulations if the driver committed a traffic offense for which the legislature has expressly authorized impoundment.” Id. The Long court restated this holding. 198 Wash.2d 136 at 157 (2021) (citing Villela, 16 194 Wash.2d 451 at 459 (2019)). Therefore, the issue here is not whether lawfulness and reasonableness are separate inquiries. The issue here is that under Long and Villela, the reasonableness inquiry only comes up “if there is no 17 probable cause to seize the vehicle.” 198 Wash.2d 136 at 157 (2021); 194 Wash.2d 451 at 459 (2019). As already discussed, Villela makes clear that “enforcing traffic regulations” that result in an impound is like having probable 18 cause in the criminal context, in that both scenarios allow the vehicle to be “lawfully impounded” without considering whether “a reasonable alternative to impoundment exists.” 194 Wash.2d 451 at 459 (2019) (quoting State v. Tyler, 177 Wash.2d 690, 698 (2013)). 19 5 Plaintiff is incorrect that in this proceeding the Court must take as true “the municipal court’s determination that 20 the impoundment was unreasonable.” Dkt. # 22 at 10:5–6. Plaintiff is also incorrect that defendants conceded as much. Id. What defendants actually stated is correct: “At this stage the Court must take as true that the Municipal 21 Court found the impoundment of Plaintiff’s vehicle to be unreasonable . . . .” Dkt. # 17 at 13:5–6. The fact of the municipal court’s finding does not constrain this Court’s independent judgment as to whether plaintiff has presented a 22 cognizable legal theory for the conversion claim presented in this matter. Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 23 6 Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not relevant here. See Dkt. # 22 at 4 n.3 (arguing that “[t]he municipal court’s determination that the impound was unlawful cannot be relitigated in this 24 court.”). As discussed above, the issue here is whether plaintiff committed a traffic offense for which a legislative body “expressly authorized impoundment.” Long, 198 Wash.2d 136 at 156 (2021) (citing Villela, 194 Wash.2d 451 at 25 459 (2019)). If so, plaintiff’s bus was “lawfully impounded.” Id. The Seattle Municipal Court judge found plaintiff “committed” the underlying violation of SMC 11.72.330 that triggered the impound of plaintiff’s bus under SMC 26 11.30.60A. Dkt. # 23 at 126–127. That decision by the Seattle Municipal Court judge is not being relitigated here, making the doctrine of collateral estoppel irrelevant to this Court’s analysis of plaintiff’s first cause of action. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 9 1 Cullen v. State, 200 Wash. App. 1066, *5 (2017) (conversion claim not allowed where 2 impound pursuant to unchallenged state statute “was lawful.”). 3 The legal theory behind plaintiff’s conversion claim therefore fails because, 4 5 contrary to plaintiff’s argument, any unreasonableness in the impoundment of plaintiff’s 6 bus does not “automatically” establish that the impoundment was unlawful in these 7 circumstances, where “authority of law justifie[d] the intrusion” into petitioner’s rights 8 under Wash. Const. art. 1, § 7. Dkt. # 22 at11:12–16. See also Long, 198 Wash.2d 136 at 9 10 156 (2021) (citing Villela, 194 Wash.2d 451 at 459 (2019)); SMC 11.30.60. As a result, 11 the Court will dismiss plaintiff’s conversion claim because it lacks a “cognizable legal 12 theory.” Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 13 C. Second and Third Causes of Action: Deprivation of Right to be Free 14 15 from Warrantless and Unreasonable Seizures Under the Fourth 16 Amendment 17 Although plaintiff’s complaint does not state that her claimed violations of the 18 United States Constitution are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 19 Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), plaintiff’s response to defendants’ motion to dismiss appears 20 21 to confirm that plaintiff is bringing Monell claims under Section 1983. See Dkts. #1; # 17 22 at 14; # 22 at 21:13–14. Therefore, the Court will analyze plaintiff’s second and third 23 causes of action, as well as plaintiff’s other claims of federal constitutional violations, as 24 being brought under Section 1983 and Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 25 26 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 10 1 Cities may be held liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations committed by their officers. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. To establish such 2 liability, Plaintiffs must prove “(1) [they were] deprived of a constitutional 3 right; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate indifference to [their] constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving 4 force behind the constitutional violation.” Lockett v. County of Los Angeles, 5 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020). A municipal policy can be, among other things, “a failure to train [or] supervise.” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa 6 Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2019).
7 Jones v. City of N. Las Vegas, 150 F.4th 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2025). On the second 8 and third causes of action, plaintiff contends that defendants “deprived Plaintiff of 9 10 her Fourth Amendment right” to be free from warrantless and unreasonable seizures 11 “by seizing her vehicular home.” Dkt. # 1-2 at 8. 12 1. The City of Seattle’s Policy or Lack Thereof 13 Defendants argue that these and all of plaintiff’s other claims of federal 14 15 constitutional violations must be dismissed as a matter of law as to the City of 16 Seattle “because there is not a single allegation contained in the complaint that 17 Officer’s Strozier’s decision to impound Plaintiff’s vehicle was performed pursuant 18 to an unconstitutional City policy, and there is no allegation that the City made a 19 deliberate or conscious choice not to train its officers.” Dkt. # 30 at 13:17–20. See 20 21 also Jones, 150 F.4th 1030 at 1039 (9th Cir. 2025). While there is no question that 22 the impound of plaintiff’s bus constituted a seizure “within the meaning of the 23 Fourth Amendment,” Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 863 (9th Cir. 24 2005), upon review of plaintiff’s complaint, the Court agrees with defendants that 25 26 the complaint lacks any allegation that the impound was performed pursuant to a ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 11 1 City of Seattle policy or was caused by a lack of City of Seattle policy. Dkt. # 1-2. 2 “In this circuit, a claim of municipal liability under section 1983 is sufficient to 3 withstand a motion to dismiss ‘even if the claim is based on nothing more than a 4 5 bare allegation that the individual officers’ conduct conformed to official policy, 6 custom, or practice.’” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 7 624 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th 8 Cir.1986)). Here, even in places in plaintiff’s complaint where an allegation of that 9 10 sort would logically arise (such as Dkt. # 1-2 at ¶¶ 29, 31, 32), the complaint does 11 not include any allegation, bare or otherwise, that Officer Strozier’s challenged 12 actions conformed to a City of Seattle policy, custom, or practice—or were caused 13 by the lack of a policy. Dkt. # 1-2. Plaintiff does offer some allegations concerning 14 15 City of Seattle policy in her response to the present motion to dismiss, stating that 16 testimony at the impound hearing showed “the City did not have a standardized or 17 uniform policy of refusing to wait past 9 a.m. for a privately arranged tow truck to 18 arrive,” Dkt. # 22 at 15:13–15, and that Seattle’s failure to have a policy to guide 19 officer discretion as to when to impound a vehicle “violated Horner’s Fourth 20 21 Amendment rights” because “[i]f Seattle had had a similar policy, then presumably 22 Officer Strozier would have followed it and no violation of the Fourth Amendment 23 would ever have occurred,” Dkt. # 22 at 21:1–12. But in plaintiff’s complaint there 24 is no similar argument, much less any “bare allegation” along these lines. Karim- 25 26 Panahi, 839 F.2d 621 at 624 (9th Cir. 1988). On a motion to dismiss, the Court’s ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 12 1 review is generally limited to the contents of the complaint. Campanelli v. 2 Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996). Therefore, as to the City of Seattle 3 the Court will dismiss plaintiff’s second and third causes of action as a matter of 4 5 law. Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 6 2. Qualified Immunity 7 As to Officer Strozier, defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims of warrantless and 8 unreasonable seizure, and all of plaintiff’s other claims of federal constitutional violations, 9 10 must be dismissed under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Dkt. # 17 at 21:13. “Qualified 11 immunity balances two important interests––the need to hold public officials accountable 12 when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, 13 distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Martinez v. City of 14 15 Clovis, 943 F.3d 1260, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 2019). 16 [O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of 17 their conduct was “clearly established at the time.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 18 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012). “Clearly established” means that, at the time of the officer's conduct, the law was “ ‘sufficiently 19 clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would understand that what he is doing’ ” is unlawful. al–Kidd, supra, at 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Anderson v. 20 Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). In 21 other words, existing law must have placed the constitutionality of the officer’s conduct “beyond debate.” al–Kidd, supra, at 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074. 22 This demanding standard protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those 23 who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). 24 D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018). Here, plaintiff argues that the applicable 25 26 Fourth Amendment principles were clearly established at the time Officer Strozier ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 13 1 impounded plaintiff’s bus. Dkt. # 22 at 19:1. Further, plaintiff argues that “Seattle 2 has clearly been aware of these principles since the Price district court denied its 3 motion for summary judgment in a class action case challenging car impounds 4 5 nearly 20 years ago.” Id. at 19:22–25 (citing Price v. City of Seattle, No. C03- 6 1365P, 2005 WL 1189585, at *2, 4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 1, 2005)). 7 The relevant holding of Price does not support plaintiff’s argument that the 8 unlawfulness of Officer Strozier’s conduct in impounding plaintiff’s bus was clearly 9 10 established. 11 The decision to impound a car “must meet the strictures of the Fourth Amendment,” which requires that the impound must be reasonable. U.S. v. 12 Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir.1996). Outside of criminal investigations, 13 the police may reasonably impound a car when necessary for “community caretaking” purposes, such as protecting public safety and providing for the 14 efficient movement of traffic if the car is creating a traffic hazzard or to prevent 15 theft of abandoned cars. “The authority of the police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and 16 convenience is beyond challenge.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 17 368-69, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976).
18 Price, No. C03-1365P, 2005 WL 1189585, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 1, 2005). 19 Plaintiff’s bus was parked on a public street, “the 5000 block of Colorado Avenue 20 21 South, in Seattle, Washington.” Dkt. # 1-2 at ¶¶ 20, 22. Attached to plaintiff’s 22 complaint is a Seattle Municipal Court judgment from plaintiff’s April 11, 2023, 23 impound hearing finding that plaintiff committed the underlying violation of SMC 24 11.72.330 (parking in violation of posted signs) that triggered the impound of 25 26 plaintiff’s bus under SMC 11.30.60A. Dkt. # 1-2 at 14. See also Dkt. # 23 at 126– ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 14 1 127. Plaintiff’s complaint does not contest that her bus was parked in violation of 2 posted signs. Dkt. # 1-2. As Price stated, “The authority of the police to seize and 3 remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and 4 5 convenience is beyond challenge.” No. C03-1365P, 2005 WL 1189585, at *2 (W.D. 6 Wash. Mar. 1, 2005) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69 7 (1976)). 8 It is true that “[a] seizure conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable 9 10 under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and 11 well delineated exceptions,” and that under the “community caretaking” exception, 12 the fact that an impoundment was conducted pursuant to a city ordinance “does not, 13 in and of itself, determine the reasonableness of the seizure under the Fourth 14 15 Amendment . . . .” Miranda, 429 F.3d 858 at 862, 864 (9th Cir. 2005). Based on 16 this, plaintiff argues that Officer Strozier’s conduct was unreasonable in that Officer 17 Strozier “refused to wait” for the arrival of a tow truck hired by a third party. Dkt. 18 # 1-2 at 2:23.7 However, plaintiff’s complaint also alleges that Officer Strozier 19 suggested that if the privately hired tow truck got there before the city-contracted 20 21 22 7 Plaintiff’s claim that defendants City of Seattle and Officer Strozier also engaged in an “unreasonably prolonged 23 seizure” by holding plaintiff’s vehicle for fifty-five days after the impoundment, Dkt. # 22 at 18, fails because the facts plausibly alleged by plaintiff only support the reasonable inference that Lincoln Towing held plaintiff’s vehicle 24 for fifty-five days after the impoundment. Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged any non-conclusory facts that would support a reasonable inference that the City of Seattle or Officer Strozier were participants in the decision to hold 25 plaintiff’s vehicle at Lincoln Towing’s impound lot for fifty-five days after impoundment. Dkt. # 1-2. Therefore, as to the claim of “unreasonably prolonged seizure” against defendants City of Seattle and Officer Strozier, plaintiff has not 26 sufficiently alleged an actual violation of a constitutional right under either the Monell test or the qualified immunity test. See Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018). ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 15 1 tow truck, then the privately hired tow truck could take plaintiff’s bus. Id. at ¶ 29. In 2 the end, the city-contracted tow truck arrived first and Officer Strozier chose not to 3 wait for the privately hired tow truck. Id. at ¶¶ 32, 33. Thus, the particular 4 5 circumstances of this case involve a specific question concerning reasonableness: 6 When (1) a vehicle that a person is living in is parked in violation of a city traffic 7 regulation, (2) impoundment of that vehicle is a legal consequence of violating the 8 city traffic regulation, and (3) the person living in the vehicle states that a tow truck 9 10 hired by a third party is coming at some point in the future, is it unreasonable for a 11 city parking enforcement officer to decline to wait for the privately hired tow truck 12 to arrive before impounding the vehicle? The cases cited by plaintiff do not answer 13 this specific question, and they certainly do not establish a legal principal that 14 15 “clearly prohibit[ed] the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before 16 him.” Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 at 63 (2018). See Dkt. # 30 at 11:16–12:4. 17 In Miranda, the court found that under the “special circumstances” of that 18 case, which involved a car parked in its owner’s driveway, the power to seize 19 vehicles under the “community caretaking” doctrine did not apply. 429 F.3d 858 at 20 21 860 (9th Cir. 2005). But here, unlike Miranda, plaintiff’s bus was parked on a 22 public street in violation of the Seattle Municipal Code. Dkt. # 1-2 at ¶¶ 20, 22. See 23 also Dkt. # 23 at 126–127. As the Miranda court made clear, where the purpose of 24 an impoundment is to “remove a vehicle left in a public location where it creates a 25 26 hazard,” that impoundment it proper. Id. at 865 n.6. See also id. at 864 (“In their ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 16 1 ‘community caretaking’ function, police officers may impound vehicles that 2 ‘jeopardize public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.’”) (citing 3 Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368–69 (1976)). Accord U.S. v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 4 5 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2012). On the reasonableness issue, in Colorado v. Bertine the 6 Court made clear that in the Fourth Amendment context, the reasonableness of a 7 government activity “does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of 8 alternative ‘less intrusive’ means.” 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987) (quoting Illinois v. 9 10 Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983)). The Mirdanda court restated that particular 11 holding from Bertine as follows: “An officer, acting within the scope of his or her 12 community care-taking function, is not required to consider ‘the existence of 13 alternative less intrusive means’ when the vehicle must in fact be moved to avoid 14 15 the creation of a hazard or the continued unlawful operation of the vehicle.” 429 16 F.3d 858 at 865 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff argues that here, the reasonableness of 17 the impoundment of plaintiff’s bus should indeed turn on the existence of 18 alternative, less-intrusive means. Dkt. # 22 at 13:23–14:3. 19 The facts plead [sic] here show that if Officer Strozier had simply agreed to 20 wait for the privately arranged tow truck, the private tow would have arrived 21 and Horner’s bus would have been removed from the street block to be cleaned long before Strozier’s regular shift ended. Thus, Strozier’s insistence on 22 impounding Horner’s bus served no conceivable purpose and therefore it 23 violated the Fourth Amendment.
24 Id. Plaintiff’s argument thus returns us to the specific question raised by the 25 particular circumstances of this case: When (1) a vehicle that a person is living in is 26 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 17 1 parked in violation of a city traffic regulation, (2) impoundment of that vehicle is a 2 legal consequence of violating the city traffic regulation, and (3) the person living 3 in the vehicle states that a tow truck hired by a third party is coming at some point 4 5 in the future, is it unreasonable for a city parking enforcement officer to decline to 6 wait for the privately hired tow truck to arrive before impounding the vehicle? 7 Without minimizing the importance of that question, the Court finds that the 8 answer is not, and was not at the time, “clearly established” by any caselaw cited by 9 10 plaintiff. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 at 63–64 (2018). What was—and is—clearly 11 established is that where an officer is impounding a vehicle pursuant to law and a 12 reasonable belief that the vehicle poses a hazard, that officer is not required to 13 consider alternative, less-intrusive means to impoundment (including the alternative 14 15 means available here: waiting for the arrival of a private tow truck hired by a third 16 party). Miranda, 429 F.3d 858 at 865 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005). Therefore, as a matter of 17 law, Officier Strozier is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s second and 18 third causes of action, and as a result plaintiff’s second and third causes of action 19 will be dismissed as to Officer Strozier. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 at 63–64 (2018); 20 21 Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Below, the Court will analyze the 22 additional claims of qualified immunity in the context of other causes of action. 23 D. Fourth Cause of Action: Wash. Const. art. 1, § 7 24 “Washington courts have consistently rejected invitations to establish a cause of 25 26 action for damages based upon constitutional violations ‘without the aid of augmentative ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 18 1 legislation [.]’ Blinka v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 109 Wash. App. 575, 591 (2001). In 2 plaintiff’s response, she makes clear that this cause of action under Wash. Const. art. 1, § 7 3 is intertwined with her first cause of action, the conversion claim. Dkt. # 22 at 24:20. For 4 5 the reasons explained supra (II.B), the Court will be dismissing plaintiff’s conversion 6 claim. Plaintiff has provided no argument or authority in support of this Court creating a 7 cause of action based upon violations of Wash. Const. art. 1, § 7, and in any event 8 invitations of that sort have been “consistently rejected” by Washington State courts. 9 10 Blinka, 109 Wash. App. 575 at 591 (2001). Therefore, the Court will dismiss plaintiff’s 11 fourth cause of action because it lacks a “cognizable legal theory.” Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 12 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 13 E. Fifth Cause of Action: Deprivation of Eighth Amendment Right to be 14 15 Free from Excessive Fines 16 Plaintiff claims that defendants “violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be 17 free from Excessive Fines by impounding and withholding her home.” Dkt. # 1-2 at 8. But 18 Plaintiff does not plead that she was forced to pay any fine at all as a result of the 19 impoundment. Dkt. # 1-2. See U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327–28 (1998) (fine 20 21 means “payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense.”). Defendants state that 22 “when Plaintiff prevailed at her impound hearing, she was no longer liable for the storage 23 and towing fees, and the City assumed liability.” Dkt. # 17 at 20:14–15. Plaintiff does not 24 contest this. Dkt. # 22. See also Dkt. # 23 at 129 (Seattle Municipal Court judge waiving 25 26 $47 payment owed by plaintiff). Thus, plaintiff has not demonstrated a violation of her ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 19 1 Eighth Amendment rights.8 That means the issue of Officer Strozier’s qualified immunity 2 is moot as to this claim. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018). Therefore, plaintiff’s fifth 3 cause of action will be dismissed with prejudice as to defendants City of Seattle and 4 5 Officer Robert Strozier due to “an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a 6 cognizable legal theory.” Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 7 F. Sixth Cause of Action: Wash. Const. art. 1, § 14 8 Plaintiff claims that defendants “deprived Plaintiff of her article 1, section 14 right 9 10 to be free from Excessive Fines by impounding and withholding her home.” Dkt. # 1-2 at 11 8. Given that the language of Wash. Const. art. 1, § 14 “is identical to” the language of 12 U.S. Const. amend. VIII, the Washington State Supreme Court has held that the two 13 provisions are “coextensive for the purposes of excessive fines.” Long, 198 Wash.2d 136 14 15 at 158–59 (2021). As the Long court further explained, the excessive fines clause “limits 16 the government’s power to extract payments.” Id. (quoting Austin v. United States, 509 17 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993). A qualifying fine is “a payment to a sovereign as punishment for 18 some offense.” Id. (quoting Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 at 327–28 (1998)). Thus, for the 19 reasons already stated, see supra (II.E), plaintiff’s sixth cause will be dismissed with 20 21 prejudice as to defendants City of Seattle and Officer Robert Strozier due to “an absence of 22 23 24
25 8 As to the City of Seattle, for the reasons discussed supra (II.C.1), plaintiff’s allegation of an Eighth Amendment violation fails for an additional reason: plaintiff’s complaint offers no allegation, “bare” or otherwise, that defendants’ 26 alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment occurred pursuant to a City of Seattle policy or was caused by a lack of City of Seattle policy. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d 621 at 624 (9th Cir. 1988); Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 20 1 sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 2 (9th Cir. 2001). 3 G. Seventh Cause of Action: Deprivation of State and Federal 4 5 Constitutional Due Process 6 Plaintiff claims defendants City of Seattle and Lincoln Towing “violated Plaintiff’s 7 Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process by denying her a prompt post- 8 seizure hearing which she was entitled to under both state and federal constitutional law.” 9 10 Dkt. # 1-2 at 9. 11 1. Federal Constitutional Due Process 12 As discussed supra (II.C.1), plaintiff’s allegation of a violation of her federal 13 constitutional due process rights fails because plaintiff’s complaint offers no allegation, 14 15 “bare” or otherwise, that defendants’ alleged violation of her federal constitutional due 16 process rights occurred pursuant to a City of Seattle policy or was caused by a lack of City 17 of Seattle policy. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d 621 at 624 (9th Cir. 1988); Monell, 436 U.S. 18 658 (1978). Even so, the Court notes that plaintiff’s complaint also contains no allegation 19 that defendant City of Seattle told plaintiff she was not entitled to a prompt post-seizure 20 21 hearing to challenge the impoundment of her vehicle—other than the complaint’s merely 22 conclusory description of “Defendant City’s and Lincoln Towing’s” alleged “insistence 23 that she was not entitled to any judicial hearing . . . .” Dkt. #1-2 at ¶ 48. See Daniels-Hall 24 v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). Beyond that conclusory allegation, 25 26 the complaint fails to otherwise allege that the City of Seattle caused plaintiff’s post- ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 21 1 seizure hearing to occur seven months after plaintiff’s vehicle was impounded. Dkt. # 1-2. 2 The complaint does allege that two employees of defendant Lincoln Towing did not help 3 plaintiff initiate a request for a hearing and that, at one Lincoln Towing impound lot, 4 5 plaintiff was told she could not make a hearing request because she was not the registered 6 owner of the vehicle. Dkt. # 1-2 at ¶¶ 36–38. The complaint also alleges that Lincoln 7 Towing is the City of Seattle’s “agent” for towing services, id. at ¶¶ 2, 8, but the complaint 8 does not allege that Lincoln Towing is the City of Seattle’s agent for the purpose of 9 10 arranging post-seizure hearings. The Seattle Municipal Code provides for post-seizure 11 hearings within two days of receipt of a written request. SMC 11.30.120.D. See Lone Star 12 Sec. & Video, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 584 F.3d 1232, 1237 (9th Cir. 2009) (enacting 13 and publishing a statute is sufficient notice for the purposes of procedural due process) 14 15 (citing United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 108 (1985)). Therefore, plaintiff’s federal 16 procedural due process claim against the City of Seattle fails under Monell, 436 U.S. 658 17 (1978); fails to breach Officer Strozier’s qualified immunity under Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 18 62–63 (2018); and shall be dismissed for lack of “sufficient facts alleged to support a 19 cognizable legal theory.” Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 20 21 2. State Constitutional Due Process 22 “Washington’s due process clause does not afford a broader due process protection 23 than the Fourteenth Amendment.” In re Dyer, 143 Wash. 2d 384, 394 (2001) (citing State 24 v. Ortiz, 119 Wash.2d 294 (1992)). Plaintiff does not argue otherwise, nor does plaintiff 25 26 offer any Washington State authorities in support of her state constitutional due process ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 22 1 claim. Dkt. # 22 at 21:15–22:6. Therefore, for the above-explained reasons concerning the 2 factual allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, see supra (II.G.1), plaintiff’s state procedural 3 due process claim fails for lack of “sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal 4 5 theory.” Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 6 Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action is therefore dismissed as to defendants City of 7 Seattle and Officer Strozier. 8 H. Eighth Cause of Action: Violation of Homestead Act 9 10 Plaintiff claims defendants City of Seattle and Lincoln Towing “violated the 11 Washington Homestead Act by attaching her home as security for an impound debt and 12 threatening a forced sale of her vehicle home in violation of the Washington Constitution, 13 article XIX, § 1 and RCW 6.13.070.” Dkt. # 1-2 at 9. While plaintiff’s bus likely qualifies 14 15 as a homestead under the facts pled in plaintiff’s complaint, what triggers application of 16 the Homestead Act is an attempt to collect on a debt. Long, 198 Wash.2d 136 at 147, 152 17 (2021) (“The homestead act operates as a shield to protect against creditors’ actions; it is 18 not a sword to prevent such actions in the first instance.”). Here, as in Long, there is no 19 allegation of an attempt to collect on a debt owed by plaintiff (nor could there be, since, as 20 21 discussed above, plaintiff does not owe any debt). Id. See also Dkt. # 1-2. Nor do the facts 22 pled in plaintiff’s complaint plausibly allege an “attachment” that would trigger 23 application of the Homestead Act. “Attachment” is “the physical ‘seizing of . . . property 24 to secure a judgment or to be sold in satisfaction of a judgment.” Long, 198 Wash.2d 136 25 26 at 152 (2021) (quoting Blacks Law Dictionary 157 (11th ed. 2019)). Even taking as true ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 23 1 plaintiff’s claim that the impoundment led to the attachment of plaintiff’s home “as 2 security for an impound debt,” that attachment would have occurred after the 3 impoundment, and thus could not be the reason for the impoundment. See Dkt. # 17 at 4 5 9:8–10. Thus, “the homestead act’s protections do not apply” to plaintiff on the facts pled 6 in her complaint. Long, 198 Wash.2d 136 at 152 (2021). Therefore, plaintiff’s eighth cause 7 will be dismissed with prejudice as to defendant City of Seattle due to “an absence of 8 sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 9 10 (9th Cir. 2001).9 11 I. Ninth Cause of Action: Consumer Protection Act 12 This claim was brought only against defendants City of Seattle and Lincoln 13 Towing. Plaintiff, in her response, “acknowledges that the City of Seattle is not a ‘person’ 14 15 for the purposes of the CPA and thus cannot be sued for violating the Act.” Dkt. # 22 at 16 24:17–19. Therefore, the Court will grant defendant City of Seattle’s motion to dismiss 17 this claim with prejudice. Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 18 J. Tenth Cause of Action: Negligence 19 Plaintiff claims that when her vehicle was in the “sole possession” of defendants 20 21 City of Seattle and Lincoln Towing, those defendants “negligently failed to exercise 22 reasonable care to protect plaintiff’s property from theft and damage, and that negligent 23 failure was the proximate cause of the theft of her property and of damage to her 24 25 9 In plaintiff’s response she alleges some sort of conspiracy, perhaps to violate the Homestead Act or perhaps to 26 violate a common law prohibition on damaging another person’s business. Dkt. # 22 at 23:11–24:12. These causes of action do not appear in plaintiff’s complaint, Dkt. # 1-2, and therefore will not be considered. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 24 1 property.” Dkt. #1-2 at 10. Setting aside the question of how the City of Seattle and 2 Lincoln Towing could each be in “sole possession” of plaintiff’s vehicle, Dkt. # 17 at 3 23:22–24:1, plaintiff’s complaint does not state any facts that plausibly allege the City of 4 5 Seattle was in “sole possession” of plaintiff’s bus when the alleged theft and damage to 6 plaintiff’s bus occurred. See Dkt. # 1-2 at ¶¶ 32–47. Although plaintiff’s complaint does 7 allege that Lincoln Towing “contracts with the City of Seattle to provide vehicle towing 8 services, and is an agent of the City of Seattle,” Dkt. # 1-2 at ¶ 8, the complaint does not 9 10 allege that Lincoln Towing was acting as the City of Seattle’s agent during the time 11 plaintiff’s bus was being held at Lincoln Towing’s impound lot. Plaintiff’s response to the 12 motion to dismiss makes no agency argument at all as it relates to negligence. Dkt. # 22 at 13 22:7–23:2. In addition, plaintiff’s contention that the City of Seattle was in sole possession 14 15 of her bus under the theory of “constructive bailment,” Dkt. # 22 at 22–23, cites no 16 Washington State law and instead relies solely on out-of-state decisions from state courts 17 in Illinois, South Carolina, and Florida. Those out-of-state decisions do not support 18 plaintiff’s argument that under the particular facts of this case the City of Seattle is a 19 constructive bailee.10 Thus, although plaintiff argues that these out-of-state authorities 20 21 22 10 See Am. Ambassador Cas. Co. v. City of Chicago, 205 Ill. App. 3d 879, 882–83 (1990) (finding the City of 23 Chicago was a constructive bailee where the Chicago Police Department impounded a car, kept the car under its “exclusive control” at the police department’s impound lot, and during that time the car was “stolen from the 24 department’s lot.”) (italics added); Hadfield v. Gilchrist, 343 S.C. 88, 102 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding that a tow company operator, not the City of Charleston, was a constructive bailee where his towing company, acting pursuant to 25 a City of Charleston ordinance, impounded plaintiff’s car); People v. Andrews, 6 Cal. App. 3d 428, 433 (Ct. App. 1970) (stating, in regard to the validity of inventory searches, that upon the impoundment of a vehicle the police 26 “undoubtedly become ‘an involuntary bailee of the property and responsible for the vehicle and its contents,’” but not discussing a factual scenario similar to the one alleged here). ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 25 1 show that police “and/or” a private towing company can become constructive bailees, Dkt. 2 # 22 at 22:19–23:2, when applied to the facts of this case none of plaintiff’s out-of-state 3 authorities actually supports the police “and” a private towing company proposition. 4 5 Therefore, plaintiff’s tenth cause of action will be dismissed as to defendant City of 6 Seattle. Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 7 K. Eleventh Cause of Action: Request for Permanent Injunction 8 Plaintiff requests that this Court permanently enjoin the City of Seattle and Lincoln 9 10 Towing from engaging in the rights violations alleged in the above causes of action. 11 Because causes of action one through ten have already been dismissed, this cause of action 12 will be dismissed as well. 13 III. Conclusion 14 15 For all the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss filed by 16 defendants City of Seattle and Officer Robert Strozier (Dkt. # 17). Plaintiff’s motion for 17 partial summary judgment (Dkt. # 25) and motion to lift stay (Dkt. # 35) are therefore 18 STRICKEN as MOOT. 19 As to the causes of action that have not been dismissed with prejudice, if plaintiff 20 21 and her counsel believe they can, consistent with their Rule 11 obligations, remedy the 22 deficiencies identified in this Order, they may file a motion for leave to amend that 23 complies with LCR 15 within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. 24
25 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 26 1
2 Dated this 6th day of May, 2026.
5 Robert S. Lasnik 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 27